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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation

I

examine the use of transcendental

arguments for the refutation of epistemological solipsism,
the
view that we can never know with certainty that objective

par-

ticulars exist.

In the first chapter

explain and motivate

I

epistemological solipsism by comparing it with other forms

of

epistemological skepticism, and by explicating the central notions of certainty and objective particularity.

various procedural assumptions which

I

I

also specify

adopt in deference to

the skeptic.
In the second chapter

I

develop and evaluate Strawson's

influential anti-skeptical arguments and the allegedly transcendental method which they instantiate.

I

argue that his

project is defective in detail and in principle, offering no

redemptive attraction for the purposes at hand.
In the third chapter

I

consider supplementary anti-skep-

tical resources, including paradigm case arguments, non-vacuous

contrast arguments, verif icationist arguments, extensions of
Strawsonian-type arguments, and arguments from self-ref utation.
I

argue that none of these methods succeeds in refuting epis-

temological solipsism.
In the final chapter, after drawing together the results
of chapters I-III,

and exposing the defects of further exten-

sions of Strawsonian argument -- what

priority arguments' --

I

I

call

'

cross-categorial

provide a partial account of a more

promising, Kantian transcendental method.

I

develop this

V

account by critically assessing several accounts of Kantian
method explicitly preferred in the recent literature.
arp;ue

I

that my account escapes each of the difficulties which

burden the alternatives, and conclude that my version of
Kantian transcendental argument offers genuine promise for

refuting epistemological solipsism.
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CHAPTER

I

THE PROBLEM: EPISTEMOLOGICAL SOLIPSISM
AND PHILOSOPHICAL CERTAINTY
In "this dissertation

scendental argument

—

I

shall examine the use of tran-

argument which elicits the analytic

implications of the indubitable fact that an act of judg-

mental consciousness is occurring -- for the refutation of
that version of epistemological skepticism which states that
we can never know for certain that objective particulars -re identifiable, existentially and attributively independent

particulars

—

exist.

It is my thesis that various influ-

ential, alleged instances of Kantian transcendental method,

even when maximally supplemented by other anti-skeptical
resources, fail to meet this skeptical challenge, but that
a more faithfully Kantian transcendental argument offers

unique promise in conclusively discrediting the skeptical

thesis on its own terms.
In this chapter

I

shall explain and motivate the skep-

tical problem with which

I

am concerned, explicate the cen-

tral notions of philosophical certainty and objective par-

ticularity, and set forth ground rules and procedural assumptions which any adequate solution to the problem must satisfy.

I

The version of skepticism with which

I

am concerned,

that we can never know for certain that objective particulars

2

exist, will be referred to as
•epistemological solipsism.

-1

Epistemological solipsism is more
restricted than the
distinct forms of skepticism which

state that we can know

nothing for certain, that we can
justifiably believe nothing,
and that we can never justifiably
believe that objective
particulars exist.

The refutation of epistemological
solip-

sism entails the refutation of these
other skeptical positions, but not conversely.
There may be alternative methods
for refuting these more radical forms of
skepticism.
It

may be that skepticism with regard to everything
is successfully impugned by so-called 'argument from self
-ref utation'

or

argument from self -referential inconsistency* of the

sort found in Aristotle, Husserl, and others,^

And doubts

about justified belief in objective particulars may perhaps
be dispelled by the sorts of inferences to the best
scien-

tific explanation found in Michael Slote's recent book,^

But there are good reasons,

I

shall argue, for believing

that there is only one viable approach to the refutation of

epistemological solipsism.
The epistemological solipsist is a theoretical skeptic.
He is a participant in the philosophical debate who puts

forth the cognitively significant claim that it is possible
to know with certainty all there is to know about subjective

experience without knowing with certainty anything about the

external world.

He is unlike the classical Pyrrhonist as

3

interpreted via Sextus by Arne Naess. ^ who asserts
nothing,
does not in principle reject any certainties, but
merely

conveys that as things seem to him personally, no
argument
for or against any proposition is sufficiently
strong
to

compel acceptance or rejection.

This Pyrrhonist's announce-

ments do not function cognitively, and his complete suspension of judgment is to be explained genetically, not Epis-

temologically.

Since he holds no views, his skepticism is

ad hoc, raising counterarguments to whatever is affirmed.

In contrast, our theoretical skeptic affirms and attempts

to justify some propositions.

Consequently, if doubting a

proposition entails withholding belief both from that proposition and its negation, we should dissociate the notions
of skepticism and doubt.

The skeptic need not be a doubter?

dubitability is not doubtfulness.

One can be persuaded to

accept a proposition, yet question the adequacy or reliability of the evidence that could be offered to justify that

proposition.

Persuasion is not adequate evidence.

It may be that action or behavior implies propositional

belief, so that Naess' Pyrrhonism is impossible.

implication does not hold, then
Pyrrhonist.

I

But if the

wish simply to ignore the

The best a philosopher can do is defeat all

possible participants in a dispute.

forever silent menace.

He need not fear a

Philosophers with epistemological
proclivities as
different as the Cartesian Prichard and
anti-Cartesian
Wittgenstein have argued that doubting
one thing requires
being certain of something else.^ This
may mean either
that only certainties can render other
propositions dubious, or that some propositions or
other must be certainties
if any propositions are to be dubitable.
On the first interpretation. the requirement is obviously false.
So long as
we are not justified in believing the negation
of a proposition. that proposition may be used to cast doubt
on another

proposition.^

Not all propositions whose negations we

are not justified in believing are certainties.

all legitimate doubt-makers are certainties.

Hence, not
On the second

interpretation, the requirement rules out the radical form
of skepticism which states that nothing is certain, and

may be defensible.

But there remains the still weaker

demand that one can doubt a belief only in light of other,
at least tentatively accepted, beliefs."^

This refusal to

countenance the possibility of universal and systematic
doubt does not explicitly require that there be any certainties at all.

However, neither this nor the previous require-

ment poses a threat to the non-radical, theoretical skeptic
I

have, been describing.

He can accept them both.

We further delineate epistemological solipsism by noting

that its challenge is not the challenge of discovering necessary

5

and sufficient conditions for establishing
the truth of

particular objective beliefs.

There are well-rehearsed

skeptical arguments designed to show that we
can never know
for certain, at any given time, that what
we take to be an
objective particular is an objective
particular, that
per-

ceptual judgments are corrigible, that people
who make perceptual knowledge -claims are fallible. After
all.

the skeptic

argues, there is an epistemological gap between
representa-

tions and the non-representational independent reality
one

purports to represent; claims about subjective states
and

claims about objective particulars are on different episte-

mological levels.

But all the evidence for our beliefs must

be drawn from states of ourselves; subjective propositions

are the basic justificatory premises.

Consequently, our

knowledge of objective particulars depends entirely on these

subjective states.

So unless some inferential principle

could be validated which would warrant the move from subjective to objective propositions, we could never know any

objective propositions to be true.
,

All deductive principles of evidence can be shown to

be defective by showing the evidence presumed sufficient

for establishing the existence of some objective particular
is consistent with its non-existence.

Since the experiences

of someone who has a true perceptual belief about an objective

particular may be exactly duplicated by the experiences of
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someone else whose perceptual belief is
exactly similar but
false, whether the relation between
experiences and belief
is a one-one or many-one relation, it
is always logically
possible that our perceptual beliefs about
objective particulars are false. But we cannot be mistaken
about that

which we know for certain.

Hence, we can never know for

certain that beliefs about objective particulars are
true.
The relation between subjective and objective
propositions
is not deductive.

Classical inductive or experimental inference, even if
legitimate, could not be used to justify objective proposi-

tions in the needed way.

By hypothesis, we cannot per-

ceive the objective particulars, and so cannot check for

constant conjunction between subjective data and objective
particulars.

0

Further, since there can be no discernible

difference between the content of consciousness in the
cases of veridical and illusory perception, from the content
or nature of individual perceptions we can infer nothing

about relations among perceptions or relations among perceptions and, if there be such, non-perceptions.

So one can

never tell, in a given case, whether one is perceiving objective particulars merely on the basis of inspection of

one's subjective states.

Still further, inductive inference

fails to guarantee preservation of certainty.

But again,

all the evidence for our beliefs must be drawn from certainly

.
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known subjective states.

Hence, the relation between
sub-

jective and objective propositions
is not classically inductive

Our knowledge of objective
particulars depends entirely on subjective experience,
but the relation is neither
deductive nor classically inductive.
So unless there are
certainty-preserving, valid, non-deductive
inferences other
than classical induction, there is
no justification for the
certainty of our beliefs about objective
particulars.
This line of argument may seem vulnerable
at several
points.
First, it is controversial whether there
can be no
discernible difference between the content
of consciousness
in the cases of veridical and illusory
perception. For example, Lewis held that the sense meaning
of an objective

belief, or non-terminating judgment, the
experiential criteria
of its application to reality, consists in
the (infinite) set
of direct empirical findings, presentations
immediately given

in experience (terminating judgments), implied as
probable

under specifiable conditions of presentation and action.^

In

an effort to save this brand of linguistic phenomenalism
from
the argument from perceptual relativity, whose central proposi-

tion is that there are logically possible conditions of observation under which any statement which refers only to the immedi-

ately given would be false even though a particular objective
statement were true, Lewis argued that a perceptual presentation

8

often contains clues to the conditions of
observation affecting it.
Delusion is possible, but frequently we can
detect
illusion.
By taking into account distorting conditions
as
they are reflected in experience, and
appealing to the relativization of probabilities to the premises from
which they
are determined, Lewis claims to allow for
the relativity of
sense perception. 10
,

But unless we grant the implausible sup-

position that it is logically impossible for there to
be any

distorting condition which is not reflected in immediate
experience (so that we can unfailingly safeguard our non-termi-

nating judgments by incorporating all distorting conditions
into the antecedents of our terminating judgments), we must

admit that the degree of reliability of the connection between

presentations and objective particulars is never sufficient
for theoretical certainty, which is what the skeptical argu-

ment demands.

Lewis himself explicitly denies that justified

perceptual judgments are instances of theoretical certainty,
though he thinks perhaps they are practically certain, so that
we may act upon them without hesitation.
of Lewis'

Hence, the truth

position does not entail the unsoundness of the

skeptical argument just presented.
Second, there do seem to be several valid forms of inductive

(non-deductive

)

inference, valid argument -forms in which the

conjunction of the premises and the negation of the conclusion
does not imply a contradiction, other than classical induction.

1

?
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The development of theories of
rational belief and evidential

support suggest that exclusive use of
enumerative inductive
generalization, of both categorical and
statistical form,
eliminative induction, and analogical
inference, is unjustifiably restrictive. For example,
Kneale presents a theory of
responsible evaluation of evidence, in which
probabilif ioation' denotes the fundamental relation,
admitting of degrees
from rendering a proposition practically
certain to barely
more than probabilifying the negation of
the proposition.^^
•

In this theory of rational belief, probability
is not quantitative at all, and cannot be incorporated into
a formal cal-

cuius.

Along

"thcs©

general lines, Chisholm develops in detail

a theory of evidential support.

Beginning with the undefined

concept of epistemic preferability, governed by six axioms,
he outlines an epistemic logic in which the notions of reason-

able belief and gratuitous belief, favorable presumption and

lack of it, acceptability and unacceptability, and other derivative notions, are defined and interrelated.

In turn, vari-

ous 'conferring relations’ between propositions,

(inductive

and deductive) evidence-, reasonability-, acceptability-,

unacceptability-, and gratuitousness-conferring relations,

may be defined.

Then, moving from epistemic logic to epistem-

ology, he formulates epistemic rules or principles describing

sufficient conditions under which a proposition (or ordered

)
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pair of propositions, for the appropriate concepts) may be
said to have the properties, or stand in the relations,

previously defined.

15

A proper subset of these principles is concerned with

justifying propositions about objective particulars on the

basis

of

states.

propositions about subjective
In

*

(

'

self -presenting*

On the Nature of Empirical Evidence,' Chisholm

acknowledges Heidelberger*

s

successful criticism of these

principles as originally formulated in Theory of Knowledge
and attempts to revise them.^^

I

.

am not here concerned to

independently assess these reformulated principles.

Suffice

it to say that for Chisholm the acceptability of some of

these principles is conditional upon the untenability of
the sort of skepticism embodied in the lately sketched argu-

ment.

He argues that the spontaneous act of taking something

to have a certain sensible characteristic confers not only

reasonability, but evidence, upon the proposition that one
does in fact perceive something to have that characteristic,
or else skepticism with respect to our perception of the ex-

ternal world is true

17
.

But he admits that our takings can

be false, that is, we can be mistaken, so that although

takings provide a criterion of evidence, it is not a logically
sure criterion for distinguishing veridical from illusory

perception.^®

In effect, this is to assent to what, since

Hume, has been usually taken for granted, that no form of
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induction (non-deduction) yields absolute
certainty, but only
a lower or higher degree of probability
in its conclusions.
jj* we accept the skeptic's
presupposed requirement of
absolute certainty, the success of
Chisholm's

program, like
that of Lewis', fails to entail the
falsity of skepticism.
Of course, the tenability of such
theories of evidential
support remains an interesting and
important problem, and if
the demands of the traditional skeptic
are rejected as unacceptably stringent, perhaps the only problem
in this area
worth trying to solve. But if we can defend
a distinction
between practical and metaphysical certainty,
and then pose
our anti-skeptical task in terms of
metaphysical certainty,
these other enterprises will be inadequate
to our purposes.

But our moral is not just that moral certainty
falls

short of philosophic certainty, but that discovering a
criterion of truth for objective beliefs is not required
for the

refutation of epistemological solipsism.

The criteriological

problem, first raised in theological disputes between the

Church and Reformers, where the reliability of Papal authority
and appeal to scripture was challenged, was soon raised with

respect to natural knowledge, and precipitated the skeptical
crisis in modern philosophy.

Montaigne's revival of the

arguments of Sextus Empiricus evoked attempts at reinforce.

ment, mitigation or accon^dation, or refutation, as traced

by Popkin, from Descartes, Gassendi, Mersenne

,

Pascal, Bayle,

and Hume, as well as less familiar yet influential men such
as Charron, Chanet, Huet, and Campanella.
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The criteriological problem
Is not ours.

Each perceptionbased Objective knowledge-claim
may be nnverif iable so that
at no specified time can we know
with certainty that the claim
,

is true.

This is compatible with the
falsity of epistemological
solipsism.
I only want to evaluate
the success of transcendental argument in showing that we
can know with certainty that
objective particulars exist, so
that the skeptical thesis which
denies this is false. Whether
transcendental argument can
succeed in the face of the concessions
I make and procedural
assumptions I adopt in deference to the
skeptic in section IV
of this chapter, awaits further
consideration.
The purpose
of this section was to explain that
epistemological solipsism
is a non-radical, theoretical skepticism
about the possibility
of knowing with certainty that any
objective particulars exist

at all.

II

I

want to assess the prospects of transcendental argument

for establishing the thesis that we can know with certainty
that objective particulars exist.

arise immediately.

Two preliminary questions

What exactly does 'certainty* mean here?

What exactly does 'objective particular' mean?

I

shall con-

sider the nature of certainty first.
I

begin by listing several conditions of adequacy for

the explication of philosophical certainty.

If p is a con-

dition of adequacy for a proposed explication of a concept

C,
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then any explication of c which
entails not-p must be rejected.
My list of adequacy conditions for
the explication of philosophical certainty is intended to
capture those general beliefs about certainty shared by the
disputants in the controversy over epistemological solipsism,
so long as those beliefs
are mutually consistent.
Specifically, i shall elicit a set
of demands from Descartes, who
paradigmatically posed our
skeptical problem, and accept it.
In addition to being general,
these demands are not intended to be
jointly exhaustive. Consequently, we should not be tempted to
propose the conjunction
of adequacy conditions as the explication
itself.

Our first condition states that certainty is
not an in-

trinsic property of propositions, but is a relation
between
a person or persons, a proposition or set of
propositions,

and a time or set of times.

Descartes insists on this point

in several places in his reply to Bourdin’s
objections (the

seventh set), in which he complains that his critic 'treats

doubtfulness and certainty not as relations of our thought to
objects, but as properties of the objects and as inhering in

them eternally.

The consequence is that nothing we have once

learned to be doubtful can ever be rendered certain.

consequence is that a given proposition is (or

is not)

Another

certain

for anyone who entertains it, regardless of his evidence.

Very

many arguments in Descartes rightly depend upon treating certainty as a relation of the sort described.
Our second condition of adequacy states that a person may

,
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at a time be certain about a logically
contingent proposition.
Certainties need not be necessary truths.
As Descartes argues,
the logically contingent propositions.
'I
think’ and ’i exist.’

are certainties for me whenever

I

pronounce them or mentally

conceive them.
Our third condition of adequacy states the
converse of
the second: Necessary truths need not be
certainties.

Other-

wise. Descartes could not have been, and the
atheist geometer

could not remain, uncertain about the truths of
mathematics?
and each person, regardless of his evidence and skills
at
proof, would be equally certain of all the necessary truths
he entertained.^^

Fourth, the concept of certainty relevant to epistemolo-

gical solipsism is an epistemic. normative concept.

The term

'certain* may have purely descriptive force in some contexts,

but it has some standard-setting, evaluative force in the context of the Cartesian problem.

Therefore, any analysis on

which certainty is not a concept of epistemic appraisal

is

unacceptable
Fifth, no satisfactory analysis of certainty should imply

that all certainties must be inferentially justifiable.

The

possibility that there are propositions which are certain for
a man at a time, even though there is no available premise-

set containing other propositions which are certain and es-

sential to their derivation, should not be ruled out.

Des-

cartes held that intuition and deduction were the only two

15

routes to knowledge with certainty, and that
deduction is
based on self-evident intuition.
And it may

be that ad-

mission of self- justifying or 'intuitive* certainties
is
required to avoid the dilemma that all justification
is

either viciously regressive or circular.

But even if not,

we legitimately insist on retaining our fifth condition,
since

we do not want adequacy conditions which beg detailed
ques-

tions of analysis.

Following what
of Descartes,

I

I

believe to be the correct interpretation

want to sustain a distinction between knowing

and knowing with certainty.

Therefore,

I

lay down a sixth

condition of adequacy for the explication of philosophical
certainty which states that knowledge does not imply certainty.
In reply to the second set of objections, Descartes allows that
the atheist geometer can know that the three angles of a tri-

angle are equal to two right angles, but denies that such

knowledge is knowledge with certainty (constitutes true
science), since it can be rendered dubious. 23

Again in reply

to the sixth set of objections, he grants the atheist knowledge,

but denies that it is 'immutable and certain.

Descartes'

various remarks distinguishing the requirements of the search
for truth and the practical activities of life, where the

moral mode of knowing suffices for the regulation of life,
but falls short of the metaphysical mode of knowing, can plausi-

bly be construed as supporting the distinction between 'ordinary knowledge' and metaphysical knowledge or knowledge with

I

certainty.

This distinction will he defended
further as

the analysis proceeds.

What about the converse of the sixth
condition? If certainty does entail knowledge, then, since
knowledge entails
truth, certainty entails truth.
If certainty does not entail
knowledge, then we do not establish that
we know something
with certainty merely by showing that it
is certain for us.
An additional burden is thereby imposed on
our anti-skeptical
task.

But

I

see no justification for endorsing a condition

which either entails or precludes a knowledge- or
truthentailing analysis of philosophical certainty. We
should
refrain from anticipating the status of these
entailments.
I

propose the foregoing six conditions as criteria of

adequacy for the explication of certainty relevant to the
problem of epistemological solipsism.

No satisfactory account

of certainty entails that certainty is an intrinsic property
of propositions,

that all certainties are logically necessary,

that all necessities are certainties, that ascriptions of

certainty lack all force of epistemic appraisal, that all
certainties must be inf erentially justifiable, or that knowledge implies certainty.

Descartes' most frequently enunciated account of cer-

tainty (indubitability ) in terms of irrevisability satisfies
these criteria.

In the Discourse he resolves to accept only

what he 'could have no occasion to doubt,' carefully reflecting
'in each matter that came before me

(him) as to anything which

*
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could make it subject to suspicion
or doubt... '26
M editation s his announced goal is
to establish a -firm and
permanent structure in the sciences.'
which requires that he
withhold any opinion which -might even
in a small degree be

invalidated by reasons.- and hence not be
certain and indubitable. 27 He begins The Principles
with the recommendation
•to doubt all things in which the
slightest trace of incertitude can be found.- suggesting that
it is -useful to reject
as false all (these) things as to which
we can imagine
the

least doubt to exist. -28

m

The Search after Truth he strives

to attain knowledge -solid and certain
enough to deserve the
name of science ...- 29 jr, other places he
states that the

atheist's knowledge 'is not immutable and certain;'
it is
subject to metaphysical, hyperbolical doubt, which can be

caused by 'the very least ground of suspicion,' lacking that

metaphysical certainty which 'all the most extravagant suppositions brought forward by the skeptics were incapable of
shaking.

Descartes is demanding that no proposition be accepted
into the body of philosophical and scientific theory unless
the evidence for it satisfies his rule of clarity and dis-

tinctness,

Following Frankfurt, we may say that a proposition

p is clearly perceived by a person S if S recognizes that

his evidential basis for p excludes all reasonable grounds

for doubting it.

P is distinctly perceived by S if S under-

stands what is and what is not entailed by the evidential

18

basis which renders p clearly perceived.
A person cannot regard a belief
as altogether solid and
permanent if his basis for belief
is compatible with a suffi-

cient basis for giving it up.

As long as it is conceivable

for circumstances to arise in which,
given the basis he already
has for accepting a belief, it would
nevertheless be reasonable
for him to reject it. then the belief
does not provide him
with an absolutely secure foundation
on which to build.
Foundational propositions must be acceptable
without
risks there

must be no chance that additional
evidence will ever make it
reasonable for a person to abandon them.
But when a person
bases his acceptance of a belief on a clear
and distinct
perception, he recognizes that he cannot consistently

conceive

reasonable grounds for doubting that belief,

since he cannot

intelligibly forsee any circumstances that would impugn
his
belief, he is justified in regarding the belief as
unshakably
solid and permanent.

Goodman seems to be affirming Descartes' irrevisability

condition for certainty when he says that

'I

cannot be said

to be certain about what occurs at a given moment, even at

that moment, if

I

may justifiably change my mind about it at

a later moment.

So we might say that p is certain for S

at t only if it is impossible that there is a time

than

t,

t'

,

later

such that S reasonably doubts that p is true at t'.

To avoid the psychological nuances sometimes associated with
the notion of doubt,

let us explicitly define 'S doubts p at

t'

19

as -S withholds
p or believes not-p at t.

that p is irrevisable for
S at
possible that there is a

f

t

if.

•

Then we can say

and only if. ft is

i„,.

later than t such that s
is war-

ranted in withholding
p or believing not-p at f. and that
irrevisability is a necessary
condition of certainty.
If p is a certainty for S
at t,

it is impossible that

further tests on p-might yield
results which warrant s-s retraction of p.
such irretractability would be
guaranteed if
no new evidence for
p will ever become available for S since
the current evidence is
exhaustive or

complete, or if no other

proposition could ever be better
justified for anyone than
p
IS for S at t. since the
evidential warrant for p is maximal.
But irrevisable propositions need be
neither exhaustively nor
maximally evidenced.
In fact, the irrevisability condition
does not even require that the
credibility of p be undiminishable in light of new information we
might conceivably
have

about the future.

It does not require that no amount of
new

negative evidence can count against it to
the slightest degree.
If p is irrevisable for S at t. not-p cannot
become warranted

for

3.

Therefore, there is no conceivable event such that
if

S were justified at t in believing that it will
occur after t,

not-p would thereby become warranted for S at

t.

And if p is

irrevisable, the evidence for not-p can never counterbalance
the evidence for p (for S), for then S would be
warranted in

withholding

p.

But the evidence for p could become less, so

long as the loss was insufficient to make
p unwarranted.

Hence,

20

certainties need not be ivory-tower
propositions whose evidencebases remain fixed,
it is just that their
evidence-bases are
sufficient to rule out the
possibility of subsequent overthrow.
For this reason they can provide
abiding foundations for our
©difice of true science.
But to better understand the
irrevisability condition,
note that it is stronger than
the condition definitive of
what
Malcolm has called the ’strong'
sense of knowledge.
Malcolm
says, ’When I use ’know’ in the
strong sense I am not prepared
to look upon anything as an
investigation I do not concede
that anything whatsoever could
prove me mistaken! I do not
regard the matter as open to any
question I do not admit
that my proposition could turn out
to be false, that any
future investigation could refute it
or cast doubt on it. ’33
But it becomes clear that all this
describes the speaker’s
.

;

attitude towards his proposition, what the
speaker

would be prepared to admit at the time
of statement.

’It

does not prophesy what my attitude would
be if various things
happened. ’3^^ The irrevisability condition
further demands
the constancy of my rational attitude at
all future times.

Elsewhere, Malcolm denies that if at any time there
should be a reasonable doubt that a proposition is true,
then
at no previous time did anyone make absolutely certain
that
it is true, 35

in an article otherwise critical of Malcolm,

Frankfurt concurs, remarking that statements concerning ancient
history for which we have meager evidence may once have been
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conclusively established 36
.

But this counterexample works

only because the formulation
of the principle fails to
relativize certainty to persons
or evidence -bases, as any
respectable formulation should.
By relativizing to stock of
evidence, we come up with
a principle which Frankfurt
later affirms, namely that if
at any time there should be a
reasonable doubt that a proposition is true, then at no previous
time did anyone make
absolutely certain that it is true,
provided that the evidence
possessed at the later time includes
all the evidence possessed at the earlier time. Evidence
is conclusive when
it is sufficient to justify the
conclusion based on it no

matter what further information is obtained.

And this is

the irrevisability condition.
Now,

intuitive certainties or self justif iers aside,
-

if irrevisability is necessary for certainty,
and if only

deductive justifications can be conclusive, then
it would
seem that a proposition can be philosophically
certain only
if it is entailed by its evidence.

its evidence,

If it is not entailed by

it is possible to conceive circumstances in

which, this evidence notwithstanding, it would be
reasonable
to regard the proposition as false.

And this is the skeptic's

gambit when he spins tales of contravention of natural law,

mysterious causal efficacy, and so on.

That such doubts are

impractical is confessed, but irrelevant to Cartesian,

theoretical certainty.
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If there are theoretical certainties,
we can see how,

supposing knowledge to be something like
justified, true
belief, there is something different from
and epistemically
preferable to knowledge.
Irrevisability provides an important
gain for knowledge with certainty. A man may
justifiably
believe what is true (and the relation between
his evidence
and belief be non-accidental -- or whatever
fourth condition
is needed to complete the analysis of knowledge)
at a given

time and so know that truth at that time, but
then later, due
to changes in his evidence base, lose his
justification and
so his claim to knowledge.

Consequently, this ordinary kind

of knowledge cannot make the sciences 'secure and
lasting.'

But for certainties, no future event could possibly dispel

their justification; they fulfill the Cartesian ideal of permanency.

Hence, even as a practical matter, knowledge with

certainty is more desirable than ordinary knowledge.
It may be objected that if a man's evidence for a pro-

position at a time is really sufficient, then the introduction
of no amount of additional evidence bearing on the proposition

could result in his loss of warrant.

Given the meaning many

contemporary epistemologists place on 'sufficient,' this is
plainly false.

On the other hand,

some philosophers have

proposed as a fourth condition of knowledge an 'indefeasibility'

requirement which is reminiscent of Cartesian irrevisability.^'^
Defeasible justification is justification insufficient
for knowing.

The problem is providing a non-trivial analysis
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of defeasibility in terms
of which we can define
a suitable
notion of indefeasibility. We
cannot say that the justification of p by e is defeasible
if, and only if, e
justifies

some falsehood f, since an
irrelevant part of
f

without defeating p

support

-

e

may mislead about

e
f

might justify

but reliably

so we want to say that the
justification of p
by e IS defeasible if, and
only if, e justifies some
falsehood
f which is relevant to
the justification of p.
One attempt
to capture this relevance
condition states that the justifip.

cation of p by

e

is defeasible if,

and only if, there is some

true proposition g, such that e&g
does not justify p. An
inference is not defeated merely by
the presence of false
premises, but rather by the fact that
if these false assumptions are replaced with their true
negations, the conclusion
no longer follows.
On this account, a justit-ation can be

defeated by any statement that can be added
to a given person's
knowledge, that is, by any true statement,
and not only by
s tatsmeirts

actually known by

"the

person,

Lehrer and Paxson have shown that this account
is too
strong.
Suppose S sees the familiar Tom Grabit stealing a
book from the library. But suppose further
that, unbeknownst
to S, Tom's mother has sworn that on the day
in question, Tom

was out of town, but that Tom's identical twin brother,
John,

was in the library.

Suppose Tom's mother is a compulsive

liar, John is a fiction of her demented mind, and
Tom did
oo

take the book.

According to the account under examination.
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since adding the mother's sworn
testimony to the original
evidence results in an inadeWely
justified belief. S's
justification for believing that
Tom stole the book is defeasible, so that S does not know
that Tom stole the book.
But S does know that Tom stole
the book.

Curiously, in a later article Lehrer
proposes an account
of indefeasibility which is
equivalent to
the one

just refuted.

He claims that if S is justified
in believing p on the basis
of e, the justification is
indefeasible if, and only if, for

any false proposition f, S is completely
justified in believing
p on the basis of the conjunction of e and the
assumption that
f IS false -- s would be completely
justified in believing p
on the basis of e even if he assumed
any further true proposition.

Hilpinen traces other abortive attempts at
revision.

But what the issue boils down to for our
purposes is whether

knowledge is ’extendable,' whether, if

basis of

e,

S

knows that p on the

then, for any true proposition g, S would be
com-

pletely justified in believing that
p even if he knew that
If knowledge is extendable

,

g.

then the above extendability

thesis is a condition of adequacy for the explication of de-

feasibility (and so indefeasibility).

Lehrer'

s

analysis

satisfied the extendability thesis but was shown to be too
strong.

Now Hilpinen argues as follows: Since the extenda-

bility thesis does not entail Lehrer'

s

analysis -- it requires

only that no true proposition would make p unjustified if S
”” we should try to formulate an explication of

s
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indefeasibility which is weaker than
Lehrer's yet satisfies
extendability.
Such a formulation is this; If
s is completely
justified in believing that
p on the basis of e,
the justi-

fication is indefeasible if, and
only if, for any true proposition g, s would be completely
justified in believing that
P even if he were completely justified
in believing that g.^1
Hilpinen goes on to’ claim that his
definition is not equivalent to Lehrer’s, that the extendability
thesis
does not

entail Lehrer’s analysis, and that
the extendability thesis
does entail his own analysis.
The extendability thesis says that
justification would
be preserved even if the man
acquired new knowledge.

Hilpinen’

indefeasibility condition says that justification
would be
preserved even if the man acquired new,

justified true beliefs.

Lehrer’s indefeasibility condition says that
justification would
be preserved even if (for the sake of argument)
some additional
truth were assumed. Hilpinen is right in arguing
that
his

analysis is not equivalent to Lehrer’s, and that extendability
does entail his analysis.

But he is wrong to say that exten-

dability does not entail Lehrer’s analysis.
be

If

I

would still

justified in believing a proposition on the basis of specified

evidence, even if

then

I

I

were to come to know other propositions,

would still be justified in believing that proposition

on that original evidence, even if

further truths.

I

were merely to assume some

’No true proposition makes p unjustified’

entails ’No known proposition makes p unjustified,’ but not
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conversely.

To conclude from this that extendability
does

not entail Lehrer's analysis is to confuse two
categorical
assertions with their corresponding subjunctive
conditionals.
For notice that if we improperly render the
subjunctive formulations of extendability and Hilpinen's thesis
as categorical
claims, since ’No known proposition makes
p unjustified* fails
to entail 'no justified true proposition makes
p unjustified,'
we cannot say that extendability entails Hilpinen's
condition
e

ither.
The upshot is this.

The extendability thesis entails

both Lehrer's and Hilpinen's versions of the indefeasibility
requirement.

Lehrer's condition was shown to be unnecessary

for knowledge (in the ordinary sense).

And, by the way, since

the Grabit counterexample succeeds in refuting Hilpinen's

analysis as well, Hilpinen's condition is unnecessary for
knowledge.

Since the extendability thesis entails propositions

whose truth is not a necessary condition of knowledge, the
truth of the extendability thesis is not a necessary condition
of knowledge.

And the ultimate upshot is this.

Although

ordinary knowledge need not be extendable, knowledge with

certainty must be extendable, since certainty implies irrevisability, and irrevisability implies extendability.

Con-

sequently, we have sustained the legitimacy of the ordinary

knowledge --knowledge with certainty distinction.

Knowledge

with certainty is irrevisable.
Very many philosophers would say that if certainty implies
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immunity from subsequent revision, then
nothing (synthetic)
IS certain for anybody.
Instance Scheffler's remark that
certainty 'imports the notion of fixity,
a freedom from
error and consequent revision, which
cannot be defended for
it is nowhere to be found. '^3
Peirce may be interpreted
as holding the following view.^^ There
are three senses of
knowledge.'
Relative to the body of presently available
information and our current conceptual framework,
knowledge
is the opinion we are fully authorized
in asserting, which

we do not and cannot really doubt on the
available evidence.

(Compare Rorty's definition that 'S believes incorrigibly

that p at

t

if and only if (i) s believes that
p at t, and

(ii) There are no accepted procedures by applying
which it

would be rational to come to believe that not-p, given
S's

belief that p at t,' and his various recent endorsements of
historicism.^3)

q^II this 'knowledge]^.'

Relative to the

complete body of information and the final conceptual framework, knowledge is the final and irreversible compulsory

belief destined to be agreed upon by the community of scientific inquirers.

Call this

'

knowledge^

.
'

Knowledge^ is the

opinion which is absolutely certain, which 'completely corresponds' with reality.

Since we cannot be absolutely certain

that we have attained to the final opinion on any given matter,
we must assume that whatever we are authorized in asserting
is subject to future possible impeachment.

We cannot profess

knowledge 2 s-i'though we know^ that such knowledge must obtain

•
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oner or later.

Final,

irreversible opinion is different

from absolute certainty.

Knowled^j can never be

had. but
only approached indefinitely
as one would a mathematical
limit.
I choose these two
philosophers as examples because
both, though one in confusion
and the other in recognition
Of distinctness, use
the notion of immunity from
error as
well as that of immunity from
revision.
And Descartes himself
seems occasionally to slip
into this confusion, as when
he

says.

-More especially did

I

reflect in each matter that came

before me as to anything which
could make it subject to suspicion or doubt, and give occasion
for mistake
Others,
such as Lewis and Malcolm, urge
that what is essential to
certainties is that they cannot be
mistaken; but here again,
as Firth persuasively argues, they
seem to mean unfalsif iable
not 'unmistakable.'^*^
•

,

Still, one might argue that Cartesian
certainty requires
the impossibility of being mistaken.

Now this may mean either

that it IS impossible for a person both
to certainly know something yet be mistaken about it, that knowing
with certainty
entails not being mistaken, or that knowing with
certainty
entails the impossibility of being mistaken.
The first reading is equivalent to the claim that if a
man both knows with

certainty and believes a proposition, then that
proposition
is true,

or,

given that certain knowledge entails belief, that

certain knowledge entails true belief.

But this does nothing

to distinguish knowing from knowing with certainty.

The
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second reading is equivalent
to the claim that if a
person
knows a proposition with
certainty, the propositions truth
is entailed by the fact
that he believes
it.

After all, doubt is possible
if error is possible.
Error is false belief. So error
is possible whenever believing
does not entail truth. Hence,
since a certain or indubitable
proposition is one About which the
possibility of error is
excluded, a proposition is
certain only if believing
it logi-

cally implies its truth.
And there is no non-logical way
of excluding the possibility Of error. Checking against
error cannot eliminate the
possibility of error, since, as Hume
noted, every act of
checking can itself be in error.
Each new test has its
own presumptions.
Further, there are conceivably possibilities
of error of which I am ignorant and
so cannot check against.
So if a judgment is logically bound to
succeed, its truth
must follows from the circumstance of its
being made.
On the unmistakability requirement, there
is no possible

world in which the allegedly certain proposition
is believed
yet false.
It does not imply that there is no possible
world
in which the proposition is false.

As adequacy condition (2)

tells us, certainties need not be necessary
truths.

Note

further that unmistakability is not a sufficient
condition
of certainty.

condition.

All necessary truths satisfy the unmistakability

But adequacy condition (3) states that not all

necessary truths need be certainties.
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As

I

shall argue shortly,

I

do not think that unmistaka-

bility is a necessary condition of
Cartesian certainty either.
But the anti-skeptical demand that truth
be entailed by believing
(or variations on this theme, such
as truth being entailed by
doubting, or understanding) is ^rirna
facie logically coherent,
and should not be merely laughed out
of court.

Danto has belabored

i:he

For example,

scope ambiguity and consequent scope

fallacy in the move from 'necessarily, if
s knows, then he is
not in error,' to 'if s knows, then necessarily
he is not in
error,' and accordingly cavalierly relieved us of

the onus of

isolating a class of Cartesian indubitables

me^
sick.

is

argument by comparison.
Yet

I

If

I

.

His only argu -

am healthy,

am human, and can be sick.

I

cannot be

But the issue is

whether the proposed analogues are relevantly similar.

To

infer the necessity of the consequent from the necessity of
the consequence is fallacious, but what reason do we have for

thinking this the sole attempted justification for the Cartesian enterprise?
Some other philosophers who have engaged in the Cartesian

enterprise seem to have understood philosophical certainty
as requiring some sort of maximal warrant or minimal dubi-

tability.

Russell held that a proposition is certain only

if it is as indubitable as any other proposition,

so that if

one proposition is for some reason more dubitable than another,
the first is not certain.
a notion when he defines the

Chisholm has employed such
'evident'

(which he uses in a
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preferred analysis of knowledge)
as 'that which it is more
reasonable to believe than
withhold and which is such
that
there is nothing else more
reasonable to believe. *32
The notion of minimal
dubitability or maximal warrant
may be explicated in various
non-equivalent ways, depending
on the classes of comparison
to which one appeals. 53
That is,

various definitions

'of

maximal warrant can be formulated
by

changing the range of the three
variables of persons, propositions, and times, which must
be
included in virtue of

adequacy condition (1),

por example, we might say that a
man S is maximally warranted in
believing a proposition

p

at a time t if, and only if.

for S at

t as p

(a)

p has at least as much warrant

ever has for anyone who asserts
p; or, some-

what stronger, (b) it is unimaginable
that p would have more
warrant for someone asserting it than it
has for S at t; or,
still stronger, (c) it is unimaginable
that any proposition
would have more warrant for anyone than
has for
p

S at t.

On analyses (a) and (b), maximal warrant
fails to coin-

cide with minimal dubitability, as understood
by Russell and
others.
(a) and (b) are too weak.
They are satisfied if p
has no (imaginable) warrant for anyone at any
time.

other hand, it may seem that (c) is too strong.

On the

For example.

Unger uses the slightly stronger notion that a
proposition
is certain for a man only if it is impossible
for there to

be anything of which he is more certain to try to
prove that

nothing is certain.

To determine the status of (c), as well
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as the previously discussed
unmistakability condition, we
must determine the
entail.ent-relations between these
two
notions and that of irrevisability.
Restating the conditions as explicitly as
possibles
P

it^t^'Tff
3'

’

maximally warranted for

®uoh that

p'

S

is more warranted for

Unmistakability
p is unmistakable for S at t
xt IS impossible ) that
S believes p at fand'p
L^filse.
(

(Irrevisability)

p is irrevisable for S at t i-f-F
that the
exists a f later thin t
such^that°S^i's^®
"" withholding p or believing
tha^ not!p ai

p

If each of these conditions
were held only to be necessary

conditions of certainty, then all
that is required is that
they be mutually compatible,
which apparently they are. There
need be no entailment-relations
between them. But. if any
one is held to be sufficient
for certainty, then it must entail the others (if they truly be

necessary).

As regards the necessary conditions
of certainty,

argued only in favor of irrevisability.

I

I

have

now affirm the

sufficiency of irrevisability for certainty.

Irrevisability

satisfies the six conditions of adequacy for
the explication
of philosophical certainty.
It is the only extensively documented account discoverable in Descartes.
It is strong enough
to entail extendability strong (Lehrer's)
indefeasibility,
,

and any other requirement of 'conclusiveness’
of justification. 55

Yet it is not so strong as to require utterly
exhaustive or

complete, undiminishable evidence, which seems to be
a fiction.
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irrevisability is necessary and
sufficient for certainty.
In our initial discussion
of irrevisability we
claimed that
a sufficient reason for
irrevisability was maximal warrant.
Maximal warrant does entail
irrevisability,
,

and so is a suf-

ficient condition Of certainty.

The proof is as follows.

Suppose that p is maximally
warranted.
is distinct from the
proposition p.

The proposition not-p

if p is maximally warranted,

then it is unimaginable
that there exists a pf and s- such
that p- is more warranted for
S' at f.
If p were revisable.
If p could be warrantedly
withheld or disbelieved by s in
light of future evidence, then
the evidence for not-p is
stronger than or equal to the
evidence for p. But then
p
would not be maximally warranted.
Hence, revisability entails
not maximally warranted. Hence,
maximal warrant entails
irrevisability.
,

,

It may be counterargued that all
maximal warrant says
is that it is unimaginable that
there exists some proposition

distinct from p which is more warranted
than p for S at some
given time t.
Now the irrevisability condition would
be false
if

(A)

there exists a proposition distinct from
p which is

more warranted than p for S at some later
time

f

.

It is

possible that both maximal warrant and (A)
are true.
Therefore, maximal warrant does not entail
irrevisability.
The dispute rests on the reading of
'unimaginable.'
it means

If

'unimaginable for S at t,' then the conjunction of

maximal warrant and (A) is possible, simply because

S can
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forget his original evidence
and later be rationally
persuaded
to accept not-p.
On the other hand,
if -unimaginable, means
un infiaginstbX© for*
r srivonp
4-v>
anyone,
the impartial
•

m

•

•

sense used by

Philosophers, then the
derivation of irrevisability
from maximal warrant succeeds,
since
the

-objective- sense is intended,

maximal warrant entails
irrevisability.

Unmistakability does not entail
irrevisability. All
necessary truths are unmistakable.
Some necessary truths
are revisable.
One can well Imagine a
persuasive argument
coming along warranting
suspension of judgment on a
necessary
truth.
Therefore, some revisable
truths are unmistakable.
Therefore, unmistakability does
not entail irrevisability.
One might insist, -But of
course revisability entails
mistakability. How could any future
evidence generate warrant
for withholding or believing the
negation of a proposition
whose truth is entailed by the
fact that it is believed?This objection confuses the
obtaining of the entailment between belief and truth and the
knowledge that the entailment
obtains.
If one knew that belief guaranteed
truth, presumably
one could not reasonably disbelieve
that proposition.
But such
knowledge is not implied by the unmistakability
condition.

Irrevisability does not entail maximal warrant.
For
suppose that no evidence over and above
that which supports
p for S at t could conceivably overturn
that is,
p,

p is irrevisable for S at t.

suppose

Then perhaps one could argue

that p has maximally good evidence (of the
relevant sort of

)
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evidence) bearing on

U -

although

I argued in
.y original
iscussron of irrevisability
that even this need not
be true.
But in any event, other
propositions of other kinds,
for which
other kinds of evidence
are relevant
levant, could conceivably
have
still .ore impressive
credentials.
Constant rational acceptance of p is compatible
with greener pastures
in any entirely
different ball park.-

One might try to prove
that irrevisability entails
unmistakability as follows:
Suppose that irrevisability
does

not entail unmistakability.
(i)

S believes th,at d

a-t-

-i-

»

Then three condition must
hold:
(ii) p IS false, and
(iii)

(at
It IS logically impossible
to warrantedly believe
not-p or
But (ii) and
p.
are

(m)

inconsistent.

t'

Therefore,

irrevisability entails
unmistakability.
The question is whether
it can be unwarrantable
to believe
a truth or withhold a
falsehood, more precisely, whether
there

could never be a time during
which believing the truth or
withholding the false is warranted.
The argument rests on the
assumption that for any proposition
whatsoever, it Is possible
to warrantedly withhold
it if it is false, and
possible to
warrantedly believe it if it is
true.
This assumption is false.
It falsely rules out the
possibility of unconf irraable truths.
Generalizing, since truth conditions,
justification conditions,
and belief conditions are not
invariable, irrevisability does
not entail unmistakability.
For suppose mistakability that is,
the possibility of false belief.
Revisability does not follow.
,
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since just because you can
be mistaken, it does
not follow
you can be warranted in
thinking so or withholding
on
the matter.

At first blush it would
seem that unmistakabllity
entails
maximal warrant,
if believing a proposition
entails its truth,
of what concern is the
possible intrusion of evidential
slippage? let. in one sense of
-belief at least, propositions
seem to satsify the
unmistakability condition without
satisfying the maximal warrant
condition.
Consider the proposition
•I am believing.if i believe that I am
believing, then it
follows that I am believing.
But circumstances could be imagined in which -I am thinking(understood in the broad. Cartesian sense of I am conscious-)
is more warranted and safer
to say than -I am believing.Suppose all this reporting is
going on in a psychoanalyst- s office,
where eventually the
analyst elicits the patient-s realization
that at the time
of utterance, he was not believing
anything at all. but refusing to commit himself to any of
the alternatives.
The

claim to believe was revisable. hence
not maximally warranted,
though Its truth is entailed by the
fact
that it is believed.

A little further thought,

however, will save us from

being hoodwinked by this spurious
counterexample. An unmistakable proposition is one about which it

is impossible to be

mistaken.

So if the patient was mistaken about believing,

then his claim to believe was not logically
guaranteed.
lieve.-

-Be-

in its two occurrences above, was being
used equivocally,
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There is a good proof that
unmistakability does not entail Maximal warrant.
All necessary truths are
unmistakable
some necessary truths
are such that their
warrant is weaker
than the warrant for some
other proposition. Even
the fact
that some necessary truths
are more warranted than
others
show this.
Therefore, some non-maximally
warranted
propositions are unmistakable.
Therefore, unmistakability does
not entail maximal warrant.
The status of the final
entailment from maximal warrant
to unmistakability is of
no concern to us.
Certainty is ir-

revisability.

Maximal warrant is sufficient,
but not necessary
for certainty.
Unmistakability is neither necessary
nor sufficient for certainty.
It is irrelevant to our
concerns whether.
Whenever maximal warrant guarantees
certainty, it also guarantees unmistakability.
Presumably, since justification and
truth conditions are distinct,
the entailment does not hold.
To foreclose a source of future
misunderstanding, let
me explicitly note that various
probabilistic, behavioral,
introspective, and other accounts of
certainty are unsuited
to the anti-skeptical project of
this dissertation.
Probability calculi in which certainty is
identified with probability value of 1, and only tautological
truths are assigned
the value 1, do not provide us with an
acceptable notion of
Cartesian certainty.
On such accounts, a man can never be
certain of any logically contingent proposition.
Since it

is l ogically contingent that objective
particulars exist, we
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could never be certain,
in this sense, that
objective particulars exist.
But this account of
certainty violates
adequacy condition
(2).

Neither purely behavioral
nor purely psychological
or
introspective analyses of
certaintv are appropriate
cerxainty
to our
epistemic concerns. To say
that someone is certain
about a
proposition just in -case he
is indisposed to inquire
whether
that proposition is true,
or just in case he is
indisposed
to seek out or consider
further information that bears
on
that proposition, or
just in case he takes no
precautions
against the possibility that
the proposition
O'

is false, or
just in case he is free
from doubt about the
proposition,
is to give a defective
account of certainty as it is
used
by the epistemological
solipsist.
Aside from the internal

difficulties of these views

-

the man’s indispositions may

be the result of apathy,
his unwariness and freedom
from
doubt the result of ignorance,
and so on
they violate

-

adequacy condition (4).
And we should reject identifying
Cartesian certainty
with knowing that one knows.
If the principle (KK) that
whenever a man knows a proposition,
he knows that he knows
It, IS true, then knowledge
would entail certainty, and condition of adequacy (6) would be violated.
But, it may be
argued, (KK) is false, so that explicating
certainty as
second-order knowledge is not precluded by
condition (6).

After all, if a man knows a proposition, he
understands

it.
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•S knows that he knows
that p*
p

iiiusx satisfv
must
n +
+u
satisfy a
truth
condition
xn excess of the
truth conditions for
'S knows that p- alone.
TO know that he knows
p. s .ust understand
-s knows that pto know p, he must
understand p, Put need
not understand 's
knows that p.A man might not know
what -knows that- means,
yet know a good deal;
one need not have the
concept of knowledge in order to know
things. 5? since the truth
conditions
for first-order knowledge
are weaker than those
for secondorder knowledge, first-order
knowledge -claims do not entail
the corresponding
second-order claims.
Therefore.
,

(KK) is false.

Further, if a proposition
q is compatible with all a
man knows, then if he knows
that p. q is compatible with
p.
But it does not follow that
q is compatible with the man's
knowing p. so it is possible
for q to be used to overthrow
the claim to knowledge,
the case of the timorous
student
who IS uneasy about the
acquisitions that are genuinely
his.
though he knows that
p. he does not have adequate
evidence
for his claim to know, and
so does not know that
58
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he knows.

But even if (KK) is false, the
second-order knowledge
account of certainty is too weak.
Many times when a man S
knows a proposition p. another
person T knows
that S knows

that

p.

Since S is not always in an epistemically
inferior

-

position to T with respect to
s does not suffer 'logically
p
privileged non-access' -- S sometimes
knows that he knows

p.

More, a little thought will reveal
how infrequently S suffers

privileged non-access.

Hence, very many cases of ordinary
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knowledge are cases of
philosophical certainty, if the
secondorder knowledge account of
certainty were right. Therefore,
unless all sorts of mundane
propositions are Cartesian certainties. It IS false that
if someone knows that
he knows
that p, he is certain that

Having discussed the notion
of certainty as it occurs
in
the epistemological
-solipsist thesis, I should
conclude this
section by noting that the
correlative notion of possibility
in the skeptical claim
that it is possible that no
objective particulars exist, is
a weak sense of epistemic
possibility. 6o
A proposition is weakly
episteraically possible for a man
S at
a time t if, and only if,
it is compatible with everything
that is certain for him at t.
Hence, a proposition is weakly
epistemically impossible for 3 at t
if, and only if,
it is

incompatible with something certain for
S at t.
But if a
proposition is epistemically impossible
for 3 at t, then, and
only then, is its negation epistemically
certain for S at t.
Therefore, a proposition is epistemically
certain for 3 at t
just in case its denial is incompatible
with something which
is certain for 3 at t.
And this is equivalent to saying
that p is epistemically certain for
3 at t provided that
p
IS entailed by premises which are
epistemically certain for
S at t (or is identical with such
a premise).
Therefore,
the way to refute epistemological solipsism
is to logically

deduce its denial from philosophical certainties
inevitably

acknowledged as such by the epistemological solipsist.
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III

Since we are trying to
refute the epistemological
solipsist, we must either
understand by •objective
particularWhat he does, so that our
argument is not simply an
ignoratio
Slenchi, or we must show that
the meaning he wishes to
impute to objective particularis incoherent, replace
it by
a suitable, coherent notion,
and then proceed to
establish
the existence of objective
particulars in the legitimate
sense.
If this legitimate sense
can be shown to be the only
legitimate sense, then it seems
that we have met the skeptical
Challenge.
If there are alternative,
coherent conceptions
of objective particulars,
then in establishing the
existence
of objective particulars
in one sense we have not
thereby
established their existence in all
the legitimate senses,
and so have not unequivocally
refuted the skeptic, unless
•

something-s being an objective
particular in the proffered
sense entails that it is an
objective particular in all the
alternative senses.

mention the second, circuitous strategy
because the
reader may wonder whether, if I take
seriously the
I

idea that

the uniquely promising anti-skeptical
method is Kantian

transcendental argumentation, the straightforward
strategy
is available to me.
Kant seems to have argued,

roughly, as

follows.

The Copernican revolutionary or
transcendental

idealist thesis shows that the only object of
which we can
meaningfully speak is the object apprehensible by
consciousness.
Appreciation of the transcendental or epistemological
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turn enables us to understand
that «e cannot get beyond
our
representations and compare them
with an 'independently
realobject.
The distinction between
subject and object must lie

within consciousness and
must be seen as the result
of a
process of objectification.
This process, the activity
of
judgment, consists essentially
in the conceptualization
of

the contents of the- mind
in terms of certain
universal and
necessary rules. Objectivity
can only be understood (consistently) in terms of the
necessary synthetic unity or

combinatory coherence of the
representations or mental contents themselves.
Only by this mental activity
can a person
become aware of a unified
objective world distinct from
his
representations.
The truth of judgments about
objects must
be verified in terms immanent
to consciousness.
Kant's view seems to imply that
it is misguided to pose
the problem of knowledge as the
task of bridging the epistemological gap between representations
and the non-represen
tational independent reality one
purports to represent, and
that the problem is properly conceived
only in terms of establishing lawlike features among
representations. And this
requires reinterpreting what is meant by
*real objective
particular.’
So Kant's is a resolution by redefinition
of
’objective particular.'
It may be countered that only the
problem of empirical

verification of objectivity beliefs, which is
not even the
skeptical worry of the dissertation, demands
any
sort of
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reaennUion. .ut not neaetiniUon

ot .o.,ecttve
pantieulan..

truth IS a relation of
oorresponaence between what
is said
or What xs thought
and so.e state of
affairs or fact, then
presumably one verifies
objectivity beliefs by
comparing
ones representations with
that which one purports
to represent. to see if they
fit.
Kant rejects this
comparative method
of verification.
But no redefinition of
'objective particular'
IS called fori the
standard definition already
refuses to
countenance anything but
objects of possible
consciousness
as objective particulars,
objects whose existence
is. nevertheless. independent of
all actual mental acts.
By 'object
of possible consciousness'
all is meant is 'object
which
thinking beings, were there
any. could become aware
of.'

not

object which exists only
if some thinking being
can
become aware of it.' Kant
is not a phenomenalistic
idealist.
He does not hold that
objective particulars exist
only if
thinkers exist,
it is not as if objects
exist if one person
survives a nuclear holocaust, but
perish as soon as he dies.
He does hold, however, that
if thinkers exercising their
capacity for thought exist, then
objects exist.
To reject the comparative method
of verification is not to
grant that we always only directly
perceive sense data (Lockean
ideas. Humean perceptions. Kantian
representations), and that
objective particulars must therefore
be collections
of.

constructions out of. sense data.

or

Additional, controversial

*
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considerations, such as
arguments from
perceptual relativity
U^e-gap. .alluoination,
and so on. are
needed to estallis
even that the ob1ect=. n-p h
^
perception are person-private
and so not
t
mtersubjeotive. it is the
appearance -reality gap
xns ance of the
hnown-not Icnown gap.
that is essential
e s eptioal
thesis.
The introduction
of sense data is
not needed for
skepticism.
There is still
®Pall th
the gap between
^..
rngs as they seem
and things as they
are.
Therefore. Kanfs
response to Cartesian
or Humean
epistemological solipsism
need not involve an
idealistic redefinition
of -obieotive
particular,

"

-

.

joinder, it may be
insisted that any
credible Kant
exegesis requires that
transcendental idealism imply
the
collapse of the knowing--beinff
oeing
dic:+ir..%
+
S
distinction,
and the consequent
preclusion of meaningful
talk about things as
they are in
themselves. But again,
this insistence rests
on confusion
concerning the nature of
objective particulars.
Being a
reality which could exist
even if nobody could
become conscious of It, is not a
necessary condition of
objective
particularity.
In fact. I suggest it
contradicts the analysis Which faithfully
depicts the skeptic's concern.
The
unknowability of things as they
are in themselves is not
the unknowability of
objective particulars.
'

even if

am mistaken about thi s
strain in Kant's
thought. I contend that
there is to be found in
Kant an
argument designed to defeat the
skeptic in his own playground.
I

,
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Where ^the.e is no attempt
at hollow victory hy
low redefinitron.
And so I simply will
stipulate that it is that
argument rnnocent of the
fallacy of irrelevance
that I intend to
pursue
have spoken of the ordinary
notion of an ohjective
particular in terms of which
the skeptical thesis is
formulated.
strictly speaking, historically,
no such notion
exists. External world
skepticism has centered on the
existence Of physical objects.
But although all physical
objects
are objective particulars,
the converse is untrue.
Some
kinds Of events. Quinean
process-things or space-time worms,
and the like, may be objective
particulars also.^2
I

Ana^isis of

Ma^t^ Russell even

^

identifies physical objects

with groups of events arranged
about a center, arguing that
the only permanences science
needs are the four-dimensional
space-time continuum and perhaps
the conservation

of energy,
but that in neither case must
the permanence be supposed
substantival .63
And in Metaphysical Foundations
of Natural Science
Kant himself, after defining
-physical body- as -matter between
determinate boundaries (with figure)and characterizing
matter as -the movable in space,goes on to further specify
that matter is a repulsive force
resisting penetration, to-

gether with an attractive force for bodies
situated elsewhere.
He holds that extension, which
is itself
a force, is a

consequence of the repulsive forces of
each point in space
filled with matter. And he elaborates
his theory quite elegantly.^'^

Even in the first Critique Kant argues
that it is

,
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mere prejudice to assume that
matter must exist in parcels
differing only in araount.^5

Essential to epistemological
solipsism is the problem of
Objectivity.
But that objects be Aristotelian
parcels of
enformed matter is inessential.
As far as our forthcoming
analysis is concerned, objects may
be loci of concentrated
force fields, or any one of a
number of other things. Transcendental arguments encroach minimally
on scientific theory and
discovery. No substantive propositions
of physios follow from
their conclusions. As we shall see.
transcendental propositions are not axiomatic and need have
no. non-trlvial deductive
consequences, imply no empirical claims. They
only assert
the satisfaction of a general predicative
function;
in the

present case, that function specified by the
analysis of
objective particularity.

Although not all objective particulars are physical
objects, an account of physical objects naturally
approxi-

mates an account of objective particulars.

Candidates for

physical objects, as ordinarily understood, must satisfy

various conditions.
extended.

First, they must be spatiotemporally

Temporal extension rules out the momentarily

present, particular entity which instantly arises and in-

stantly perishes.

The discrete, transitory atomic entity,

the Humean impression, cannot be a physical object, since

physical objects are at least relatively stable continuants.

Spatial extension rules out mental acts or representings
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Since no .entaX events
are spatiaU.
extenaea (even i,. Xn
a
en.vative sense, they
are spatially locatahle
no acts
) .
Of consciousness
are physical objects.
second, physical
objects are mind-independent.
Sense
ata. Which on some
views are spatiotemporally
extended, are
not counted as physical
objects because they
are mind-depenthey exist only if
someone is conscious.
But something
a physical Object only

-

if

u,

ts independent of
anyone-s perception of
it at that time.
It IS possible that

such an object existed
before anyone
perceived it, and that
it will continue to
exist even if
everyone ceases to perceive
it. it might exist
at a time at
which nobody was conscious.

Physical objects, as ordinarily
understood, must be
perceivable by the senses.
It seems as if something
of which
can know only that it
causes our experiences could
fulfill
the two, aforementioned
conditions.
But our latest condition
rules out entities to which
we can have no sensuous,
cognitive
access.
Finally, something is a
physical object only if it is
possible for more than one
person, suitably placed, to
perceive the numerically identical
object.
This publicity
requirement rules out the kind
of entity that has been
called -sensibilium.'
Sensibilia are sense data capable
of
existing unsensed. 66
a species of sense datum,
sensibilia
are person-private, and hence,
not physical objects.
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By recalling Moore’s distinctions
between objects
•presented in space.’ ’to be met
with in space,’ and ’external
to our minds.’ we recognize
that the foregoing provides an
inadequate test for physical
objects.
Shadows, for example,
are spatioteraporally extended
and publicly perceivable, yet.
ordinarily, they are not regarded
as physical objects.
But,
shelving the dubious point that
shadows must be shadows of
something, the existence of, the
the possession of knowledge
about,
shadows, are fully germane to the
truth of metaphysical and epistemological solipsism,
respectively.
Shadows
are respectable members of the
class of objective particulars.
Further, objects external to our minds
need not be
objects to be met with in space.
The images of animals

exemplify this sort of object.

But by acknowledging the

truth of the converse-entailment, and
abstracting from the

peculiarities of the Aristotelian conception embodied
above,
we can arrive at a more useful and refined
account
of ob-

jective particulars.

Hampshire, Chappell, Woods» and others have

examined the distinction between identification as
a member
of a class and identification as some pa rticular
member of
68
I
a Class.
In its first use. to identify (as) is to classify

or describe sortally; in its second use, to identify
(iden-

refer) is to pick or single out from other things
of a class, as names and definite descriptions are
typically

used to do.

Principles of classification, for sorting objects

.

.

.
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into kinds, and princinlpc? n-p
’j
principles of individuation,
for distinguishing Objects Of a given
hind, are appealed to
in the two species
Of Identification.
As 'individuation- and
'classification'
have been defined,
individuatability implies
classif iability
But on definitions lacking
reference to class Membership,
the
implication is more controversial,
and is tantamount to the
thesis that there cannot be
unconceptualised or unsynthesized
intuitions, or, as Sellars
puts it, there cannot be a
this
Which is not a this-such
^9
sucn.
so far I have only affirmed
that
objective particulars must be
individuatable

But Objective particulars must
not only be individuatingly
identifiable, they must also be
re identifiable
that is, identifiable as the numerically same
thing in different perceptual
situations at different times.
Now if reidentifiability implies
identifiability in both its senses,
then, whether or not individuatability implies classifiability,
all objective particulars,
since re identifiable, are
classifiable as well as individuatable. 7°
And although questions of
reidentity, 'Is this
.

X the same X

which...?' seem to presuppose
classifiability, the issue remains controversial, and can at present,
I think, be left
unresolved
Two other properties essential to
objective particulars
are existential and attributive
independence.
Something is

existentially independent if, and only if, its
existence at
any given time is independent of anyone’s
perception
of it

at that time.

Something is attributive ly independent if, and

+

,
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only if. it can have
properties other than those
it seems
to have to the
perceiver.

Concerning existential
independence. I must make
a confession Which may. although
I think ought not.
disillusion
the reader as to the
prospects of this dissertation.
As I
understand this conditiom
it requires independence
from the
conscious activities of
finite, sensible creatures
like us.
Supposing God to have the
power to create and sustain
objects
by thinking about them
objects perceivable by the
rest of
in the usual way. obeying
the laws
^

»

—

of physics, and so on

-

would not want to disallow
that such objects are
objective
particulars. Current scientific
theory about the ultimate
constituents and likely origins
of matter is in no way
circumscriptive Of the nature of
objects.
Descartes himself,
who paradigmatioally posed
the very skeptical challenge
with
which we are concerned, maintained
an atomic theory of time
Which required God's recurrent
sustenance of his creation.
It seems perverse to admit
that the Lockean inert, senseless,
matter which God once for all created
by an act of thought
(will) IS an objective particular,
but that the same sort of
thing which is constantly preserved
by his thinking
I

is not.

Most important, the view that for
all

I

know to the contrary,

my mental states constitute the
universe, that for all I know,
the world is my dream, would be
refuted by the known existence
of objects of the kind just
envisaged
Summing up, a particular is an objective
particular if.

.
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and only if, it

(i)

identifiable,

Uii) existentially independent,
and

(ii) reidentif iable

(iv) attributively
in-

dependent.

Since reidentifiability
entails identif lability
you could not Pick something
out as persisting if
you could
It out at all
P
condition (i) is redundant
and may
be deleted,
striving for elegance of
definition, one might
try to show that
reidentifiability entails both
existential
and attributive independence
as well, so that an
objective
particular is a reidentif iable
particular.

-

—

One strategy for showing
that reidentifiability entails

existential independence proceeds
as follows: The notion of
an -existential- or mind
-dependent datum- is properly
defined
in terms of a perceptual
situation at a time. Since it
can

be shown that specifically
identical perceptual situations
cannot recur, identification in

different perceptual situations

at different times must be
identification of different existential- or mind-dependent data,
so that what is mind-dependent
cannot be what remains numerically
the same over time.
A natural challenge to this
strategy, and the entailment

from (ii) to (iii), is to argue that
there are existentially
dependent entities, such as pains, which
are nevertheless
re identifiable.
Pains do not exist when nobody is conscious,
yet I can refer to my self-same pain in
cases of discontinuous
perception. And it is not only generic sameness
that

attribute to the pain
this morning.

I

had last night and the one

I

I

can

am having
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think such counterexamples
are spurious.
Numerical
reidentity-olaims about pains
rest upon identification
of
their physical sources, which
sources may persist. For
suppose that I complained
about a shoulder pain on
I

Monday, and

a physician diagnosed
its cause as bursaitis.

medicinally,

I

still hurting.

He treats me

go home, sleep, and awake
Tuesday, my shoulder
I

return to the doctor and complain.

have the same pain in my
shoulder.'

•! still

Would

I not unhesitatingly
retract the claim of numerical
identity if the doctor truly
told me that the bursaitis had
cleared, and that my current
discomfort was caused by a recently
sustained bruise?
So I believe that Hume was
right in arguing that continued existence implies independent
existence '^'2 But again,
the issue remains controversial,
and need not
.

be resolved.

Proceeding cautiously, we can retain
(iii) as a non-redundant
condition of objective particularity.
Then even if pains are
reidentifiable. their candidacy as
objective particulars is
ruled out by their existential
dependence.

Similarly for attributive independence.

If all and only

mind -dependent data have all those
characteristics which they
seem to have to their owners, then if re
identif lability entails
existential independence, reidentif lability
entails attributive
independence.
There seem to be direct routes from reidentifia-

bility to attributive independence, but they rest on
premises
as controversial as the conclusion they are intended
to establish.

With prudence over elegance, let us retain condition
(iv).
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IV

want to make explicit the
ground rules and procedural
assumptions which will guide
our search for a successful
antiskeptical, transcendental method
in subsequent chapters of
this dissertation.
First, since we wish to
establish that
we can know for certain
that objective particulars
I

exist,
it is insufficient to
demonstrate that we do not. or even

cannot, know that we do not
know with certainty of the
existence Of objective particulars.
Joad has argued that if a
man can only know the content
of his own consciousness,
he
cannot know anything other than
his own consciousness, and
so cannot know any arguments
for solipsism.
if there are any
arguments for solipsism, we cannot,
if solipsism
is true,

know them.

Even if Joad

argument were sound, it would be inadequate to our purpose.
It is not enough to argue that
•

s

the

skeptical thesis has not been, or even
cannot be, established,
since it does not follow from the fact
that some proposition
is unprovable that it is false.
Universal, empirical generalizations attest to this.
So even if epistemological solipsism
cannot be proved and we know it, we cannot
conclude that
it is false.

Not only must we try to develop a method
which can be
used to prove the anti-skeptical thesis, but we
should try
to join the battle on the skeptic’s own terrain,
granting

those assumptions which reputedly generate the skeptical
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conclusion.

Thiq
IS mpan<=
means, -p,v,^4.
first, accepting the
egocentric
predicament as the original
position from which we must
Philosophize,
we need not ennoble the
position with claims
of self -evidence, as
when Stace repeatedly tells
us that
It is evident that, however we may
wish otherwise, we cannot. if we are honest,
escape the conclusion that
the initial
position Of every mind must be
solipsistic . and -that I am,
to start with, only aware
of m^ omi thoughts and
experiences,
appears to be self-evident. 74
we need only stipulate
that,
for dialectical purposes, we
accept
•

it.

If we add that,

second, all inferences from the
hard,
introspective data must be deductive,
or, perhaps more
guardedly, all inferences must
guarantee preservation of
certainty, and, third, that all our
premises must be philosophical certainties, since ’everything
which bears any

manner of resemblance to an hypothesis
is to be treated as
contraband; it is not to be put up for
sale even at the

lowest price, but forthwith confiscated,
immediately upon
detection, *75 we have already imposed
significant restrictions on the range of epistemological
approaches.
We

must repudiate naive realism, which
insists that there
is no need to appeal to experiences as
evidence for the

existence of objective particulars, and so no
transition
from subjective to objective to justify. We
cannot assume
that empirical knowledge is a community
phenomenon necessarily
based on data available to all, that the secure
data for

~
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analysis are publicly observable,
and then proceed to argue
that subjective experiences
are insufficient to
constitute
the foundations of
empirical knowledge, both
because the
of public things cannot
be adequately characterized
in exclusively phenomenal
terms, and because Hume and
Descartes were wrong to believe
that a man cannot possibly
be
mistaken about the character
of his subjective experiences. 76
Similarly, we cannot follow
scientific realists such
as Sellars, holding that
subjective impressions are postulated after reflecting on
certain features of our view of
public reality, such as the need
to explain aberrant perception.
We cannot argue that if
subjective appearances
are

to be postulated, they must
have outer, public criteria,

since otherwise they could not be
encompassed in an intersubjective language needed for the
scientific enterprise.
The viability of pursuing a
rationalist course such as
Plato's depends largely on what we take
the extension of
appearance' to be.
Plato embraced the unbridgeability of
the appearance-reality gap, while
assuming direct cognizability
of the non-sensuous,

independently real.

If Plato were argu-

ing that we cannot know reality via
sense-perception

.just

—

ause we cannot know appearances, meaning
that any argument
from the nature of subjective states must
fail, then obviously
he would be violating one of our concessions.

If he were

contending that no argument from premises about how
the world
sterns could

establish how it is, that arguments from the
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£°2tent Of consciousness
to objectivity must
fail, then none
Of the procedural
assumptions need be revoked.
Egocentrism
demands that we argue from
our thoughts and/or
perceptions.

Argument from the nature
of our thoughts is
consonant with
thxs demand,
if px^to is rejecting
representationalism altogether. substituting a
faculty for intuitively
apprehending
the real, then again
there has been an
infraction of the rules.
Whether the licit argument
from the nature of our
thoughts
can succeed, and whether
this is a
argumentation in
the rationalist tradition,
remains

pM

to be seen.

Here I
strike the precautionary
note that a later rationalist
as Leibniz seems to have
argued as to how the external
must be. if there is a world,
that there is a world is
tablished by sense -percept ion.

only

such

world
es-

Just as we have dismissed
realism, which denies the
representational nature of consciousness,
for its disregard
of the eg ocentric predicament,
so we must dismiss phenomenalism. subjective-objective
reductionism. for its disregard of
the egocentric pre^ eament
Reductionism tries to show that
.

objective particulars are really
experiences, or, in its linguistic version, that objectivity
statements are analytically
equivalent to conjunctions of hypotheticals
expressive of
personal experience.
In either case, the quandary over
objectivity dissolves.
We must also rule out the Aristotelian
view that when

our senses are functioning properly,
under proper conditions^
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we acquire true
information, and that,
when necessary, our
intellect can correct our
sense reports and
therefore, gain
reliable knowledge about
the external world,
since skeptics
Challenge the reliability
of our natural
faculties under the
best of conditions,
denying Aristotle's
criteria for deciding
when our faculties are
operating properly, response
by appeal
to The Philosopher
would be question-begging.
As documented
by Popkin. Pierre
Chanet. Father Yves de
Paris, and Jean
Bagot. and. to a lesser
extent. Mersenne. Herbert
of Cherbury.
and Charles Sorel. used
this tack to bypass the
skeptical
problems raised by Montaigne
and Charron. ?7

For similar reasons, we
must renounce the following,
contemporary line of argument.78
^s regards any particular
belief, any genuine, cognitive
doubt requires that there be
formulable grounds for removing
that doubt, so that only
determinate, resolvable doubts
are genuine.
Determinate
doubt is resolved in accordance
with accepted standards of
justification! hence, the correlative
notion of certainty
is understood in terms of
currently accepted norms governing the resolution of determinate
doubts.
Therefore, the
more pervasive doubts of the
epistemological solipsist are
bogus.
Since our skeptic's doubts are
non-radical and determinate. and since the primary target
of his attack is the
standards of justification themselves,
this argument begs
the question.
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Again, similarly, «e
must forswear allegiance
to any
gm 1 C perspective
P
which either rejects
the foundational
picture Of knowledge or
loosens beyond recognition
the strictures traditionally
imposed on that foundation.
Por example,
instead of trying to
resolve skeptical doubts,
tried
to rescue knowledge by
showing that its practical
verifiability
and usefulness do not
depend on any unshakeable
grounds.
He
invites the 'reasonable*
skeptic to abandon doubt,
and join
in the quest for the
most convincing, most
useful presentation
and organization of the
information of which we are
all obviously aware .79
skeptical attack is developed
in
terms of the dogmatist's
strong demands on genuine
knowledge.
mitigating those demands simply
pulls the rug from underneath
the contestants.
It IS important to appreciate
that the preceding dis-

cussion embodies methodological
as_sumptions by which a solution to the problem of
epistemological solipsism
is intended

to abide.

It is not as if we exclude
the possibility of discovering that, for example, all
reasons considered, we do some-

times directly perceive objective
particulars.

Far from it.

It is just that we should
strive to do as honest and sympathetic a job as possible. But
since others may think that
what I call 'sympathy' is another
name for mania, I shall

not attempt to apply the same
stringent requirements to the
alternative solutions I criticize.

59

To recapitulate,
anyone who assumes the
egocentric preatcament ana accepts
the view that all
.ustinea ^owleageclaiins are either
self- inc;+i -rir*
or deductive
consequences of
justified premises, is
susceotihia
P ible +
to epistemological
skepticism
regarding the external
world
it
that •ohjective partic lar
t. a concept whose
applicability cannot be
empirically
aeaucea by referenceto the content oi
inaiviaual perceptions
or sets Of them,
consequently, it is a
concept whose employment assumes what no
experience oouia establish.
This threat
confronts rationalist and
empiricist
ipiricist alike.
alikp
n
Descartes
sought
to overcome it bv annppi
ppeal to the veracity
of Goa, Hume concluaea
that It couia not be
overcome, ana Pascal
agreea that as long
as there are aogmatists.
the skeptics are
right.
Respecting
the boundaries of the ciroip p-r
f our ideas and
supposing the
rigorous view of rational
justification to
.

.

“

—

'

be correct-but

minaful Of Pascal’s warning,
ana appreciative that
proof of
Objective knowleage is the
next best thing to proof
of objective knowleage with
certainty-our project is to examine
the role of transcendental
argumentation in the refutation
of epistemological
solipsism.

.

'
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CHAPTER II

STRAWSONIAN TRANSCENDENTAL
ARGUMENTS
P.F. Strawson is an
influential advocate and
alleged
practitioner of Kantian
transcendental

method,

m

pursuit

Of a satisfactory
refutation of the skeptical
thesis, in

this Chapter
1

I

examine Strawson's
writings.

Shan try

In chapter III

to supplement Strawsonian
argumentation with
other anti-skeptical
resources. We shall discover
that
there are several closely
related and easily confused
conclusions for Which one might
argue,
carefully distinguishing these conclusions
and exposing the
inadequacies of
the arguments designed
to establish them, we
shall make great
progress towards a positive
P o-LOive theorv
xneory n-p
of the successful antiskeptical method.

m

At the same time, however,
we will generate worries,
since some of the arguments
to be attacked may seem faithfully Kantian. The reader may
doubt that an historically

philosophically viable alternative
survives.
attempts to allay those doubts.

Chapter IV

In The B ounds of Sense Strawson
argues for the 'objec-

tivity thesis' that all experiencers
must use concepts of
objective particulars. 1 An objective
particular is a reidentifiable particular, that is, a particular
identifiable as
the same thing in different perceptual
situations at different

fig

times.

The argument for the
objectivity thesis, the
objec-

reasoning

-

a sound instance of
a transcendental
argument.

Yet Strawson never
fully explicates the
nature of such reamg. I shall give a general
account of his transcendental
method. Clarify it by
considering a defective
criticism of
Richard Rorty.s. outline
the objectivity argument,
and then
criticize both the argument
and the method in general.

But first, to better
understand the objectivity
thesis
four points about Strawson's
use of 'identificationshould’
be noted.
First, recall that
'identification' here ™eans
individuation.' not 'classification.'
Second, referring
(or 'introducing a term
in a substantive style')
is not
something that expressions
do. but something that
an expression can be used to do,
referring is a characteristic
of a

use Of an expression.2
Third. Strawson distinguishes
the
making of an identifying reference
from identifying. A

speaker may identifyingly refer
to a particular without
identifying it, identification
occurs only if the speaker
successfully communicates the identity
of the referent to
his audience.
More precisely, a speaker
identifies a particular to a hearer if, and only if,
the speaker uses an
appropriate referring expression (such
as most proper names,
pronouns and definite descriptions)
to refer to

the particular,

and the hearer picks out the
particular as what the speaker
referred to. Consequently, publicity
is built into the notion
W*
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condition Of the hearer's
success in identifying
the particular is his sensibly
discriminating it. knowing
it is the
one referred to by
the speaker.
Per Strawson, all eases
of
particular-identification are
ultimately linkable to
cases
where the particular
is sensibly present.
Strawson wants to prove
that any creature capable
of
experience must be able
to use concepts of
particulars which
are identifiable, in
the sense just characterised,
as the
same in different
perceptual situations at
different times.
He thinks this can be
proved by the legitimate
method of
metaphysical reasoning. For
him. the proper task of
metaphysical reasoning is the
articulation of those principles
analytically implied by any
coherent conception of experience
we can form.
The truth of these
principles is deducible from
any actual or hypothetical
description of an experience, so
long as the description is
coherent.
The notion of coherence
here is a technical one.

Syntactic well-formedness and
internal consistency are necessary
but not sufficient conditions
of coherence.
A description
is coherent just in case,
in addition to being syntactically
correct and free from contradiction,
it is formulable within
a language that is coherent.
A language is coherent (or
self-sustaining) just in case it does
not presuppose, is
not parasitic upon, terms in some
other language not available
to the user in question.
The terms of one language L are

.
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parasitic upon the terms
of another language
L* if. and only
If, the meanings
of the terms of L
cannot he understood unless the meanings of
the terms of L- are
understood. And.
for Strawson, the meaning
of a term is understood
hy a person
(or. equivalently for
him. a oonoept is
possessed hy a person,
only If the person could
use the term in forming
judgments
about some real or imagined
entity.? pi„ally. fcr those
like
Strawson who xaKe
take the
thp wi
++trovir,+
Wittgensteinian variant of the
linguistic
turn, a person is able
to form judgments about
a kind of entity provided that he is
able to experience that
kind of entity, hence, there is no
non- judgmental experience.
•

There is an important unolarity
about the relation of
parasitism or presupposition between
languages.
Do only some
Of the terms of L lack
meaning for its user when not
supplemented by the resources of L'?
This condition would be too
weak,
some proper subset of the
language, with incomprehensible terms expurgated, would
then be self-sustaining.
Hence,
such a subset could be used to
form judgments. Hence, such
a language-user could have
experience. But Strawson intends
the incoherence of a language
to be the test of its user's
inability to have experience. Therefore,
he must insist that
the meaning of no term of L can be
understood unless the

meanings of the terms of L' are understood,
if L is parasitic
upon L*
But do the terms of L depend on some or
all of the terms
of L’?
I think we must say only some.
To take the relevant
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case, suppose „e are
anxious to show that
subjectivity concepts require objectivity
concepts, that a purely
phenomenal
language of the sort the
solipsist boasts enjoying
presupposes
a language with terms
designating objective
particulars. It
ia not that we are
precluded from understanding
the meaning
Of. say. the subjective,
sensory expression -redlikeunless
we have use of. say. the
term .house..
To deny this would
be to disallow differences
among people. s vocabularies.
Consequently, only some of the
terms of L. are needed to
support L. Which some? If
we specify some particular
set.
then vocabularies cannot
vary with respect to that set.
But
this is what is required by
the Strawsonian method,
since if
we liberally allow any set.
we shall be unable to establish

conclusions concerning the necessity
or indispensability of
some selected concept.
Let us temporarily leave
unspecified
the constitution of the set by
using the vague notion of a
•suitable set..
We can then say that one
language L is

parasitic upon another language

L.

if.

and only if. none of

the terms of L could be understood
unless some suitable set
of terms of L* were understood.

This is still not quite right, if
languages like natural
languages are possible substituends for
L'
since fully
,

intertranslatable languages have the same
conceptual resources
but different words.
We do not want dependeify on particular
terms but on the concepts those terms
express
the ability

—

to use the German word 'rot' is as good
as the ability to
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use the English word
Ted..

Consequently, we should
araend
our definition to read.
A language L is
parasitic upon a
class Of languages K if.
and only if. none of
the terms of
L could be understood
unless some suitable set
of terms of
some L- which is a member
of K were understood.
Then a language L is self-sustaining
or coherent if, and only
if. it
is not parasitic upon
any class of languages K.
each member
Of which is different
from L.
The last qualification
is
necessary since, according to
the definition of
'parasitic,every language is parasitic
upon itself and may. depending
on how we fill out the
notion of sufficient set, be
parasitic
upon some or all of its parts.

For convenience, we may also
explicitly relativize coherence to acts Of description,
or any other linguistic activity. by saying that L is
parasitic upon L' relative to
linguistic activity A if, and only
if. A is impossible in
L but possible in L+L'.
Such an L is incoherent relative
to that A.
An L is absolutely incoherent if,
and only if,
it is adequate for no linguistic
activity.
For descriptions,
then, a description D is coherent
or self-sustaining
if,

and

only If, the L in which D is
formulated is coherent relative
to D, that is, L is not parasitic
upon some L' relative to D.

Strawson thinks the truths of scientific
metaphysics
are deducible from any coherent
description of a form of
experience. And he thinks that experience
minimally entails
recognition of particular items by means of
general concepts)

?4

something is an experience
only if it is a
recognition of
r-rticular items as being
of such and such
a general kind ^
But to have a concept
is to be able

to use a term.
Hence,
to assess a purported
description of a possible
form of
xperience is to evaluate
a language which
might be used by
someone having such an
experience. A form of
experience is
possible provided that
some language corresponding
to it is
coherent or self-sustaining,
as just defined.
II

Rorty criticizes Strawson's
method by arguing that 'it
is a mistake to think
that we can begin by imagining
an experience which we might think
possible and then go on to
show by transcendental
argumentation that it is not
possible
If it is not possible,
it is not imaginable either.'^
This criticism is defective
on two counts.
First. Strawson
is not arguing that an
experience is possible
if.

if, we can coherently
describe it.

and only

He holds that any possible

form of experience is coherently
describable. He does not
hold that every coherently
describable form of experience
is possible.
That we have the conceptual
resources to describe a particular form of experience
does not imply that
the subject of such experiences
could exist.
The question
IS whether the man's language
is comprehensible to

himself)

whether the language of the purported
experiencer is coherent
and not whether ours is.
So we can begin by considering a

o
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candidate

fo™

of experience and
then go on to show that

it IS impossible
since incoherent.

Second, Rortys argument
is unsound.
We can suppose
that a preposition is
possible, deduce that it
is impossible
and conclude that it
is impossible.
There is no difference
in rejecting this form
of argument and
rejecting uses of
i:£dnctio ad absurd- with
non-modal suppositions, the
modal
case is just an instance
of the general method.
One might
think, -how could we
suppose something to be
possible if it
can be proved to be
impossible?' But compare,
'how can you
suppose something to be true
when you can show that
it is

false?'

The second task might seem
easier in that we must
only suppose that the
proposition fails to be true of
the
actual world
at least we have access to
a host of possible

—

worlds of which it is true

—

whereas the first method asks

us to suppose something true
of no possible world, to
consider a possible world of which
something true of no possible
world is true. But the ordinary,
non-modal reducti has the
same status, since what we are
ultimately

doing is considering

an impossible set of propositions,
a set of propositions
jointly true of no possible world.
That is, an ordinary
reductio shows that some conjunction
is inconsistent, not
merely that it is false. So even
in the ordinary case we
start out with an impossible supposition.
It might be thought that the
connection between possi-

bility and imaginability resuscitates at
least the correctness,

9

.

76

It

,h.

....

hing IS not possible,
it is not imaginable
either.®
Since Strawson consistently
talks of coherently
concelveb..
states of affairs,
presumably
j-y Korty
Rortv is using
i c.

interchangeable with

’

conceivable

’imaginable' as

.•

But the inference from
conceivability construed
psychologically, to possibility,
seems unwarranted.
Impossibilities can be and are
conceived.
Kneale shows that if the
inference were valid, certain
mathematical problems could
be
solved by mere appeal to
the attitudes of
mathematicians
Certain mathematical
propositions have not been
established
nor refuted. Take Goldbach’s
conjecture that every even
integer greater than two is
the sum of two distinct
primes.
The truth Of this proposition
is an open question.
So mathematicians find it conceivable
that it is true.
Therefore,
by the principle that
anything conceivable is possible,
the
conjecture is possible. But the
conjecture, being a mathematical proposition, is true if
possible, since false necessary
propositions are necessarily false.
Therefore. Goldbach's
conjecture is true.
All the premises justifying
this unacceptable result, except the
principle that imaginability
entails possibility, are known to be
true.
Hence, we should
reject the principle.
,

Ill
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With the general theory
in .i„d, i think we
can represent the overall
structure of Strawson's
oh^ectivity argument as follows. Any
describable experiencer
™ust use consepts (a 'recognitional
component' in Judgment ).
^The use
Of concepts entails
the ability to use
the concept '.y experience' or 'see.s to .e'
consciousness requires potential self-consciousness.
But the ability to use
the concept
•my experience' entails
the ability to use
objectivity concepts.
Hence, all experiencers
which we can describe must
be able to use objectivity
concepts.
(We can now say that
a suitable set of terms
includes terms expressing
the concept my experience' and
some concepts of objective
particulars.) Experience is
judgment, which is what is
reported
by assertion. A concept
is the ability to use an
expression
in making assertions.
If experience of Xs is
possible, then
assertions about Xs are possible.
Now if one's language is
inadequate for the expression
of a certain kind of assertion,
richer language is needed, then
the language is incoherent with respect to that kind
of assertion.
Hence, if a
kind of assertion is not
expressible in a coherent language,
then the putative form of experience
reported by such assertions is really unexperiencable
Hence, to argue that all
describable experiencers must be able
to use objectivity
concepts is to argue that no describable
language-user could

-

.

assert anything unless he could make
assertions about objective particulars.
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If making any
assertion at all requires
the ability

o .aKe

assertions about objective
particulars, then any
s eptrcal
philosopher who denied
the indispensability
of
thought about Objects
would refute hi.self
the ™o„ent he
entered the debatp
.a
4
r_ior^,
anyone denying the
possxbrlity Of talcing sense
of the concept of
an object would
e refuted.
Even if such a skeptic
refrained from Judging
the fact that I am
now
w asserting ththings would prove him
wrong
Formulated linguistically,
the objectivity
argument is
an argument against
the possibility of
a private language.
A language is private
if. and only if.
is a language that
only Its speaker
(logically) can understand
IZsut if we show
that all languages must
contain terms purporting
to desigobjective entities, then
publicly observable phenomena
are not conceptually
independent of the use of
such terms.
And if publicly observable
phenomena are evidentially
relevant to the use of such
terms, then, since a term
is understandable provided that it
is empirically applicable,
it
must be possible for persons
other than the speaker to understand such ‘terms.

u

.

Again, the concept of an
object is the concept of something that can be other than
it seems to someone.
But if
all experiencers must be
able to use such concepts and
so
have the appropriate words in
their linguistic repertoire,
then none of them could use a
language in which what seemed
to them was logically all
that counted.
But if something
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„v.

lor those others to
understand
unaerstand the ^language
as well, in
Which case the language
is not a private
language.
The argument as stated
is not quite right.
If two
things count for
understanding a language,
where count-neans -is necessary.and a man satisfies
exactly one of
them, then the man
fails to understand the
language.
Consequently, if What seems
to the speaker counts,
then if the
speaker has privileged
access to this, no matter
what else
counts, something in his
language is private.
•

If the ob-

jectivity thesis is true,
then some of the terms
of every
language must be non-private.
It does not follow,
however,
that some proper subset of
the language is not
private.
Hence, if part of a language
is itself a language,
then
there must be private
languages.

Strawson has a ready reply to
this attempt at turning
the tables.
He will say that he never
wished to argue that
no language, that is. no
set of terms and formation
rules,

can be private.

He wants to establish that
no coherent or

self-sustaining language can be private.

The private subset

of the language envisioned
above is incomprehensible in

isolation, although when embedded
within the language permitting talk about objects it makes
sense.
It is a consequence of the objectivity thesis
that no non-parasitic
private language is possible.
That my account of the overall structure
of the objectivity

,
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argument correctly instantiates
a e,ore generally
employed
method Of Strawson's, can
perhaps ^ost clearly be
seen by
comparing the structure of
his argument against
Quine in
•Singular Terms, Ontology and
Identity. 13There he argues
against the possibility of
a language containing
no demonstrative, token-reflexive,
or egocentric elements,
a language in which no individuative,
identifying references to
'ngs are made, by arguing
that such a language would
be
in which no reference to
any particulars at all
could
be made.l Distinguishing
the set of sentences
containing
singular terms and the set of
sentences not containing
singular terms, he objects, in
a preliminary way. that
•

•there is simply no guarantee
whatsoever that a descrir,tdo„
of the general logical
character of the second set of sentences. which is an appropriate
description so long as that
set of sentences is considered
in the context of a language

which also contains the

nrst

set, remains an appropriate

description when the set of sentences
in question is deprived
of this context. 'i5on the contrary,
he intends to establish

that 'it is impossible in principle
that the language of the
paraphrases should be interpreted as Quine
and the rest of
us interpret it, unless it is seen
as a paraphrase -language
i.e. unless language also contains
singular
terms. '^^And

later he rhetorically asks "how the words
’treating an ostensively learned word as a predicate true of the
shown object’

can be regarded as anything but an empty
description in the
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case Of a language
which contains no
devices for making
a^E-strative
to objects. ..l^Concerning
Quine's
notion Of a language
containing reference to
particulars
carried hy the variables
of Quantification,
but no reference
by (the non-existent)
singular ter.s, Strawson
concludes
that 'this description
I have argued
to be inadmissible -IS
compare all this to one
of Strawson's closing
remarks
concerning the objectivity
argument in The
of

refer^

s^.

be ?ImpteS

b?%^riinal^ob jecf

describes, and henfe can
What more

LSd

f^

perfectirweiwo”

LoSef

be ^®q^ired to demonstrate
the oos=!iwhoi^of its ?emtotar^ttenr%^’'^;^®’ ^"'^°«Shout the
bili+if

4.-

A-p

t^rt^fc^n^ptii^
form
•Mnxi

sucrrpIHLf
picxure,
-WN •

4-

IS
Whtt
ht
/vhat has
to he shown is tha +

The strategies of both
arguments conform to the account of

Strawson's method

I

have offered.

As implied in the above quotation,
the objectivity
thesis and the thesis of the
impossibility of a pure sensedatum experience are logically
equivalent.
A pure sensedatum experience is an experience
of a man who, lacking
object concepts, is unable to
distinguish the order and

arrangement of objects and the order
and arrangement of his
experiences of objects, is. in the
terminology

of Individuals.

-
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a sollpsistic
consciousness. 2°But since
the expression
pure sense-datum experiencemay be used in various
ways.
let us introduce the
univocal term, -purely
purely inner experience,'
e
call any experience
requiring the use of
concepts but
not the ability to use
objectivity concepts a
-purely inner
•

experience

'
.

Rorty identifies a pure
sense-datum experience with
the
kind of experience which
can be described solely
by use of
adjectival expressions or
sensory concepts, requiring
no
substantives. By -substantiveRorty sometimes means
something like -term designating
a re identifiable
particularnot merely singular
term which purports
to refer.-

So

understood, items such as
sense data, which can be
objects
Of reference but lack
criteria of reidentification,
cannot
be the designate of
substantives.
Hence, sc understood, it
would seem that the kind of
experience requiring no substantives would be a purely inner
experience.

But a language without
substantives in this sense need
not be an exclusively
adjectival language.
Substantives
and adjectives do not exhaust
the elements
of syntax.

The

sense datum theorist can make
use of non-sensory relational
predicates, adverbs, and indexical
expressions such as -here,now,- and -this.- And sense data
are legitimately the kind
of egocentric particular
picked out by the man-s use of -this.

Rorty himself employs the weaker
notion of substantive
when arguing that an experience using
only concepts of sensory
-

.
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qualities is impossible.

To use a concept is
to be able to
make a judgment, which
involves having a thought
expressible
by a complete sentence.
But if one's resources
consist exclusively of names for
sensory qualities, one
will not be
able to construct a
sentence.
Substantives as well as adjectives are needed to form a
judgment, since to understand
a

predicative expression and so
possess the corresponding
concept. one must know to
what sort of thing the
predicate is
ascribable
We can discount two
problematic features of Rorty's

argument.

First, there is the curious
suggestion that adjectives are names of qualities.
But the supposition of a
Platonic, relational or
'Fido'-Fido theory of meaning is
so antipathetical to Rorty's
Wittgensteinian-Deweyan— Heideggerian philosophical temper,
that I dismiss the suggestion
as the result of unfortunate
phraseology. 23second he does
seem, to suppose that all the
qualities designated by adjectives are sensory, as revealed
in his move from the inadequacy
of a language consisting only
of terms for sensory concepts
to the inadequacy of a language
consisting only of adjectives.
But this supposition is gratuitous! very
many adjectives
designate non-sensory qualities. To exclude
these from the
language is to be restrictive without reason.
.

The main difficulty with Rorty's
argument, however,

is

that in the sense in which its conclusion
might be true, the

concept of a sense-datum or afterimage, the concept
of an
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en xty „.ose being
aepenbs upon being
peroeivea. ie a suita y-tanoe Of
a substantival
concept.
Consequently, tbe
oonclusaon is not
equivalent to tbe
objectivity thesis,
it
a very wea.
conclusion which the
sKeptio need not avoia
orty recognises that
adaitional argumentation
is requirea'
set to the objectivity
thesis, ana later
maintains that
even a language with
both substantives and
adjectives is
impossible unless the
speaker can interpret
the substantives
as names of objects.
The best route to
this conclusion is
Strawson's argument, which,
having clarified his
overall
strategy, we are now
in a position to
examine.

-

-

IV

Strawson's argument begins
with the fundamental
thesis
that experience is
recognition of particular
items as being
Of such and such a
general kind
the conceptualizability
thesis.
He identifies this with
the Kantian claim that
experience requires both
concepts and intuitions.

-

But. the

argument proceeds, these
acts of subsuming individuals
under
general concepts would not
be possible unless they
belonged
to a single consciousness
(unity of consciousness).
And
the diverse recognitional
acts could not belong to a
single
consciousness unless it was
possible for the agent to be conscious of the identity of that
to which he ascribes these
various acts, unless the agent
was potentially aware of himself as having experience.
But this possibility of self-
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ascription of experiences
(transcendental self-consciousness)
n.plies the possibility
of empirical knowledge
of objects,
conceived of as distinct
from any particular
states of awareness Of them. Which
in turn implies the
possibility of objectively valid judgments.
This last possibility
implies
the existence of a
-rule-governed connectedness
of perceptions
Which IS reflected in our
employment of empirical
concepts
Of Objects conceived
of as possessing an
order and arrange-nt Of their own. distinct from
the order and arrangement
of the subject's
experiences of awareness of
them. 25Therefore. experience is
possible only if our perceptions
are
connected according to rules,
and objectivity concepts
provide (or better, are)
such rules.
•

Before evaluating the argument.
It.

I

think we can simplify

First, the unity of consciousness
lemma which intervenes

between the conceptualizability
premise and the thesis of
transcendental self-consciousness
is. for Strawson, superfluous.
In one place he explicitly
says that the unity of
consciousness statement only expresses
a coherent thought
When Interpreted as the
transcendental self-consciousness
statement. 2<^He provides no explanation
for this obscure

remark, but we may try the following
support. Items do not
belong to consciousness like stones
in a heap, consciousness
is active, and an activity
requires an agent. Consequently,
if diverse classif icatory acts
-belong- to a single consciousness, there is an agent performing some
activity with

respect to them, and the
+
® ar>t^vi
activity
in question is that
of
being aware. And since,
to repeat er,
requires an agent
ir the agent is aware
of his
acfc. ho
IS acts
he is aware of
himself as
performing those acts.
’

•

confess that this reasoning
is strained, in
fact, the
final conditional claim
is almost certainly
false.
Further
it proves too much.
Neither Strawson nor
Kant holds that a
man has an experience only
when he is actively aware
of himself as having that
experience.
It is enough that he
be
potentially self-aware.
But I do not want to tarry
here,
since I do not believe we
can fully understand what
Strawson
IS up to until we examine
the inference from
conceptualizabii
to this requirement for
the possibility of
self-ascription
xperiences.
In the meantime, let us
uncritically follow
the argument's author and
delete the lemma concerning
the
unity of consciousness.
I

'

The second simplification
results from the realization
that, intrasystematically,
the possibility of experience
of
objects, the possibility of
objectively valid judgments, and
the possession of objectivity
concepts for organizing per-

ceptions. are intended as expressions
of the same thesis.
To experience something as X
is just

to judge it to be an

X,

which involves the concept of

X.

Hence, to experience

objects is just to make objectively
valid judgments, which
involves using objectivity concepts.
Hence, to be able to

experience objects is just to be able
to make objectively

8?

valid judgments

which involves the
possession of objectivity
concepts, since the
possession of a concept
is the ability
to
use it.

The Simplified
Objectivity argument
begins with the
conceptualizability thesis,
infers the truth of f
transcendental
-consc.ousness, and concludes
with the objectivity
thesis.
thrs as the crux of
the matter is reflected
in Strawson-s
inal recapitulation
of xne
the cha-ntPi4-u
Chapter: «a
’Anything
we could
understand by a possible
experience must be.
potentially
the experience of a
self-conscious subject and
must therefore
have the internal
connectedness, carried by
concepts of the
objective. Which is necessary
to constitute it a
single
course of experience of
an objective world. *27
The Objectivity argument
must show that transcendental
self-consciousness, and so our
very conception of
experience,
muires fulfillment of the objectivity
condition. That objectivity concepts suffice
for these things is
irrelevant
to the controversy.
Yet Strawson sometimes
talks as if all
he has Shown is the
adequacy of the objectivity
condition.
For example, he says that
transcendental self-consciousness
means 'that experience must
be such as to provide
room for
the thought of experience
itself.
The point of the objec-

tivity-condition is that it provides
room for this thought. -28
Even in his lately quoted
recapitulation it is not clear
whether the required internal
connectedness, carried by concepts of the objective, is
exclusively carried by such concepts.

.
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ese statements
notwithstanding, we must
understand the
argument as designed
to estahiish the
neoessit,. and not
. the su„ioienc„ o. oh,
eeti.it. concepts tor
the poss.^Urt. ot an. torm
experience we can ma.e
inteiiigihie to
ourselves,
with this understanding,
let us evaluate the
argument.
The sole premise,
the conceptualizabilit.
thesis, states

at experience is
recognition of particular
items as being
Of such and such a
general kind. This is
tantamount to the
Claim that experiential
judgment is subsumption
of individuals
under general concepts,
that sentences used to
make empirical
statements have general
terms or descriptive
predicates
pr©d ics.'tsd of* (©i'thp'p
nf'Pi
v»ino4t
neither aff irmativel. or
negativel.) the denotata of singular terms or
referential expressions.
*

assume from

It is

the start that all
experiencers possess partioularit. concepts, that all
language users are able to
use
singular terms. What must be
argued is that particularity

requires objectivity, that
individual concepts presuppose
objectivity concepts, that we
can use singular terms
purportedly to refer to identif iables
only
if we can use them to

intend to refer to re identif
iables

Consequently, the notion of
experience used in the premise cannot be the loaded one
of experience of objects.
If
it were, the premise would
be question-begging.
Unfortunately,
both Kant and Strawson are
suspect on this count, and Kant
at least sometimes is guilty
as charged.
In the objectivity
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argument, however, Strawcsn^
Strawson is innocent.
He follows Kant
in explicating
'experience- as 'empirical
,
pineal w,
knowledge,'
but
not in using
'experience' as elliptical
for ’experience
of
Objects.'
•

.

•

The crucial featnv^

r^-p

+u

® °°noeptualicability premise
that experience
requires a 'recogniti
cr=i component'
s^i^ional
or
e use of concepts,where the recoenitinn i
gi^itional component
is
further identified with
the general or
descriptive parte of
^^scriptive
on
^
a judgment.
29lhis component compares
(or
^ better
Detter, can compare,
there may be uniquely
instantiated predicates)
the
particular designated by
the referential
part of the judgment
with other particulars.
The strategy is to
show that the
use of concepts entails
the usability of the
concept 'seems'
t° mej or -my
experience.- which entails
the usability of the
concept IS or 'object.'
Let us examine these
moves in turn.
Is it true that any
experiencer must be able
to use
the concept -seems to
me- or -my experience'.
Does the existence of a recognitional
component in experience
require the
is
3

.

^

possibility Of referring
different experiences to one
identical
subject, the potential
acknowledgement of the experience
as
one's own. Must experience
provide room for the concept
of
itself as experience?
The fact that there are
entities whose being depends

upon being perceived provides
Strawson with a path from conceptualizability to transcendental
self-consciousness.
He
argues that in such oases,
the item recognized does
not exist
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independently of the act of
recognition.

But experience

the ability to
discriminate between the
reoognitional component and the
item recognized,
since the item
reoognized is the object
of awareness, the
q

s

recognitional
component is the awareness
itself.
Hence, experience requires the ability to
discriminate between the
awareness
and the object of awareness.
Therefore, experience
requires
the ability to be aware
that we are aware. We
can experience
mind-dependent entities for which
there is no act-object

distinction by being aware of
our act of awareness,
this
self-awareness is the recognitional
component in such experiences 30si„<,e as I suppose
the argument might conclude,
in all cases of experience
there occur such subjective
states,
all experience requires the
ability to be aware
.

^

that we are
aware, all consciousness requires
potential self-consciousness.
Alternatively, it might be continued
that to experience an object requires
objectivity concepts, which are concepts of things which can be other
than they seem, and so
which imply the ability to use
subjective concepts,

hence,
in such cases it is unproblematic
that we can be aware that
we are aware.
And since the anomalous cases were
handled

above, all instances of experience
require potential selfawareness
.

There are some illicit transitions
infecting this line
of reasoning which are symptomatic
of a more pervasive failing of the objectivity argument.
Throughout, we have allowed.

sake of argument, that
experience requires concepts
and language, and now we
are to be shown that
it requires
the thought Of itself
as experience,
fhe original precise
argument stated that experience
requires that there
be a recognitional component.
The foregoing, however,
unwarrantedly assumes that experience
requires that we can
^ recognitional component.
At least this strong,
claim is needed to show that
experience must provide room
fo,
the concept ’experience,'
which is Strawson’s restatement
of the thesis of
transcendental self-consciousness.
But even this stronger premise
is inadequate, indeed
irrelevant, to establishing the
desired conclusion by an
argument of the sort under
consideration.
In the original
premise the recognitional component
was identified with a
concept or ability to use a general
term.
Now, without any

justification whatsoever, the recognitional
component is
Identified with the subjective portion
of experience, the
act of awareness.3lBy transitivity
of identity, the concept
Of something is identified with
the awareness of it.
But
this Identification is not only
gratuitous, it begs part of
the question as well.
The premise talks of descriptive predicates and general concepts, the conclusion
of second-order
awareness.
Simply to assume that concepts are
awarenesses
is to assume an important part of
the conclusion.

It is interesting to note an

hominem argument that

can be used against Strawson's move here from
'items can
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enter consciousness only
if they are somehow
classifiableto -Items can enter
consciousness only if they
are classifiable as -experiences(only if „e
are

expert^

can be aware that we

them).

In

IMividj^

he argues that a

condition Of a non-solipsistic
consciousness (one which
can
draw
'the-my-experience-the-oboect-of-my-experiencedistinction) is possession
of the concept of a
re identifiable
particular.
He then considers and
rejects an argument for
the truth of the converse,
explaining that

it seems as if no

distinction between a personal
and impersonal pronoun
is
needed, as if a personal
pronoun is superfluous to
the purpose of describing one-s
experiences of persisting
objects. ^2
The impersonal -it is
thought- may be substituted
for the
•I think.But here seems to be a form
of experience which
need not be aware of itself
as having experience.
Impersonal
description suffices. Here is
a case in which the argument-s
premise is true but the lemma
requiring the possession
of

the concept -my experience-

is false.

Therefore, on Straw-

son’s own showing, the inference
is invalid.
If my diagnosis is correct,
the weight of Strawson’s
premise increases as follows.
The project begins optimistically.
The use of concepts, the making
of judgments, is
alleged to be essential to experience.
It is then contended
that someone lacking the concept
-my experience- lacks the
means for making judgments, using
concepts, and thus lacks
experience.
The project is challenged: For example,
-How do

+
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you know whether a man io
"

•

experience but just
not
Perhaps there are inei
ineffablp
table «experiences.
Etc
The Strawsonian
rejoins that be is
eoneernea with aesoKbable
or .uagable experience,
with forms of
experience which can
be coherently
described.
The renlv
P y IS to condemn as
absurd
e suggestion
that one could not
have desoribable
experience
unless he understood
what experience was.
.0 foreclose this
reply, the Strawsonian
decides to restrict
his attention to
forms Of experience
which are aware of
themselves as having
experience, to self-conscious
experiencers. But if this
is
the starting-point,
we have started at
the end.
Strawson
Identifies desoribable and
self-conscious experience,
but
this is a mistake.

saying?

•

^

A direct move to the
objectivity thesis is
invalidated
by the same difficulties
noted above.
The need for a reoog-

nitional component, asserted
by the premise, is
supposed to
rule out the possibility
that all judgments are
about sense
data or entities whose
is ge rcipi
and so establish
that some judgments are
about objects, and hence

^

.

that objec-

tivity concepts are required.

But sense-data judgments
can

have reoognitional components
and so satisfy the demands
of
the premise.
Predicates such as Tedlike* are
suitable
in-

stances Of descriptive predicates.

It is only the surrepti-

tious identification of the
reoognitional component with the
act Of subjective awareness that
makes the argument seem
plausible.
If reoognitional component*
is given this latter
•
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sense,

it obviously follows
that tt« •'ind^ Of
^
objects which
does not allow of the
subjective

awareness-independent object distinction cannot
be the only objects
of experience
But this is not the
sense of the precise.
Subjective judg™ents have a general
component and a particular,
referential
component, and this is all
that is needed for
experiential
judgments.
Subjective judgments do lack
the ground for
distinguishing the subjective
awareness of an object and
the
independent object itself,
but this is not a
requirement of
experience.
So a purely inner
experiencer. one with the use
Of concepts but not the
ability to use objectivity
concepts.
IS not ruled out by
Strawson's sole premise.
It may be that the existence
of a general component

(with comparative function)
in judgments of experience
requires the distinction between
an experiencer and his ex-

periences.

Comparing is a species of relating,
items are
relatable only in a unified
framework,

and so, in the present

case, a single experiencer must
be distinguishable from the
diverse experiences which are
interrelated. But the experi-

encer— experiences distinction

is not the same distinction

as that between the portion of
experience contributed by
the experiencer and the portion
contributed by the independent object. And as I have argued,
only if it must be possible
to distinguish within experience
a part of experience due to
the subject and a part due to the
independent object does it

follow that a purely inner experience is
impossible.

The
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aocep.a.Xe

aoes no.

nsxstent with his theory
of metaphysical
reasoning.
-wson may respond as
follows: I admit
that the experienoerexperience distinction
is different from ..
subjective awareness
inrt
ess-rndependent
object distinction.
But the first distinc/,

equate to describing
the existence of
the first distinction
niust includ© fcer'Tn<5 1 1
Perienoe' and 'subject
of experience.'
But th
+
these terms would be
unavailable if the speaker
could
not. within experience,
distinguish what was due
to the object
and What was due to
himself.
The language describing
the
distinction is parasitic
upon a language describing
the second.
The language lacking
the resources for
making
the second distinction
is incoherent,
consequently, the
putative form of experience
associated with it is
impossible.
The objectivity thesis
is deducible from any
coherent description of a possible
experience,
since the sense datum
language is incoherent, it
is of no concern that
it fails
to entail the objectivity
thesis.
•

Sven if sound, all this
argument would show is that the
purely inner experienoer is
unable to describe, as we
might,

that his judgments contain
general and particular components,
or that he only experienced
subjective states and not objective particulars. 33 The
argument does not establish that
such
a man could not actually
judge which experiences he
was having
at any one time, which
ability is sufficient for experience.
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The ability to
describe or classifv
cj-assify nr,
one’s experiences
is
enough, hy the argument's
o»n
t

starting-point,3\,e need
not
able to classify them
as 'experiences..
So at best
Strawson's objectivity
argument shows that
inner experiencers
are unable to do the
philosophy
P xxosopny of
of* their
own situation.
In suiHj we nave
have bA^n
been given no reason
to believe that
there could not be a
lanffnai^A
language (i) not employing
objectivity
concepts, (ii) usable by
itself, but (iii)
describable only
by means of a richer
language with objectivity
concepts.
It
has not been shown that
any subject of experience
we can make
xntelltgrble to ourselves
must be a user of
objectivity concepts. though it is true
that to make it so
intelligible
to

ourselves we must use such
concepts. But that is
trivial,
since we are drawing the
object-subject distinction in describing the experience.
Therefore, the possibility of
experience has not been shown to
entail the ability to use
objectivity concepts.

V

The limitations of the
objectivity argument can be gen
eralized to Strawson's entire
method of metaphysical reason
ing.
Transcendental arguments are typically
construed as

arguments showing the deductive
consequences of the possibility of experience (or. for some,
the presuppositions of
the possibility of experience,
where presupposition is a
different relation from that of
deductive consequence).
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Strawsonian transcendental
arguments articulate the
analytic
implrcations of any experience
we are able to

describe, the
invariant features of our
conception of experience.
But if
something is entailed by
the fact that we can
conceive of a
possible experience but not
by the nature of possible
experience Itself, there is no
reason to suppose it is
true in
all worlds in which there
is experience.
This Strawsonian method
of articulating the
subjective
conditions of thought so far
as we can describe
it,

the conditions of our
description of thought,

that is,

is the method’

characterized as 'descriptive
metaphysics' in Individnale
The main argumentation of
Individuals is
an instance of

this method which

I

have tried to elucidate,
except there

objectivity is assumed and
spatiality is deduced. The question is this: What are the
conditions of the possibility of
identifying thought about objective
particulars?
Could a

non-spatial scheme provide for
objective particulars, so
that material bodies need not be
the basic particulars of
any scheme capable of making
identifications and reidentif ications?
Strawson argues that directly locatable
particulars
which are or possess material bodies
are. from the point of
view of identification, the ’basic’
particulars of our conceptual scheme. A class of particulars
is

’basic’

if,

and

only if, it is possible to make identifying
references to
to particulars of other classes (those
classes of particulars
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to which we do in
+
n faot
fact identifyingly
refer) only if „e
make
-i

™.

. 1 ...

sess material bodies,
and only this class,
satisfies the
criterion of basicness.
Therefore
inereiore, +Vw=>
these are the basic
particulars of our conceptual
scheme.
so far. the overall
method of argumentation
parallels
the method of parasitism.
The talk of identification

of a

type Of particular without
dependence on particulars
of
other types corresponds
exactly to the talk of
recognizing
a type of particular
within a non-parasitic or
coherent language.
But I want to study and
develop some details of the
argument, both to better
appreciate the stengths and weaknesses of the method, and to
discover whether any of its
inslianccs are correct,

Relativizing the notion of identif
ioational basicness.
let us say that Xs are
identifyingly prior to Ys for a
person
S if. and only if. s could
not identify things of kind
Y

without reference to things of kind

X.

but not conversely.

And Xs are re identifyingly
prior to Ys for S if. and only if.
the reidentification criteria
for things of kind Y turn in
part on the identities of Xs. but
the reidentification
criteria for Xs do not turn on the
identities of particulars
of kind Y.
Mirroring in simplified form our discussion
of

self-sustaining languages, let us say that
X is conceptually
prior to Y for S. just in case S could not
grasp the concept
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Y (us©

"th©

wcprl

'v*

or some synonym or
translation) without
grasprng the concept X.
Put not conversely.
Finally, let us
say that Xs are
epistemologically prior to
Vs for s. provihea
at If S drd not know
that things of kind X
existed, he
could not know that
things of kind Y existed,
hut if 3 did
not know that things
of kind Y ©xist©d
exist©d, h© might still
know
that things of kind X
©xist©d.

Strawson seems to argue
that identif icational
priority
-Plies conceptual priority,
and then, at first hlush.
that
identifxcational priority
implies some sort of
ontological
priority,
support of his claim that
material bodies alone
satisfy the criterion of
identif icational basicness
(that
material bodies are identif
icationally prior to all other
kinds Of particulars), he
argues that if some sorts of
particulars, Y, are in some
general way asymmetrically
dependent
on the identification
of particulars of another
sort, X. then
it would be a general
characteristic of our conceptual
scheme
that^ the ability to talk
about Ys at all is dependent

m

on the

ability to talk about Xs, but
not conv©rs©ly. ^^If xs ar©
identif icationally prior to Ys
then Xs ar© conceptually
prior to Ys. He then adduces
considerations
.

such as the

following; The admission into
our discourse of the range of
particulars, births, conceived as we
conceive them, does require the admission into our
discourse of the range of particulars, animals, conceived as
we conceive them, but not
conversely.
Hence, 'animal' is conceptually
prior to 'birth.'
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Therefore, animals are
identif icationally prior
to births
Therefore, animals are.
in some sense, ontologioally
prior
3’?'
to births.
This argument fallaciously
affirms the consequent.
The
easiest emendation would be
to change the major
premise to
its converse
conceptual priority implies
identif icational
priority.
But this seems to conflict
with Strawson’s stated
enterprise of seeking the
conditions of the possibility
of
identification (and re identif
ication) of objective
particulars.
It seems as if truths about
procedures of identification

-

should serve as premises of
the argument.
On the other hand.
I noted that the
argument of Individuals assumes
the truth
Of the objectivity thesis.

This is tantamount to assuming

that concepts of objective
particulars are conceptually basic
(no other concepts are conceptually
prior to object concepts).
The argument of In d i viduals
could then be most sympathetically
viewed as an effort to establish
the inferences from the

conceptual basicness of objectivity
concepts to the conceptual basicness specifically of
physical object concepts to
the Identif icational basicness of
physical
objects.

What of Strawson's apparent imputation
of ontological
force to the claim of identif icational
basioness? Both
Bergmann and Leclerc have interpreted
Strawson as mistakenly
supposing that the hierarchy of communicating
is the hierarchy
of being. 3°Evidence that Strawson
moves from talk about Ianguage to talk about the world includes his
opening remark

101

that one way ot saying
-we thinh ot the
wcnXa as containing
Objective particulars,
is -our ontology
comprises objective
particulars,,
his claim. .That it
should be possible to
identify particulars of
a ^
eiven
^
seems a necessary condition Of the inclusion
of that type in our
ontology.,-

and his

inferences from identif
lability-dependence of types to
truths
about ontological types,
'^“and his argument
in the final
chapter that appearing as
a logical subject is
not a sure
mark of being an individual.
Usually, philosophers
regard the ontologically
basic
entities, or substances,
either to be those which
are simple
and can only be named,
but not analyzed, ortfeose
which exist
independently.
On the first test,
material objects

are not.
on Strawson. s own showing,
ontologically basic. For him.
all names of looatable
particulars with which we are
not

presently acquainted are complex,
reference to all such items
requires the backing of some
set of descriptions,
since the
perceptually absent members of
the class of material bodies
are non-simple, it would be
entirely gratuitous to assign
privileged on tological status
to the perceptually present
members of that class.
It is difficult to provide an
analysis of the locution

•exists independently, as used
in the second test of ontological basicness.
The most natural candidate
confers ontological basicness on all and only
those things which exist
in all worlds in which anything
exists.
(Relativizing, Xs
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..UK, ..
not exist unless Xs
did, but not conversely.)
if, however
it is. as so.e have
claimed, a necessary
truth that scethLg
exists, then it would
be a necessary truth
that the ontoloSioally basic entities
existed.
Ontologically basic entities
would exist in all
possible worlds.
But then, one .ight
conclude. the distinction
between ontology and logic
would be
obliterated {given that in
a possible worlds
semantics, logical truth is also defined
as truth in all possible
worlds).
But why should we blame the
account of basicness for
this, perhaps overbold,
conclusion? The troublemaker
is
the renunciation of empty
worlds.
After all, if particulars
and universals most
generioally exhaust the ontological
categories. all particulars are
either subjective or objective,
and independent argument
showed that objective
particulars
were ontologically basic,
then, if we further accept
the
thesis that something or other
must exist, we should not balk
at the conclusion that objective
particulars exist necessarily.
It is not as if we wish to
preserve the possibility that
subjective particulars could exist
in the absence of objective particulars
it is the goal of the
dissertation to
rule out this possibility.
So if all particulars are either
subjective or objective, and every
possible world contains
at least one particular, then
objective particulars must
exist.

—

Unfortunately, the preceding argument suffers
from an

,
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unsupported shift fro.
-something .ust exist- to
-see particular must exist.it does not preclude
an exclusive
world Of abstract entities,
fact, since abstract
entities
reputedly exist in all
possible worlds, objective
particulars
could not. according to
the preferred definition
of -ontological basicness.- be the
only ontologically basic
entities,
so the account of basicness
does contribute to

m

the trouble.
No one thinks Platonic
realism compromises the
autonomy of

metaphysics
source of difficulty is the
generality of the account
Of basicness.
Ontological basicness was to be
a consequence
of identificational
basicness.
But identif icational dependencies obtained between classes
of particulars only.
Non-particulars do not exhibit a dependence
on particulars as nonbasic particulars do with respect
to basic particulars.'"
e

So

any thesis concerning ontological
priority ascribable to
Strawson must be restricted to types
of particulars
Whatever -exists independently- means,
it has something
to do with the way the world
is.
Now suppose

it is true that,

relative to our conceptual scheme,
the class of material bodies,
and only that class, satisfies the
criterion of identiflcational basicness.
Can we infer from the fact
that the iden-

tif lability of Ys depends on reference
to Xs. that such iden-

tifiability also depends on the existence
of Xs?

Strawson believe we can?

And does

Or is Strawson more conservatively

concerned to establish an implicative relation
between iden-
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tificational priority (basicness)
and priority (basicness)
Of ontic commitment?
Or is the introduction
of ontic com..itment a spurious complication?

These are the conspicuous

questions at this juncture.

After all, the evidence that
Strawson moves from claims
about language to claims about
the world is shamefully
weak.
It IS true that in the cited
passages he talks about the

constitution of, and conditions for
inclusion in, our ontology.
But elsewhere he identifies an
ontology with a conceptual
scheme, and in still another
place he explicitly disavows
claims to primary existence, sole
reality, or reduoibility
(while suggesting that identif
icational basicness may underlie
these more powerful claims
And why do we think he is arguing
from identif icational
priority to (the unexplained) priority
of ontic commitment?
Well, Strawson said that, relative to
our conceptual scheme,
we can talk about births only if we
can talk about animals,
but not conversely.
Supposing that the inference from conceptual to identif icational dependence is
warranted, it follows that we can identify births only by
reference to animals,
but, even though being an animal entails
being born, we can

identify animals without reference to births.
•We can paraphrase one entailment

Strawson says,

('This is an animal* entails

•There is some birth which is the birth of this*
paraphrased
as *This is an animal* entails *This was born*) so as to

eliminate what logicians might call quantification over births;
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but we cannot paraphrase
the other (-This is a
hirth- entails
•There is an animal of
which this is the birth-)
so as to
eliminate quantification
-^3
over animals.

construing -we can eliminate
quantification over birthswe are not compelled
to hypostatize

births' or 'we need
not be ontically committed
to births.- we generalise,
arguing
that, since we can eliminate
quantification over all but the

identuicationally basic entities,
we need not reify anything
identifioationally dependent.

In particular, we attribute

to Strawson the conclusion
that we need not be ontically
committed to anything but material
bodies (and persons). But
the notion of priority of
ontic commitment here is
trivially
equivalent to the notion of
identif icational priority, so
that any ar guments from the
one to the other would be
otiose.
On the Russell-Quine view,
commitment is carried by the quan-

tified variables (function-satisfiers,
for Russell) of the
canonical language because this
happens to be the referential
apparatus of the language. And so
the general point would
be that we need not countenance
the existence of anything we
need not refer to.
One can say what needs saying by
picking
out other referents.
But identif icational dependents
are

just those things we need not refer
to.

Therefore, to say

that the variables of the canonical
language must range over
Xs is just to say in a particular,
theory-laden way, that
Xs are identifioationally basic.
So compromise talk of ontic commitment is
vacuous.

The
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issue again boils down
to whether we can
infer from the fact
that the identifiability
of fs depends on
reference to Xs
that such identifiability
also depends on the
existence oi
The inference is
invalid unless we add
the premise that
we can refer to Xs
only if xs exist.
The truth of this
precise IS a controversial
question, in chapter III
i shall urge
Its falsity.
And Strawson's own theory
of reference is too
complex to pursue here.
But let these two points
suffice.
If Strawson accepts
the premise, then
Bergmann's and Leclerc's
interpretation of his enterprise
is correct.
And although
IS massive
fa^ie evidence for
acceptance
claims
that a necessary condition
of speaker-hearer
identifying
**
It:rej
T ^
^
^
_
ference to a particular
is the existence of
that particular, 44
that expressions functioning
in the referring role
presuppose
the empirical fact of
existence .^^and so on'^^..

—

V%/-%

.

.

^

my unargued, but arguable
belief that he rejects the
premise.
happy to remain on the level
of identif icational and
conceptual dependencies.
Finally, if we could argue from
conceptual priority
to epistemological priority,
an important link to the antiskeptical conclusion would be
established.
Then,
if the

objectivity thesis

c

ould be proved, we could
directly infer

the impossibility of knowing
subjective states but not ob-

jective particulars.

The best argument

I

can think of fails.

Knowledge requires judgment and
judgment requires the use
of concepts.
Hence, if you could not use various
concepts

10 ?

unless you could use
X-concepts, you could not
make the
various, corresponding
judgments or knowledge
-claims unless
you could make judgments
about Xs. and so could
not know
that the various things
in question existed
unless you knew
that Xs existed.
The final inference
is fallacious, what
follows is only that you
could not know that the
various
in question existed
unless you could make
judgments
about Xs.
Knowledge is not required.
VI
in the last section

have tried to show that
instances
Of the method of
parasitism, or descriptive
metaphysical variations on that method, to be
found in Individuals are
defective.
Of course it does not
follow that the method itself
is faulty.
Are there in Individuals
arguments in favor of
the method? In chapter
2 Strawson considers whether
the
conditions of a non-solipsistic
consciousness can be satisfied
in a purely auditory universe
.'*'^By replacing occurrences
of
auditory particular- with the schematic
•E-particular.' I
we can here find a candidate
for a general argument in
I

,

support of parasitism.
The argument goes as follows,

(1)

Necessarily, if a man

S's E-experience (experience of
Es) is such that he can make
sense of the distinction between
himself and his states, and

something other, then S's experienced
world contains reidentifiable E-particulars, since the
existence of Es is then
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ogxoally independent
of the existence
of one-s states
on
'' logically
possible

ILtV° Should

exist Whethen on not
they wene being
obsenved.
It would not ™ake
)
sense to say thene
logically could be
rexdentxfiable panticulans
in a punely E-wonld
(a wonld with
on y Es nn it)
unless cnitenia of
neidentif ication can be
framed in punely E-ten.s
(exclusively in ten.s of
E-expnessions).
Hence. (3) the conditions
of an act-object
conscxousness can be satisfied
in an E-wonld only
if «e can
descnibe in punely K-ten.s
cnitenia fon neidentif
ication of
E-part;iculars
•

Premise (1) is not an
instance of any tnue,
genenal
prxncxple such as: Hecessanily,
if s can within
expenience
-ke sense of the x-Y distinction,
then the existence of
Ys xs logically
independent of the existence
of Xs. so that
fon S's scheme it is
logically possible that Ys
exist whethen
or not accompanied by
Xs.
The classical distinction
between
rationis and
^3 useful here.
Pen example, we
can mentally abstnact at
least some pnoperties fnom
the individual things Which
instantiate them, but such
pnopenties
cannot exist sepanately.'^SThis
panticulan instance aside,
it centainly seems to be
generally false that just because
a distinction is meaningful
to a man. the relata

^

^

^

of the

dxstinction can exist apart.

The contradictony view is

much like the conceivability-possibility
entailment
ticized in section II of this
chapter.

I

cri-

Y
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It may be urged
that tho

x.

premise which would
justified by such a strong
general principle is
unneeded,
rnce parasitism
arguments are intended
to establish truths
a ou how we must
thinlc. perhaps
what we desire here
is the
aim that if the X-Y
distinction makes sense
to S. then S
must think Of the world
as containing Ys
that can exist independently Of xs. But
even this is too
strong,
.he personstates Of a person
distinction makes sense
to Strawson, but
Strawson rejects a view
of the world in which
states can
exist independently of
persons.
Hence. Strawson need
not
think Of the world as
containing mental states
that can exist
independently of persons,
even though he can make
sense
^e

of

the

person— states

of a person distinction.

What about a weakened
conditional premise the
consequent
Of which states merely
that S must be aWe to
think of the
world as containing Ys
that can exist independently
of Xs?
We might provide a
reading for the antecedent,
-the X—
distinction makes sense to S.so as to render the conditional
tautologous. But if .makes
sense> simply means -is understood.- the premise is
problematic. Again, given
Strawson's
own theory of persons, it
is false.
Strawson finds it inconceivable that mental states
are independently reidentifiable.
In chapter 3 of Individuals
he argues that particular
states of consciousness cannot
be identifyingly referred
to
except as the states of some
identified person,
fact,

m

one of the main contentions
of the book is that the minimum

no
conditions of independent
identif iaMlity for a
type of
particular is that its
members be neither
private nor unObservable.

StiU

more decisively, in
our conceptual scheme,
states
independently. Therefore,
they
oa
n
canLTrT"'""
be independently
identifiable.
But conceptual
priority
entificational priority.
Therefore, we cannot
think Of the world as
containing states of
consciousness
existing at a time at
which no person exists,
if the first
premise of Strawson- s
argument were true, it
would follow
that we cannot make
sense of the distinction
between a person
and his mental
ai statp«s
states.
But we can.
Therefore, the first
premise of the argument
is false.
If we reject the idea
that (1) is justified by
appeal
to a more general
principle, and if „e give
a stronger reading

antecedent, it seems that we
can escape the above
criticism.
Let us read (1) as stating
that, necessarily.
If S can, solely cn the
basis of his experience
of Es, understand the subject-object
distinction, then the Es S experiences are re identifiable
(and so existentially
indepen).
The above criticism startswith
the supposition that
S understands the person-state
of a person distinction.
But it fails to delineate the
genesis of this ability. So
if. for example, s has use
for the distinction even though
he has experienced only
persons, all that follows is that
persons are reidentifiable particulars,
which is as Strawson

,

Ill

wishes it.

argued that the
sense-datum theorist,
who experienoes only sense data,
can understand the
differenoe between
se
and what he is at
any given moment
being presented
-th (though not the dirterenee
between that part of
experience determined by him
and that part determined
by the independent Object), ret
sense data are not
reidentif iable
they lack existential
independence.
I can adduce no
considerations additional to
those offered earlier,
so let us
proceed to examine premise
(2).

Premise (2) states that
it would not make sense
to say
there could be reidentifiable
particulars in a purely E-world
unless criteria of
reidentification can be framed
in purely
E-terms. For whom would
it not make sense
us or the Eexperiencer? Clearly not for
us.
For example, it would
Make sense for us to say
there could be objective
particulars
in a pure sense-datum
world even though the (our)
criteria
for reidentifying objective
particulars cannot be framed in
a pure sense-datura language.
We formulate the criteria
in
our conceptually richer
language.

-

The insight is supposed to
be that if there are reidentifiables in a world with only
Es. so Es must be them, then
the criteria for reidentifying
these items must be formulated

with exclusive use of expressions
about Es.

What is supposed

to be impossible is that a
purely E-experienoer, an Inhabitant
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of a world in which
all things are conceived
to be Es, sensibly say there could
be reidentif iable
hence existentially
.

independent. E-particulars,
by
tn a
a criterion
4+
appeal to
y anneal
formulated in some language
some of the terms of
which purport
to designate particulars
which are not E-particulars.
If we lose sight of
other features of Strawson's
theory,
this premise might appear
controversial, it might be
construed as saying that a
man who thinks that Es
are all there
is cannot, by appeal
to a test formulated
partially or wholly
non E terms, judge whether
he is observing a
different E
from tte one he observed
previously, or observing the
same
E again. But suppose
someone thinks that sensible
macroentities are the only things
that exist, yet allows that
tomic micro-entities are
convenient constructs. Such a
person might meaningfully
formulate a principle of macroentity identity over time in
terms of these theoretical
constructs.
If so, the premise seems to
be falsified.
On a better interpretation,
premise (2) is trivially
true.
If a man conceives everything
to be an E, then all
his individual concepts are
E-concepts and, for Strawson,
all the referential terms of his
language are E-terms.
It
follows that such a man could not
meaningfully formulate a
principle by use of a sentence including
non-E terms. Such
terms are empty vocables or concatenations
of letters for him.
•

So,

(1) necessarily,

if S is a purely E-experiencer who

understands the subject-object distinction,
then Es are for
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hi™ reidentlf iable

and (2) if s can
reidentify these Es,
then the principle by
which he does so «ust
be forn,ulable
within his own. pure
E-language. By transitivity
of i„pUcation one may conclude
that (3') if s is a
purely E-expariencer who understands
the subject-ob ject
distinction, then
S C3.n f orrHuXo.'t© criteria r»f*
of reidentity of Es
in his own language.
Strawson concludes that
(3) if S is a purely E-experiencer who understands the
subject-object distinction,
then
we can describe criteria
for reidentifying Es in
exclusively
E-terms,
if (3.). then (3). since,
according to Strawson,
if someone can formulate
a criterion, we can
describe it.
Analogous to his earlier
affirmed thesis that all
possible
forms of experience are
coherently desoribable and so
describable by us. we now have the
principle that all formulable
criteria of reidentity are
desoribable by us.
,

One might object that
conceptually and epistemologically

privileged beings cannot be ruled
out a priori and there is
no reason to believe that we
could describe the relevant
linguistic (conceptual) activity of
such beings.
In fact,
given the restricted abilities of
creatures conceptually
inferior to us, we have good reason
to disbelieve we could
describe such activity. To undermine
this criticism, we
could restrict the range of
B-experiencers to exclude conceptually superior beings, noting that
such a qualified
Strawsonian argument is interesting enough.
,

It is doubtful that the point of the
criticism is really

s
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undermined.

If we take seriously
the essential role of

conceptual schemes in
interpreting reality, then
we will
allow the possibility of
our inability to describe
the
criteria of reidentity of
even conceptually
primitive people.
If. on the other hand,
-conceptual inferioritysimply means
•having some proper subset
of the conceptual
resources of
the standard (us),- then
the criticism is
parried.

In sum, premise (2) and
the inference from (3-)
to (3)
n.ay be exonerated,
but premise (1) remains
guilty.
But even
if (1) were true, it would
be unsuitable support
for the kind
of anti-skeptical parasitism
arguments we have been considering.
Its antecedent is satisfied
provided that someone both
experiences only Es
makes sense of the sub ject—
object

^

distinction.

But if someone understands the
subject— object
distinction, he has the concept of
an object. But Strawsonanti-skeptical arguments are supposed
to prove that object
concepts are indispensable. Those
arguments tried to show
that certain kinds of pure
experiencers are impossible since
the description of such experiencers
is incoherent, since
the description requires the ability
to use concepts (words)

other than those accessible to the pure
experienoer himself.
For example, experience of just sense
data was argued to be
impossible on the grounds that the description
of such an
experience required objectivity concepts, but
that, ex hvno -

the^, the sense-data experiencer lacked those concepts.

On

the contrary, the present argument assumes
that all the pure
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„ethod turns out to
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VII
in this section-

it:::
and

V

r

I

shall evaluate Strawson's
well-hnown

-- -

- ---

^ -If-nePuting
denial.

raw

„ost general and
powerful conclusions in
criticise
Oi Strawson's
method.
The skeptic asserts
that we can never
now for certain that
the various -distincf
existences which
mmediately apprehend are
numerically identical,
that objects persist through
time.
Roughly. Strawson argues
that
since existents must be
comoared
P ed, enmrxov.comparison requires relation
the existents must be
brought within the same
frame of reference). and such relation
requires the existence of
some
relatively stable objects
maintaining their identity
over
time, the skeptic's
assertion guarantees the
truth of what
he professes to deny. ^9
so far as

can see. the anti-skeptical
argument of
individuals just amounts to saying that the
skeptic cannot
both agree and disagree
with us, cannot accept our
conceptual
scheme which allows for
reidentification of objects and then
always doubt or deny
particular-identity claims about
objects.
This is where descriptive
metaphysics rears
I

its head. We

^
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have, says Strawson,
the idea of a e,4
t
Single
spatiotemporal
ra of material
y
objects. A condition
of having this
-heme is the unquestioning
acceptance of particular
identity
n at least some cases
of non-continuous
observation.

Strawson claims that the
skeptic ‘pretends to accept
a conceptual scheme,
but at the same time
quietly rejects
one Of the conditions
of its employment.

‘50He says that the

skeptic^s doubts are unreal
real since 4-u
they amount to the
rejection
Of the Whole scheme
within which such doubts
makes sense.
This is so because a
unified framework of
identification
encompassing distinct observation
situations is required in
order even to sensibly raise
the question of particular
identity over time, which
in turn requires the
existence of
•satisfiable and commonly satisfiedcriteria for the identity of at least some items
in various ‘subsystems(that
is. frameworks of present,
continuous observation), since
he holds that the fundamental
topological properties
of a

framework must have their analogue
in the features of the
reidentifiable particulars, he
concludes
that the skeptic

cannot legitimately doubt or deny
the existence of these
analogue particulars, which are
material bodies.
First, the final stage of this
argument is untenable.
It requires that the salient
topological properties of a

framework have their analogue in the
reidentifiable parti-culars housed by this framework. But
the locational relations
between the particulars, and not the
dimensions of the
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P r iculars themselves,
ate to he oottelatea
„ith the numhet
dimensions of the frame«orK
in which they are
locatea .51
SO. for example, the
establishment

of a three-aimenslonal
framewor. Ooes not entail
the existence of
three-aimensional
reidentifiable particulars.
Perhaps more strikingly,
the
assumption of a four-dimensional
spatiotemporal framework
does not commit one to
the existence of
space-time worms
supersession of three-dimensional
material

bodies.
Second, and more generally.
Strawson fails to realise
that the skeptic need
not deny the actuality
of our practices.
The Skeptical question
is one of justification.
And so you
cannot refute the skeptic
about some proposition
p by arguing
that if not-p. then not
possibly h. where h describes
various
(perhaps habitual) practices
we share.
The question is whether
we ever justifiably engage
in h.
In particular. Strawson
tells us that the skeptic pretends to accept a scheme which
he really quietly rejects.

But the skeptic's activities
are neither surreptitious nor
illicit.
In rejecting the scheme in
which objective particulars exist, the skeptic is not
denying that it can be used
Upon entering the debate and
formulating his philosophical
views, he himself may openly use
such a scheme. But he is
using concepts which he thinks may
be unnecessary for describable experience, and which he
thinks are employed without rational credentials.
His view is not that we cannot
use objectivity concepts.
We often do.
But their designate
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cannot be shown to be
better than fictions.
we can gain
perspective by comparing
three levels of
argument. We can
articulate the subjective
conditions of
experience, thought, or
judgment, that is. show
which concepts are indispensable
for
to be possible.
Ibis has some
anti-skeptical

^

^

bite
Dite.

v,
It shows
that the re-

ferents of the concepts
in question are not
merely useful
fictions.
But, for all such
an argument shows,
they may
still be fictions, even
if indispensable ones.
Natural
beliefs, indispensable
elements in our mental
makeup, need
net be rationally
defensible. We may call
this procedure
a •metaphysical deductionof such concepts,
Kant thought
this task was accomplished
by his Metaphysical
Deduction
of the Categories.
A transcendental deduction
is needed
to show, as Kant puts
it. -that subjective
conditions of
thought have objective
validity. - 52 that is. that
the concepts everyone must use
in
n oraer
order to
tn make judgments
are rightfully or justifiably so used.
•

.4

Strawson- s method, articulating
the subjective conditions Of thought so far as
we can describe it. that
is. the
conditions of our description
of thought (the descriptive
Metaphysical method), is the
weakest enterprise of all. and
misguided as a response to
epistemological solipsism, strawsonian transcendental arguments,
parasitism arguments, are
regressive or analytical like Kant-s
argument of the Prole gomena.
They assume the general structure
of our conceptual
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0 en,e and

.eg questions of
Justification.

on the

aue^

f^

This misdirected

and neglect of the
cuestio Juris
n-a.es Stra^son-s an
inappropriate response to
the sceptical
thesis.

But »e have not only
discovered the method's
unsuitability. Evaluation of
the objectivity argument
showed that
the sorts Of results
which the method possibly
could issue
in are completely
trivial.
That any self -conscious
experior se lf -describing
language-user, must be a user
of
the concept *my experience,'
or 'my language-use'
(from which
we try to elicit objectivity
concepts), is absolutely
trivial.
The conceptual needs of
the self -reflective
epistemologist
are not the same as those
of the minimally
inquisitive experiencer, yet the latter is
a conscious, judging
agent
nonetheless. Metaphilosophy
is not the weapon to compel
the solipsist’s surrender.
And in this metaphilosophical
task, descriptive metaphysics is no better off than
revisionary metaphysics. For
the structure of human
thinking is either prereflective
or
not.
If it IS, then the descriptive
metaphysician, in revealing and describing this
structure, must also be helping
to create it.
If it is not, thinking must
start with categorial presuppositions, must operate
on a level which is

already philosophical.

In neither case can it be immune to

attack on the level of revisionary
metaphysics.
And it does not follow from the fact
that the structure

s
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Of human thinking
is prereflective.
that the categorial
structure is specincally
determinea in advance,
any more
an it follows from the
fact that I ordinarily
talk about
he world by uaing
spatial, temporal,
causal and mental

concepts, that

am committed to any
particular analysis of
these concepts. 53so
specific conclusions about
our view of
the world, based on
the mere sturiv
i
study n-p
of language
in use, is
also unwarranted.
I

Finally, not only is the
Strawsonian method unsuitable
to our project and
its potential results
uninformative, it
is questionable whether
it can establish any
conclusions
concerning the possibility
of e:,perience .
Even if concept
C is parasitic upon
concept C«. it does not
follow that experiencing Cs presupposes the
ability to experience C>s,
although to experience Cs as
Cs requires the grasp
of c-

(or

the ability to use -C'*
or some other word synonymous
with,
or a translation of. it).
Cs may be experienced under
some
other coextensional but not
cointensional description not
requiring the grasp of C. So.
for example, even if experi-

encing my subjective states as
-states* requires the ability
to use objectivity concepts,
those states may be experienced
under another description, such
as -redlike and roundlike.which does not entail the ability
to use objectivity

concepts,

I

path.

see no redemptive attraction
in following Strawson*

Hampshire, whose method is very much
like Strawson-s.
sums up the fundamental strategy
by arguing that a language
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Which we cannot imagine
being used is not a
language, and
that the sort of language
we can imagine being
used is determined by the language
we ourselves use. so
that we can
fairly infer from features
of our own language
to features
Of anything that we
shall ever describe as a
-language* (and
so allow as a possible
form of experience). 5h„y
ability to
envisage alternatives, my
capacity for thought-experiment,
is obviously limited by
my present conceptual and
attitudinal
equipment, and so depends on
my present conceptual
scheme.
But it cannot be assumed
that the structure of the
scheme
is non-contingent.
And metaphysical possibility
should not
has shown.55conceptual
apparatus creates expectation,
and
expectation creates illusion.
Strawsonian transcendental
argumentation seems to me an
unsanctionable way of doing
metaphysics.

—

f

NOTES

CHAPTER II

Co,;

LtdT"^l9667^p|7^*^lly,^^^

d-onUon. Pethuen o

ms4 59 <i,5«,. 390 .
tony Flew (Lond on
ed. An:~Macmillan
Also reprinted in cSemooreAoTIHTPP- ,21-52. See p. 29.
eds. Irving M. CopI
^^°Slcal Theory ,
and Jamee\
millan Company. I 967
°
ThT”Ma^d
pp iL 127
Robert
Price. 'Descriptive Metaphysics), Ghinp.!
Oxford Common
Room.* Mind (1964): 106-110
in tryiHTto defend
distinction
StrawsoA'^n!^
against language -relativists.
metaphysics

—

Strawson. Individuals

CffT°m7^
application^'*'

^

p,

.

15 ^

^

PP-

''°P<=®P"®

15-

72, and 86 .

empirical criteria of

Ibid., pp. 20, 25. 47.
72, 100, and II 7 , especially
100.

an unS:n?able";rg™en?™o?

ler^rea^is^ °p

P^f

?trpossibiUtr^aS'dlmonstraU^A Sainstl??^

K'

an
^rim'oo^tl^r'^F^j:?
important role in philosophy.. aAd\';nuLe°io ^

really distinguish conceivability
and imaginability. Being able to produce
imagery
is
not
necessary to conceiving the truth of
a prfpoLuon? Fo^
example, we can conceive but not
imagine there being
galaxies Snlike anything that
can imagine.
wrcan^iLginf
So we can conceive
tL
associated states of affairs of whichpropositions
we cannS imagine.

wniiam Kneale, Probability

and Induction (Oxford,

Clarendon Press, 1949), pp. 7

^80

Strawson, The Bounds of Sense ,

p.

:

110.

123

12 .

See John Turk
Saunders anH

iaOSuage

Pro^

d-

u

^

yorlc."So»

13.

argument’itself'^is‘'s™arized^b^°®^ and Identity,' The
follows. 'Some univf^?
Strawson on p. hh6 as
our experience
connected wUh
if ISfare t.^n
oonneoted"with^°°^;-

or^Ilie^^
learnt

®='P®^i®nce?

But*'no^i:°''^-^

^^'"°^^fe'tlvely fd entlf^

r

Henc^

Particulars unless
1hrUngufge'con?aIns'Ivi^ W^nUfied
making demonstratively
iden?t?fi'®* unless
references
-'^^*^’’® singular
f°P particulars,
if this r>nnrf{ +
terms
fulfille™®
Pl®®®
fop
the
generarno^?
snr^J®
something of a particular
°f predicating
and
general notion o^

w

refe“J?Lrto"r;ir?LSl^“!."°’^

U.
beariAg^on the ’one^Aonoerning
®rs®“®'’t has no
us^'^h
® us
about the need for
reference to reidentleif^V
result here is
Strawson's
assIL^el^ty'^he^®^^
^
““if ?1 argument.
Objectivity
Ibid., p. 435.
My underlining.

5.

16.

Ibid., pp, 436-437^

17

Ibid., p. 447^

.

18.

Ibid., p. 448.

19.

Strawson, The Bounds of
„
i
answer to Rortri-HFitlcIii-TA
sAcUoA

20.

21

.

22 .

Ibid., p, 99

Rorty.

i?°"'P®''®

°“p

.

'Strawson's Objectivity
Argument.

'

pp.

219.220.

Ibid., pp. 219-220.

23.

Discussion'I-'Melning^and N® '^ifft Ryle's, in his

19 '19 ), 69-76.
Sellars
argued that semantic s+a+fj example, has powerfully
non-relational (in
any but a purely
predicates are
not names at all
see esnec ia?
Abstract Enti?ieA ' fA IhfpAfiA^ '’A® 'Empiricism and
Philosophy, of Rudolf Carnap.
ed, P.A.
a. hcnilpp
SchilAA (La
Ta Salle:
5 aTT^ Open
Court. l^^TiTpiT^AAbS
(

•

124

25 .

’Strawson.s Objectivity
Argument., p
Strawson. The Bounds
of Sense,
p.

Ibid,, p. 111
27.
28.

,

Ibid., p.

114

Ibid..

107.

3.

Cf.

Kant, BI 34

233

98 .

,

,

29.

'-oogni.
®^^'‘®®^Strawson- s antiLookean-abstractionist view
o?
use (following
°"°®P^^®<=quisition and
Wittgensteinl
concept never means
that 'having a
ture we have found beina ahio
in difeS
oonoepts. and this
"a^s
conoep?!f
use Of the concepts
''^*’®
subseiTJ^Ht
formed
or finding,... not
a picking Lt Tofl%5!!®'^? recognition
interested in from among
feature i am
other -rin+
neously.*
See Geach’s Mental
simulta(New York* Humanities
Press. 1957). p. 4o.
30.

Strawson, Ijie Bounds of
Sense nn inn im
IS presented clearly,
argument
for"
slight ?v different
sl^tly
by Rorty, pp. 216-218.
purposes.

31.

Outirobjlcts^^ PhiloLoMcaf^n”^"^®?"’ 'Strawson on
213-221.
see es ggS laflf
1970).
shift becomes
evident in Strawson
on n
im
C
the recognitional
explains that
comoonent ion
ledgment of experience
acknowas ono'c^i^^^ There
to think this
is
no
reason
potentialitv in n
term or concept from
general
’absorDtiSn*^?n+^^+?^^®
,

•

32.

"Otic.
.i„c.
^
^
concept of
Other persons nno
persons and so
no concept of* myself
concept ^f
any experience i^^rlence'^s^e'c'Llar^f^^^"!
or do any judSinHt all
^ toUfws
that possession of the
co^eft
ncept of nfw'
other
persons
is
necessary for exnevlort,.,.
conscious experience only
if^he^has' not”o"i°^"
®°'"®
objectivity concents or other,
o+hlr" k
* lv"°^
but
the concept of
other oersons
Tf
®?«ld prove this conclusion
false, thir if ^L
F«™®”t (so called
by launders 'and JeLf

f

125

33.

Harrison, pp. 219-220.

34

Strawson, The Bounds of
Sense

.

35.

Strawson, Individuals

36.

18id., p. 17.

37.

Ibid., pp. 51-52.

20.

38-39.

pp.

,

p.

,

38.
Lv"xl

.

1

—

(January/l 963 )r 20 - 39 r^®’’
39.

Strawson. Individuals,

40.

Ibid., p, 16; and throughout.

p.

^
XXXVIII,

i 43

15, and see pp. 119 and
247.

41.

i^Indi^iduals
(

42.

Wlnier: ? 9 l i)

.^3 !g^2

‘Strawson's Ontology
BLilosoohy . 9 ^

^

”

43.

Strawson, Individuals,
pp. 119 and 59.
Ibid., p. 52.

44.

Ibid., pp, 181 and I83.

45.

Ibid., pp. 227, 228 and
236.

46.

Ibid., pp. 237-239.

4?.

Ibid.

48.

Or so

See also

»

0n

Referring.'

see p. 72.

,

I

would argue.

There are some who hold that
separately. Also, an anti-abstractionist^sL^L^R^®!^
such as Berkeley would hold that
the idea of
y IS
?= abstractable
fn
X
from the idea of Y if, and onlv if
^ exists unaccompanied by Y,
which
f
himself, is when and only when it is
pos-'
sible that^Y
sihlethat
X is perceived at' some time and
Y is not
accompanying X. See The PrinilHlS§n j^pwledge. Introduction, sections 10
and^5
^

^

49.

Strawson, Individuals

.

p,

35.

50 .

Ibid.,

51.

B.A. Brody, 'On the Ontological
Priority of Physical
ysicai
Objects,' Nous , V, 2 (May, 1971):
155.

p.

35.

126

52

.

53

.

Sass. Ssi.tique of Puj^ Reason
B122.
These points are
made by Derek A m n
tive* and
McDougall,
'Revisionarv*
u
.

!

•

’DescriT)-

54.

experience for
oontiAuity^'^'^All^of^'T^*'®'*'^'^®^
-neihodoloCT
•?rLscend®''!!'?"^®
?"E®''wnf "^"'P^hire's

55

.

FoundS7w65T7

foreSmpL!°'^'”^""

12 ?

CHAPTER III

supplementary anti -skeptical
resources
Strawson.s method could
not get ue Ueyond
the circle
r Ideas,
A fortified
anti-skeptical artillery
may
fare better.
Paradigm case (with and
without Moorean variations). non-vacuous.
contrast, and verif
icationist arguments
ave been fashionable
anti-skeptical methods.
Stroud has
argued that verificationism
is sufficient to
refute skepticism, and necessary
for transcendental
arguments, hence,
transcendental arguments are
superfluous.! And Nielsen
has
quite recently argued
that the conjunction
of all three methods refutes epistemological
solipsism, and if „ot,
neither
can transcendental
argument.^ Arguments from
self -refutation
have also captured the
fancy of many enemies of
the skeptic,
and some of these foes
think that transcendental
argument
just is argument from
self-refutation. Recall, for
example.
Strawson- 3 remarks in chapter
1 of Indlvidume 3
in this chapter

shall argue that none of
these methods
successfully impugns the
skeptical thesis. The proof
that
paradigm case, non-vacuous
contrast, or verif icationist
resources are not required by
Kantian transcendental method,
and that arguments from self
-refutation are different from
transcendental arguments, comes
in chapter IV. where a
theory of transcendental argument,
untainted by any of
these suggestions, is provided,
and the method is correctly
instantiated.
I

5i
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There is a family
of paradig,„ ease
arguments. There
exist As because here
is X and x XS
is a standard case
of an A
Ts are not Bs because
certain paradigmatic
predicates of Bs
o not apply to
Ys in standard usage,
Zs are not to be
idenfied With Cs because
here is a paradigm
2 which lacks a
necessary condition for
being a paradigm
Traditional
versions of the argument
proceeded as follows. Some
person
asserts ‘There is at least
one F thing.- where
substituends
for -F- are certain
descriptive predicates.
The person understands the sentence he
utters, and since
understanding
a complex designator
requires understanding its
constituents,
he understands its
constituents, in particular,
he understands
F.
But -F- is only definable
ostensively. Therefore,
there
raust have existed at
least one P thing.
There are two ways the
argument might proceed from
here.
It might continue that
since -objective particularis a

descriptive expression of the
appropriate kind, and since
the person understands
what it means, it follows
that some
Objective particulars have
existed.
Typically, though, the
stratagem has been to force
translation of the skeptical
issue into the concrete.
It has been argued, for
example,
that there exist trees and houses
(or hands!), from which
it has been inferred that,
since trees and houses are exemplars of objective particulars,
objective particulars exist.
A notable instance of appeal
to standard examples is
Moore -s.^ Moore holds up his hands
and says to his audience.
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While gesturing «ith one
nana. -Here is one
hand., and. gesturing «ith the other.
-Here is another hand."
„e concludes
fros, this that two
human hands exist at
that time and that
therefore, there at that
time exist objective
particulars.’
Moore anticipates the
dissatisfaction of philosophers
concerning the first premise,
but claims they have no
good reason
for their dissatisfaction,
since although the first
premise
is unprovable (since he
cannot prove he is not at
the relevant time dreaming, for
example), it is nevertheless
Known
for certain.

First we must raise some
questions about the generalised
version of the argument. Must
a man understand all the constituents of an understood,
complex designator? Someone
may
understand the French sentence
-Je ne sais pas’ but understand no French words, and so
none of the constituents
of

the sentence.

And the same kind of situation
can arise
within one’s own language. One may
understand some idiomatic or technical expression
without understanding all. or
even any. of the words making
it up.
And more generally,
it is arguable that whole
declarative sentences, or the

statements which token them at a given
time, are the fundamental units of communication, and that
one can (and must)
understand assertions before understanding
(being able to

define) isolated words.

But even if this objection is correct.

do not think It does serious damage to
the thrust of the
argument. The paradigmist can reformulate
the argument so
I
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as to avoid it.

For
or «Yanir.i«
example, «
Moore need not have
used the
sentence, *Here is a hand •
‘hand- and using an
indicative gesture would
have sufficed
suff^f^ad +
to convey the same
information.
^

The claim that
certain descriptive
phrases are only
definable ostensively
recalls to mind the
more general. Humean
concept empiricist thesis
that all ideas are
copies of impressions, that all empirical
concepts are derived from
instances of the things
characterised. So stated,
as Hume
himself realized, the
principle is clearly false,
you do
not give meaning to the
description .the New Jerusalem,
by
pointing to its purported
referent.
The claim is rather

that all Simple ideas,
which comprise such complex
ideas,
are acquired through
experience of instances. The
ideas of
gold. ruby. etc. are
derived from experience,
but the imaginative Idea Of the New
Jerusalem is derived only
indirectly
through combination of simple
constituents.

But even in its restricted
form, this thesis seems to
identify the meaning of a
descriptive expression with its
reference. But Frege has shown
such a referential or denotative theory of meaning to
be untenable.® Not all coextensional descriptive expressions
are synonymous, and so
the meaning of an expression
is not its reference.
It may be rejoined that to
assume the meaning is never
the reference is question-begging,
and that Fregean considerations are inapplicable to predicates
designating sensible

9
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qualities, or to any
general ter.ns for that
matter.
But
rather than plunging
into Platonistic
semantics, a better
response is that -only
definable ostensively
here means
•must be learned by
reference to cases,- the
issue is one
of concept-acquisition,
not meaningfulness.
When Malcolm
says that there are words
in ordinary language
whose use
implies that they have a
denotation, he does not
mean that
those terms mean what
they denote, but that they
could never
have been learned (and
so used) unless examples
in which
they apply and do not
apply were exhibited.

But even if we are prepared
to accept a restricted
concept empiricist thesis
such that all simple,
sensible
qualities are derived from
experience, the move to objective
particulars such as trees, houses,
and hands is problematic.
There is a difference between
the compresence of redness
and rectangularity and....
and the red. rectangular
house
over there.
Unless objective particulars
are identified

with collocations of sensible
prcferties. it remains unclear
whether the paradigmisfs -objective
particular- la a legi-

timate instantiation of the thesis.

Now we have arrived at the real
issue.

Some expressions

can be learned through descriptions,
some must be learned
by reference to cases. Malcolm
(and the other anti-skeptical
paradigmists) maintains that -objective
particulars- (-material things-) and -it is certain
that- are members of the

latter class

—

expressions comprehensible only by showing.

"
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by exhibiting
instances of their
application
Tt
tor everyone to say
What is wrong Sine
"istaken

“

facts

h..e

;

•*

.

,

about the

ahl!t th"
rect language.
lang

language is corSo ’whenever

rshUr.
P^^^osopher
claims that an
ordinary expression
is self -contradictory
he has
e
the meaning of
that ordinary
expression. .10
First, we Should
notice that Malcolm-s
specific attack
loaves the problematic
idealist unscathed.
Our skeptic does
no hold that. Since
nothing inconsistent
is to be found
i„
nature, xt is a necessary
truth that objective
particulars
0 not exist.
„e merely professes
a universal incapacity
to
prove that they do.
fo say that for all
i know,
a.

there aL
Ots. IS to say that
it does not follow
from what I
icnow "thai; there
are obieotn
t+ is not
j.
objects.
It
to say that it does
j

•

follow from what
I

I

iinow
know

know there are none.

that there are
«
no objects, so that

Also, his criticism
bears only on philosophers
who hold
there are no instances
to which the descriptive
expressions
in question apply, and
only to those who
intend ordinary use
The problematic idealist
escapes on both counts.
He does
not defend the radical
skeptical contention that
no statements
are certain, he rejects
such a view. He just
claims that we
can never know for
I or certain that
objective particulars exist.
the philosophical,
theoretical sense of 'oertainty'
he
uses is not intended to
coincide with the ordinary,
practical
...4

s
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sense.

Hence, the skeptic could
grant with equanimity
that

the ordinary concept
of certainty is
explicable only ostensively.

But the skeptic need not
grant even this. As both
Flew
and Urmson have argued,
the paradigm case
argument applies
to descriptive language
only, and not to evaluative
language.
•certain* is a term of
epistemic appraisal,

it is not a purely

olassificatory expression.

Therefore, the existence of
certainties cannot be established
by appeal to standard
cases.
What about -objective
particular*? is is true that
a
person could not acquire the
concept of objective particularity or the intelligent use
of the expression -objective
particular* unless there existed
actual instances of objective particulars, or. perhaps
more, that acquisition was
eausally dependent on those
instances? since the combination
Of two or more (mutually
consistent) descriptions is itself
a description, and compound,
fictitious descriptions are
readily constructible. it is false
that all descriptive
phrases describe actual entities,
and generally, one can
learn the meaning of phrases
designating non-existent things.
Is -objective particular*

Cmaterial thing*) one of those

expressions whose meaning must be explained
by exhibition
Of actual instances?
Passmore *s remark that -material thing*
is a philosopher*
phrase which plays no part in ordinary
language (and so is
not within the purview of the paradigmist)
seems off target.'^

13 '*

Even if this is
right, -tree

•

.h„

.

p„„„, „

•” "«

.n, 1,
it could be
1.
p established
that anv
^ of these terms have
denotait could be inferY*pr] +vio+ -u
Objective particulars
exist.
er hand, it seens
undeniable that words
such as
•tree, and -house, can
be learned
descriptively, and need
not be learned ostensively.
So perhaps

...

.

the-paradig.ist.s
only hope is to worh
directly on .objective
particular..
But as Chisholm was the
first to point out. not
only
can the acquisition of
various philosophical words
such as
•Imaginary., .possible, and
.nonexistent, (for which we
could
not produce instances
of true application)
be explained by
appeal to methods of contrast
(learn .certain, by
contrast
with .doubt.) and limit
(learn .perfect circle, by
exhibiting
a sequence of shapes
approaching circularity as a
limit),
but the method of illusion
may be used too. That
is. words
can be taught by false or
deceptive examples. We can
learn
how to use .certain, and
.material thing, (.objective
particular.) by observing situations
which we mistakenly take
to have characteristics
they do not in fact have.l3por
the
learning of terms, an apparent
example is as good as a real
one.
Therefore, paradigm case arguments
cannot demonstrate
the reality of objective
particulars.

Flew says with favor, »As that
famous Broadway philosopher Mr. Damon Runyon might have
saidt

*If this is not a

so and so it will at least do
until a so and so comes along.
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By no. „e 3ho„X.
.eaXi.e that this is
.isplaceh unherstate»ent vxs a vis the
sKeptioal issue of this
dissertation
Hume does not deny
that our mental
fictions .ill do
the case of every
paradigm case argument,
the question is
Whether the paradigm
features appealed to are
supported hy
good reasons for the
usage in question being
.hat it is This

m

^-^tion

of

justifies

is not ans.ered by
appeal to cases

Does Moore. s previously
presented proof add anything
to the approaches .e
have Just assessed.
As an allegedly
rigorous proof. Moore-s
argument begs the question.
One
could not know the premise
to be true without
first knowing
the truth of the
conclusion.
If the premise is to
be sufficiently strong for the
deduction, it must be
tantamount
to the Claim that there
here exists exactly one
objective
particular which is a hand and
here (elsewhere) exists
another Objective particular
which is also a hand. After
all.

part Of the demonstration
is the waving of the hand,
but
what else but an objective
particular is perceptually ac-

cessible to various members of
the audience, and so on?
I
wonder if Moore would think his
proof equally successful
if done privately? Then it
would be clear

that if the pre-

mise stated merely that

I

am now acquainted with a group
of

percepts which in ordinary language
is denominated "hand.'
then the conclusion would not
follow, while if the premise
Stated more, it would beg the
question.
There is another, less rigoristic
interpretation of
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S proof.

Offered Py Melsen.
which goes as follows,
0 n shepuc and
non-shepUo can for„alaie
.alid arg^ents
their respective
conclusions. The question
then is
Whose premises are
„ore acceptable^
clearly it is „ore'
Plausible and reasonable
to accept the
empirical truisMs of
the non-sKeptic than
the esoteric premises
of the sheptic
Therefore, it is ™ore
reasonable to accept the
co™™on sense
view Of our knowledge
of the world than the
skeptical view. 15
This version of the
argument is question-begging
too.
But suppose it actually
showed, and not merely
assumed, that
it is more reasonable
to believe the favored
proposition
than some other proposition.
From this fact, even if
the
propositions are contradictories,
it does not even follow
that the favored proposition
is reasonable simolidw
let
alone that it can be known
for t.erxain.
certain
qn this argument
So
poses no threat to
epistemological solipsism.
II

Introduction of a non-vaouous or
significant contrast
principle is intended to support
the faltering paradigm case
argument.
The final objection to
that argument was that
apparent Fs (or the idea of F) are
as good as real ones (or
the veridical experience of
F) for acquiring the use of
or
giving coherent content to the
expression *F.* The nonvaouous contrast principle states
that -F* is meaningfully
applicable to some thing a only if
there are possible cases

13 ?

of as which are no+ p
F.

So, 4.^
to putj. It crudely,
.

just as all
coins cannot be counterfeit,
all ducks cannot be
decoys, all
experiences cannot be dreams,
so all Ps cannot be
apparent.l6
If there are apparent
houses, there are real
ones, and since
houses are objective
particulars, there are objective
partioulars.
Or. more directly, there
are apparent objective
particulars only if there are
actual objective particulars.
Descriptive expressions are
meaningful only if there are
at
least apparent instances of
the things described.
The descriptive expression -objective
particular- is meaningful.
Therefore, there are actual
objective particulars. Or
still
more directly, the expression
-apparent objective particularmakes sense, therefore, non-apparent.
actual objective particulars exist.

The principle is somewhat
obscure.

One may wonder

Whether, for example, if -p. is
replaced by -existent at
some time or other;- it follows
that there are possible
but non-actual objects. Perhaps
this just supports the
claim that existence is not a
(descriptive, first-order,
-determining-) predicate. But let us
ignore these technicalities and suppose the principle is
properly formulated.
In its full generality, the non-vacuous
contrast principle is false.
Let -F- be any predicate which is such
that,

when ascribed to a subject, it becomes an
instance of a
logical truth, for example, -lives in
Massachusetts

or does

not.

-

Such predicates are meaningfully applicable
to the
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appropriate kind of thi nir

4.u

instances
kind which lack 4-iaA
the property expressed
hy the predicate.
avoid this difficulty,
let us restrict the
principle to non-logical,
descriptive predicates!
that is all
we need to strengthen
the paradigm case
argument anyway
But the principle is
still false.
The existence of
necessary
truths discredits the
principle. For example,
let -F. he
•Sibling, and -a. he
-hrother. (or -John's
brother,, if
insist on a singular term
as replacement for
-a.).
There
can he no brothers who
are not siblings, yet
sibling
"that

is a

descriptive predicate.

To continue to defend
the principle

by ruling out necessary
truths would be tantamount
to reducing
it to an explication of
.logically contingent.rendering it
useless.

Most important, even if
the principle were true,
it
could not establish the
conclusion we seek. The most
we
could conclude, using the
principle, is that

it is possible,

for all we know, that objective
particulars exist. We could
not conclude that objective
particulars do exist, and so
could not conclude that we can
know for certain that objective particulars exist. At
best it shows that we cannot know
that objective particulars do not
exist.
It would show that
skepticism cannot be established, not
that anti-skepticism
can be established.
Finally, careful diagnosis of the two
recently considered
brands of anti-skepticisra^rfailing
in common with parasitism.
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the apparent and
na the
zne rpai
real, and so on.

lunT; o

T

But they fail to

actual use of any of
these.
about justification,
not practice.
e

Again, he worries

Ill

A representative version
of the verif icationist
principle Of »eaningfulness
asserts that a sentence
expressing
a non-analytic statement
is cognitively
meaningful if. and
only if. it expresses
a statement that can.
at least in

principle, be shown to be
true or shown to be
false, by
reference to empirical
observations. The history
of attempts
at satisfactorily
formulating a verif icationist
principle is
notorious the list of
counterexamples is as long as
the
liat Of proffered formulations.
Universal statements such
scientific laws, statements
about the past and the
future,
statements about the experiences
of other people, negative
existential statements, as well
as singular statements about
objective particulars themselves,
provide falsification
I

of

(various forms of) the principle.
17^3 perennially attractive
as the principle may be, no
good reasons have been given
for

accepting any strong version

-

any version which requires

the possibility of conclusive
verifiability and not merely
degree of evidential support.
I cannot in this context hope

to contribute much
to the extensive
literature on verifi

cationism

^

lation to transcendental
arguments and skepticism
in his germinal article
on this question.
Stroud argues
that a transcendental
argument without a verif
icationist
premise fails to refute
skepticism, while a
transcendental
argument with a verificationist
premise is superfluous,
since
verif ioationism alone
directly refutes skepticism.
18so whether
or not verificationism
is tenable. l must
show that transcer
dental arguments do not
require appeal to it.
For if transcendental arguments require
a verificationist
premise and

verificationism is untenable,
then transcendental
arguments
are unsound.
And if transcendental
arguments require
a

verificationist premise and
verificationism is tenable,
then
given that verificationism
by

itself suffices to refute
skepticism, transcendental
arguments are superfluous.

This question takes on
added interest if Thomson
is
right in arguing that the
conjunction of premises constituting the private language
argument amounts to a version
of
the principle of strong
verifiability. 19Then transcendental
arguments can be sound only if
(the) private language argument (s) are sound. Since I
argued in chapter II that the
private language argument is a
parasitism argument, and that
parasitism arguments are unsound,
it would follow that transcendental arguments cannot be sound.

Stroud's skeptic claims that (i) a
particular class of
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propositions makes sense,
and (ii)
any of them are
true
..
st

that(l)
th
.
(1) the
truth

„

^—n-^entalist

Claims

of (i)
is
I
IS a necessary
;
condition of the
meaningf ulness of the <sir<ar>-M
skepticali position
expressed in (ii)
’’
and (2) the falsity
of (ii)
„
necessary condition
of the
truth of rn
,
(i).
(2)^ says that if
propositions of a certain
ki^ d
^
are meaningful it
must be possible
+
w,
pnasible to
know
if they (some
of
them) ,
*
.

^

verificationprecise statement of
this principle as
applied to
the skeptical thesis
is ®
given as foil
follows. *lf the
notion of
^jective particulars makes
sense to us. then we
can sometimes
ow certain conditions
to be fulfilled,
the fulfillment
of
Which logically implies
either that objects
continue to exist
unperoeived or that they
do not. -20
.

,

r
The

.

Stroud holds that this
principle provides a
direct and
conclusive answer to the
skentif»
since it follows from
P
the
principle that if the
skeptic*s claim that we
can never know
that Objects continue
to exist unperceived
makes sense, it
must be false, since if
the proposition that
objects continue to exist unperceived
could not be known to be
true or
known to be false, it
would make no sense.
But Stroud -s
inference is invalid.
If the proposition that
objects continue to exist makes sense,
then, according to his
explicitly
formulated principle, either
it or its contradictory
can be
conclusively verified. But
nothing in the verificationist
principle guarantees that the
realist proposition rather

142

than its skeptical
denial
truth
truth.

win

+

"

. so
And
nothing- in +v.^
.

conclusively refutes

the skeptical thesis.

If a class Of
propositions makes sense
only if it is

false that «e can never
know whether any one
of them is true,
i
follows at best that
complete suspension of
,ui^ent on
all questions of
particular reidentity is
illegitimate.
But to deny our knowledge
of persistence is.
on these grounds,
as respectahle as
affirming it. To avoid
this criticism.
Stroud-s verificationist
must delete the final
disjunct of
^3 principle and so
maintain that the notion
of objective
particulars makes sense to
us only if we can
sometimes know
^hft-t ccrtsin
critisrla
riteria entailing the
existence of unperoeived
Objects are satisfied.
Generally, all meaningful
claims
would have to be conclusively
verifiable, and not merely
verifiable or falsifiable.
But the general principle
is
Obviously wrong, it entails
that everything understood
is
true, everything meaningfully
talked about exists.
If so,
the claim about objective
particulars cannot be justified'
as an instance of (this
version of) verif icationism.
»

Rorty has argued that Stroud
is wrong to require that
all transcendental arguments
be supplemented by strong
verifioationism. He argues that a
weakened brand of verificationism which makes meaningfulness
depend, not on

word-world

connections, but on connections
between various pieces of
linguistic behavior, is acceptable
and sufficient supplemen-

..«.r .».. s,„..„..,

•re™„,

,»,,

^

„

think about Objective
particulars
R nicuxars.
Rort claims
,
.
Rorty
that we
cannot know in advance
whether
•ner an alternative
altemof
scheme (language) Will Pe parasitic
upon the conventional
one. but that
we must evaluate
each alternative
separately.
Parasitism
arguments were seen to be
too weak.
They at best establish
relations among our beliefs
(conceptual dependencies),
and
cannot show anything about
what there is or what we
know
there is. Consequently,
for our purposes. Rorty-s
answer
to Stroud is besides
the
point.

Hacker provides the skeptic
with another, though not
very attractive, way of
slipping the verif icatlonist
punch.
He argues that
verificationism. even if correct,
cannot refute skepticism with
respect to a restricted

class of propositions, since it remains
open to the skeptic to
reject
the whole, restricted
class as meaningless while
retaining
the class of propositions
he endorses as meaningful
and true, 22
This does appear to be a
logical option. Where the
rejected
class is the class of objective
judgments, this possibility
is equivalent to the
possibility of a purely inner
experience.
Since we have not yet established
the impossibility
of a

purely inner experience, we cannot
yet rule out Hacker's
escape route from verificationism.

On the other hand, if
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verifioationism is correct
and if the sKeptic
skeptic eacknowledges
Vr,
i
that ft
^
^
(and so understands
it), hut denies
the „eaning^ ness Of Objective
judgments, then we seem
to have a read absurd um of such
a saeptio.
skeptic
nf
Of course another
skeptic could say,
v*
y. *i doubt tvia+
that objective
judgments are
true, they may be
either false or
meaningless.'
I shall show that
successful transcendental
arguments
0 not rest on any
version of strong
verifioationism. By
doing this I meet Stroud's
challenge, show that
Rorty is
wrong to say that
transcendental arguments
are at best parasxtism arguments, and
escape appeal to Hacker's
distasteful
suggestion.
i engage this
task in the final chapter.
,

.

IV

Before trying to achieve
a general, unified
understanding
Of arguments from
self-refutation, it will be
instructive to
consider two specific, allegedly
transcendental, attacks on
epistemological solipsism
Srzednicki's and Bennett's.
Srsednicki's argument provides
us with a useful bridge
between the appeals to
conditions of language-acquisition
discussed in sections I and II.
and the strict arguments
from
self-refutation discussed in
section VI. Bennett's argument
IS a challenging version of
parasitism which tries to go
beyond concept dependencies
and escape the circle of our
ideas.
Srzednicki's overall strategy is
to show that if solipsism
were true, its statement would
be unintelligible,

-

hence, the
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"*• »««>."« 1. pr.,.„,„
i„
Of h.s article.
3330Upsis™ is the view that
(A) I a. the
on y Object in the
world, and (B) all
appearances of the
existence of other things
are Misleading.

Pipp^UsM, the

contrary View, denies
both (A) and (B).
that solipsism is
false.

We wish to show

suppose that (1) solipsisM
is true and provides
a deP ion of the nature of the
world as such. Then
(2) i am
Identical with the world.
Hence. (3) .j. has refe
Object other than Ilacks reference. Hence.
(5) the
concept -object other
than !• cannot be formed
by anybody nor
(if per imEossible it
was formed) could it
have application
so (6) it is impossible
to state in the terms
provided the
possibility that in this
world something other
than 1. vis.
this world, could exist.
Hence if
ir solipsism
s
is true, then
(7) neither solipsism nor
pluralism can be stated. The
falsity of solipsism is a
necessary condition of the
possibility
Of any discussion of
the problem.
But
^

.

•

(8) the

solipsism-

pluralism controversy can be
stated and argued about.
fore, (9) solipsism is
false.
The argument is at best
enthymematic.

does not follow from its
predecessors.

There-

Minimally. (5)

(4) does not imply

We correctly use many
non-denoting expressions, and
form and use intelligently
many empty, fictitious concepts.
Presumably, the supposition
(1) is intended to reveal something
(5).
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raises to justify
the inference
nierence.
thfc task
^
,
in

since Srzednioki
addresses

somewhat desultory
fashion. I shall try
to sysematxze those considerations
which seem to underlie
his

arguraent.

A concept is 'borrowed*
relative to a wor*ir^
world or segment
f that world or
world -segment, that is.
could not he framed

in that world.

Borrowed concepts cannot
he -used, or applied
in the horrower.s world,
where to say that a
concept cannot
be •used* in a world
is to say that it
could mark no discriminations in that world,
or. more broadly
(and more vaguelybut this is Srzednicki.s
own phrase), that no
idea would he
conveyed hy it.25oi,,„ ,,,3
understanding of -concept-usahility.' we note that
although all borrowed concepts
may be
unusable, perhaps not all
unusable concepts are borrowed,
consider our concept -thing.,
construed in its broadest sense.
If everything is a thing,
the ascription of thinghood
fails
to discriminate among
items of the world.
Hence, according
to the definition offered,
the concept -thing- would
be unusable. But we can frame
or acquire the concept
-thing- (in
our world).
Hence, it is not borrowed.

Using these notions, during the
course of his article
Srzednicki seems to affirm the
following principles.

I

14?

i"*

ttenoSd%innot"mai'*i
maintain that they
have that concept
. 27

coi^si'sJ s;™;';,';*
?;rS3"S'.3,’Sr
the world in which
it opeStes!29

°f!*^®*^*°rld“htve%oL^idea“^

in

>

inhabitants

thing that^coL^uLerthf
concept
concft®"
and something
that fails to. 30
’

(P6) If someone affirms
tha+ ov, «
all the relevant
specifies fully
featwet of th»"^Present
world, then he must
actual
affi™ +h»!?

for giving the account
cannot ^e^bwowld?^!®®®®'"^
Recall that the strategy
of the proof is to
show that
if solipsism were true,
the conditions necessary
for the
formation and/or employment
of the concept -object
other
than I. would not be
fulfilled, so that solipsism
would be
unintelligible.
The mere intelligible
statement
of the

solipsism-pluralism controversy
(or of either position
separately, for that matter)
would then constitute a
proof
Of the falsity of
solipsism.

Given (1), (2) follows by
simplification, and (3) and
('^) follow by the
semantic definition of reference.
And
premise (8) is a matter of
fact.
The question,
then, is

whether

5 )-( 7 ). given supportive principles
(P 1 )-(P 6 ). are
derivable from (1). if they
are. then we
(

must ask whether

all the members of the set
of principles necessary and
sufficient for the derivation are
true.
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the conjunctive
claim that the concept
•otject other than !•
cannot be
h» formed
e
.
by anybody and conveys no idea to anybody
(in a world correctly
described by
solipsism). Kccussing
on the second
conjunct, how do we
get that the concept
.object other than !•
conveys no idea
from its lack of reference
and the fact that
solipsism describes the world. (PI)
tells us that a concept
(5)

must conThe notion of -conveying
an idea* is so vague
that, in the absence
of explication. (Pi)
says little more
than that concepts must
be concepts.
If by -conveys an
ideaSrzednicki means -is associated
with a mental image.then
the pricniple is
untenable.
On other readings it
might fare
better.
The point is that a
careful assessment of (Pi)
requires a preliminary
determination of the theory
of concepts
presupposed.
Some of the other
principles provide sufficient
clues to this. So tentatively,
let us suspend judgment
on (PI).
(P2) states that it is
impossible to attribute the
possession of unusable concepts
to oneself,
if an alleged
concept -conveys no idea- to
a man, then that man
cannot use
it in making intelligible
assertions at all, and so, instantiating, cannot use it in
making intelligible

vey an idea.

assertions

about itself (or himself).

But (P2) tells us that certain

things are true, if a certain
concept conveys no idea. Since
we wish to establish that
a certain concept, the concept
•object other than I,- conveys
no idea, and since we have
no independent way of determining
the truth value of the claim
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that people in a
world in whlnh
I' conveys
nn
ea cannot ascribe
to themselves the
ability to use that
concept
.ustiiication «e see.
states that a complex
of concepts, each
of which
conveys an idea, may
itself fail to convey
an idea. Examination Of Srsednichi.s
remarks in connection
with this princxple helps pin down
the meaning he gives
to .conveys an
idea.
Srzednicki holds that all
impossiblf^
impossible or uninstantiable
predicates express the same
concept. 32por example,
-round
square, and .female
father- express the same
concept. But
he also holds that
these predicates differ
in sense or meaning.
This is explained by
the difference in sense
of their
applicable constituents. 33rpj^ereforp
^
inererore, concepts
and meanings
are dissociated,
particular, terms expressing
unusable
concepts may still be
perfectly meaningful. An
expression
can be meaningful yet
-convey no idea.-

-

m

So.

-is meaningful- and
-conveys an idea- are neither

logically nor material
equivalent.

But this result under-

ines the line of reasoning
we have been pursuing.
The
argument was to proceed from
the borrowedness of -object
other than I- to its unusability
to the impossibility of
its
contributing to the statement of
a meaningful solipsistic
thesis.
But the last link in this
chain breaks down
predicates designating unusable
concepts may be meaningful.

—

(Ph) and

(P 5 ) cannot save matters.

truth which does no work.

(P 5 ),

(PA)

is a trivial

that those possessing
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usable concepts must
be able to v-v^njure
conjure up
uo instances
in=+
and
non-instances o. those
concepts, is a .in.
ol non-vacuous
contrast principle for
concept-usability (rather
than meanngfulness). But if the
connection between
concepts and
meanings is broken, this
principle IS
Pi.xncipie
is useless for
showing
that solipsism is
meaningless if true.
We can escape all
these difficulties by
ignoring Srtednicki's lead and purging
the argument of all
reference to
concept-usability. As a
parasitism argument the
argument

lacks all promise.

But if we take the
genetic concept of
borrowedness as the crux of
the argument, take
conceptformation and not intelligibility
as the issue, then the
argument is straightforward
and provocative. Because
(A) I
am identical with the
world, i cannot say (B)
all appearances
Of the existence of other
things are misleading, since
I

could not form a concept
used essentially in (B).
The concept -Object other than Icannot be formed in the
solipsistic
universe which, according to
the solipsist, is the one,
true
universe. Assuming the
equivalence between having a
concept
and being able to use and
understand words, we conclude that
conjunct (B) cannot be stated or
understood by anyone if
conjunct (A) is true, since if
(A), the concept -object
other than I- cannot be formed
by anybody, and if a concept
cannot be formed by anybody, then
(unless it
is innate) it

cannot be possessed by anybody, and
so nobody could use it
in making judgments.
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(P6) captures this
new line of argument.
tion is supposed to be
a

If a descrip-

complete description of
everything
(relevant) in the world,
then no borrowed concepts,
concepts
Which cannot be framed in
the world, can be
required for
providing this description.
Instantiating, when the solip.
sist utters the sounds
purporting to express theses
(A) and
(B). adding that these
completely describe what there
is and

What can be known, all these
sounds must be words which
express possessed and so
acquirable
concepts, otherwise the

solipsist is merely making
noises.
But in a world exhausted
by the solipsist himself
the concept of something
other than
himself, that is. something other
than the world, cannot be
acquired and so is not possessed.
Therefore, in the solipsistic world, nothing intelligible
can be said about any
non-self. Thesis (B) is intended
to say something about
some non-self.
Therefore, thesis (B) must fail to
express
the proposition intended by the
solipsist-speaker.
But it

IS rightly agreed by all
disputants that (B) does express

a proposition about something other
than the solipsistspeaker's self. Therefore, the
supposition that (A&B)

completely and correctly describes the
world must be false.
The foregoing argument is defective.
The world
is

identical with the world.

So of course it follows that

necessarily, nothing exists which is not the
world or some
part of it. But it does not follow, and it
is false,

that

we cannot frame a concept of something not
in the world.
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(P6) says that a
ecMplete specification
of all the relevant
features of the world
cannot use

borrowed concepts,

are the .relevantfeatures.

what

Loohing at the account
given
they are what really
exists and what can and
cannot be

hno^n.

(A) is the metaphysical
thesis that a complete
enumeration

Of substances contains
but one item

temologxcal thesis that if

-

„e.

(b,

i, ,,, ,^, 3 .

think there are substances
other than myself. i am
wrong.
The metaphysical thesis
carries the weight Of the
argument, since it entails
the epistemological thesis. But
there has been no
inconsistency
established between (A) and
the fact that the subject
mentioned in (A) has an extensive
repertoire of concepts, including the concept -object
other than I.- The fact
that
there is but one substance
does not rule out a host
I

of

truths about non-substances.

To succeed, the argument
must

wrongly assume that all objects
of thought must exist.
Anyhow, it seems to me that
-object other than

not a borrowed concept in a
solipsistic world.
Srzednicki-s pluralistic account
of the world.

it excludes round squares.

is not borrowed.

is

Compare

Presumably

Yet the concept -round square-

It is a complex concept with
applicable

and so frameable constituents.
account.

I-

Similarly with the solipsistic

It excludes the existence of something
other than

the solipsist- s conscious self.

Yet the concept of something

other than the solipsist- s conscious
self need not be borrowed
for the very same reasons as above
it is a complex concept

-
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..... •.• „<,

„,„

something diverse from
mvself
myself.
proponent of the argument

..

„„

t+
<
It IS
acknowledged by the

that the solipsist
can frame the
ncept I.
And, simply by inspecting
the successive contents of his consciousness
and being aware of
their successiveness. or the variety
of sensory qualities
they present,
etc., the solipsist
can frame a concept of
diversity. Therefore. the solipsist can
meaningfully assert (A4B).3^
Finally, we should note
that the kind of argument
we
have been considering
is even less plausible
against a

faithfully formulated version
of epistemological
solipsism.
After all. the epistemological
solipsist position is really
something like, for all I
know, ray mental
states constitute

the universe, or.

am not justified in believing
that things
other than my mental states
exist.
It is not a metaphysical
thesis.
But now it becomes more
evident that things other
than I or my mental states
are thinkable . that claims
about
these other things are meaningfully
expressible.
I

It is just,

it IS claimed, that the
existence of such other things
is
not k nqwable . So solipsism
is conceivable, and is not
to
be dismissed as meaningless.
Or at least the considerations

adduced by Srzednicki do not show
otherwise.

In l^ntVs Analyti c, Bennett’s overall
thesis is much
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Uke

Strawson's, the most
interesting truths ^ *
•synthetic a priori' »
^Obviously analytic
truths about
the conditions
a
under which certain
distinctions can be
made ’
under which certain
concepts have a
signincant use.35
The unobviously
analytic is simply
the complex result
or a
•

”

..ly

"

qyir..
..

, 0..
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Cartesian argument. 38
A man having a
purely present tense
language in which
e describes each
of his inner states
as it occurs cannot
describe his states at
earlier times. He
u can
have grounds
for saying 'I was thus
at t' if. and only if.
he has grounds

for saying 'l recollect
being thus at t.' so
there is a oneone correspondence
between what is said
about past states
and present recollections.
Hence, his concept of
the past
is non -functional;
none of his
j-b present
oreqent e•^^.+
u intellistates could
gibly be described as
'recollections,
contrast, for the
ordinary man several of his
present recollections may
bear
an evidential relation
to a single judgment
about his past,
so that his concept of
the past is not idle,
being at least
useful in summing up data.
Hence, since in the solipsist's
scheme the past collapses
into the present, he cannot
make
.

m
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Judgments about his past,
he has no oonoept
of the past.
The solipsists perceptions cannot he
brought under
the concept of the
past, his purel,
p.i.ate language cannot
ave a past tense.
Now it is impossible
that a man S knows
that he is so-and-so
if being so-and-so
excludes self-consciousness, -Being so-and-so
excludes self-consciousness
for
s- entails -s does
hot know that he is
so-and-so.- But s
is self-conscious only
if s can use the
concept -this is
how it is with me,- or.
equivalently for Bennett,
the concept
•my experience now.And the ability to use
the concept•my experience nowrequires the ability to use
the concept
y experience then.- Therefore,
self-consciousness requires
knowledge of the past.
Therefore, nobody could know
that
anyone, including himself,
was having a purely inner
experience.
No one could know that
S both (a) has only
immediate
experience, that is. knowledge
of his present only,
and

(b)

has no knowledge of the
past,

himself.

s could not know (b) of

S could not know (a) of
someone other than himself,

since to know this would require
knowledge that there was
some objective realm with which
both creatures were sensorily
confronted.
Therefore, it is not possible
that S knows what
his inner experience is like
while wondering whether there
IS an objective world.
If s knows what his inner
experience
is like, he must know something
of its past history, and so
inhabit an objective world and know
that he does so.
This
is the refutation of problematic
idealism.
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The first stage of
Bennett's argument,
which tries to
estahlxsh that an inner
experienoer with a purely
present
tense language has no
concept of the past,
rests on the
peculiar principle that
no one possesses
non-functional concepts.
Earlier in KanVs
balletic Bennett explicitly
endorses a similar principle.
39Agreeing with Quine
that questions about truth always
involve questions about
conceptual
efficiency, that ultimately
the true theory is
the one which
copes most economically
with the facts, he derives
the consequence that 'if one has
a language L in which
to describe
a suboect-matter s.
it is legitimate to
add a new concept
C to the stock Of
concepts in L in proportion
as L-with-C
can describe s more simply
than can L-without-C.
•
instantiating. it is legitimate
for the inner experienoer
to add
a concept of the past
to his repertoire of
concepts describing ooourrent inner states
to the extent that this
addition

will simplify description of
certain phenomena (in this
ease
the phenomena of recollection).
Perhaps it is plausible to
connect functionality and
efficiency with legitimacy,
although this flagrantly violates a skeptical tenet which
was procedurally assumed in
chapter I. But the connection
between any of these features
and the de facto having of
concepts is extremely

tenuous.
And It is just this latter
connection that is required for
Bennett's argument, which concludes
that the inner experienoer
has no concept of the past from
the fact that there is no

non-redundant function such
a concept would serve
such an
experaencer. But do no
elements of a .an-s
conceputal schene
upUcate capacities? Are all
schemes perfectly

parsin.onious

That a concept lacks a
distinctive use fails to
iniply
that it lacks a use.
although it does seem
vacuous to say
that a man might possess
a concept for which he
could have
no use.
so it might be thought
that Bennett is arguing
not
inner experiencer can have
no concept of
the past,’

but that he cannot have our
concept of the past, and
this
because he could have no use
for such a concept. But
this
cannot be right, if 'could
have no use for' means
'must be
useless to.' Bennett clearly
feels that acquisition of
our
concept of the past would be
immensely useful to the inner
experiencer.
On the other hand, the inner
experiencer with
the purely present tense language
cannot have our concept of
the past, but this is so merely
in virtue of the defining
characteristics of his position. Hence,
if the first stage
of Bennett's argument is
designed to show that the solipsist
of the moment lacks our concept
of the past, then argument
is uncalled for
it is true by stipulation.
But if its
purpose is to prove that such an
experiencer can have no

—

backward-looking concepts at all. then

I

think it has failed

to achieve that purpose.

Still, suppose the sub-conclusion is true

—

the solip-

sist has no concept of the past and so cannot
make judgments

about the past.

And let us grant the general principle that
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SO~3n(i«go ©XClllrtAo « ^ 1 ^

®«lf-=onsciousness for s
entails that
so-and-so. and the
instantiation
thar*L"°kao mg the concept
of the past excludes
self-consciousness for S- entails
that S does not know
that he lacks a
concept Of the past.
So far, nothing new
of interest follows
suppose further, then,
that we accept the
i»plicandu™
that lacking the concept
of the past excludes
self-consciousness for S.
Then S is self-conscious
only if he has
he
a concept
1
the past,
Bennett proceeds tn
a
to conclude
that self-consciousness requires knowl^
of the past.'^O^hi^
„ove is without
Justification.
The ability to use
concepts „ay he the ability
to make judgments, but
it is certainly not
to be identified
the ability to make
justified, true judgments.
Selfconsciousness may require a
concept of the past, but
it
would suffice to satisfy
this requirement that S
merely
believe, even believe wrongly,
even be able to believe
wrongly,
that he has a past,
, ,

Yet if we grant that S
can know he lacks a concept
of
past only if he is self-conscious,
then, since the solipsist lacks a concept of the
past (according to the argument),
and self-consciousness
requires a concept
of the past, the

solipsist cannot know he lacks
a concept of the past.
If he cannot know he lacks
a concept

But

of the past, he cannot

know he cannot make judgments
about his past.
But if he cannot know he cannot make judgments
about his past, he cannot
know he cannot make justified,
true judgments about his past.

.

1S9

and so cannot know
he has no knowledge
of the past.
This
.-es us half Of Bennetfs
conclusion, that S
cannot know
(^) Of himself.
But this, as with
Strawson-s objectivity
ar.ue.ent. is Just to
say that a purely
inner experiencer
cannot recognize his
epistemic status, not
that a purely
inner experience is
impossible.
in order to shbw that

no^.

not even us. could
know
that anyone was having
a purely inner experience.
Bennett
further argues that no one
could know of someone
other than
himself that he had only
immediate experience.
The key step
here is that if s were
able to know that another
knows only
his present state. S
would have to know that
there is an
objective world with which
he and the other are
sensorily
confronted. But why is this
true? If s knows there
is
another creature, he knows
there is an objective world.
And S knows this world
sensorily affects himself because
he
sees the other creature.
But how does S know the world
sensorily affects the other
creature? The only available
answer
is that the other creature
is having inner experience.
But
this is illicit grounding for
the conclusion that the inner
experiencer* s states are caused by
the objective world.
It
begs the question.

Bennett claims that his argument
shows that a purely
inner experiencer is not a real
possibilityi but by ’real
possibility* he means ’can be known
to be realized
by his own account, all that
his argument could establish
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IS that we could not
know epistemological
skepticism to be
true.
This is not the
anti-skeptical thesis we
want, and
in the absence of some
ill-fated, strong verif
icationist
principle, there is no way
of getting from
Bennett's to the
desired result.
One might complain that
Bennett has been unnecessarily
sympathetic and I. unnecessarily
unsympathetic. Bennett,
using the proposition that
lacking a concept of the
past

excludes self-consciousness,
argued that a purely inner
exp rience (or purely private language),
though not logically
impossible, cannot be known to
be realised.
After criticising his argument. 1 protested
that, in any event, its conclusion is too weak. But if the
argument were reconstructed
using the proposition that
consciousness (and

not just self-

consciousness). or the use of any
language at all, required
possession of a concept of the past.
then, mutatls mutandis,
we could infer that a purely
inner experience is a logical
impossibility. And the critic might
remind me that
I,

a

defender of Kantian transcendental
argument, would not wish
to deny that any act of consciousness,
any synthesis
of the

manifold, requires apprehension, reproduction
,
and recognition in a concept.
The reminder rests on misunderstanding

—

as a pre-

ref lective activity, reproduction of
the manifold is not
an instance of knowledge of. or belief
about, the past.

Nevertheless, we did allow that judging (thinking)
requires
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relating items in a unified
consciousness (and so
requires
distinguishability between haver
and items
of experience)

It is plausible to think
that a unified consciousness
requires the ability to look
backward and compare what
occurred

with what is now occurring.

Suppose pursuing this line
of
argument succeeded in showing
that solipsism of the
moment
is logically impossible,
and not just -really
impossible.would this entail the falsity
of the skeptical thesis?
Not
by itself. What is also
needed is an argument to
show that
an experience of past and
present mental states alone
is
impossible, that a language with
a functional past and
pre
sent tense roust be non-private.

That the dialectics of the issue
have driven me to this
point is disquieting, and
understandably i shall decline in
this dissertation from canvassing
sentiment for and against
the morass of related questions
which comprise the privatelanguage problem.
l here offer only a summary
statement of
the problem which directly
confrcnts us now, and what I think
is an appropriate reply.
As discussed by Saunders and Henze,
Wittgensteinians
have argued that, necessarily, any
language all of whose
words refer to experiential data
(present or past), none
of which entails or is entailed by
the existence of any

publicly observable phenomena, is a language
that only
the speaker/user could (logically) understand,
but that

such a private, incommunicable language is impossible.
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most celebrated

U„e

of thought in
support ot this view

contends that language
requires obedience
to rules, but it
is .^possible to
Obey a rule privately,
since in such cir-

cumstances. thinking one
was obeying a rule
would be the
same as obeying it.
To determine whether
some item is of
a
particular kind, whether
the
nam»
® kind
Kind-name properly
applies to
it. one must appeal
to rules specifying
the criteria for
being something of that
kind.
But a private language
is a
ruleless language, hence,
even such minimal
identifications
are impossible in it,
hence, it is not really
a possible
language at all. And
again, it is a ruleless
language because rule-following
implies the possibility
of verifying
correct and incorrect moves,
but a private experiencer
would
have no possible way of
checking up on. or adding
credibility
to. his introspective
claims. And the attempt
to check by
appeal to memory also fails,
since it is impossible
to

independently check for
veridicalnes<?
cxxuicaxness o-p
of the memory impression*
at best you can believe
you beli#>v<a
a
oexieve +v,o+
y
that a
given sensation
is the same kind as you
had before. ^3

But my descriptions of my
experiences being intelligible
to others is not a necessary
condition of their being intelligible to myself.
Granted that if a word applies
to something it must apply to it not
merely as being this, but as
being something of a certain
sort.
A phenomenal language
claims to have appropriate terms
for specifying objects. It
is not incumbent on the user
of such a language to specify

s
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those objects in some
language different from
his own to
prove the meaningfulness
of his language.
As Aune points
out. you do not have
to be able to describe
semantical rules
in order to understand
a language, since
ultimately the highest level metalanguage
must just be understood
if any sublanguage is
to be understood.'^

on its own

Ayer correctly argues that
it is not necessary
that
the question whether I
keep or break any rules
should be
subject to a social check.
The check-argument
(against one
memory confirming another)
is unsuccessful, since
the sort
Of difficulty cited
arises with any use of language
one never accepted any
identification without further
check,
one would never identify
anything at all. and so no
descripl
tive use Of language would
be possible.
If one can

recognise
a word on a page, a sign made
by some other person, the
person himself, and so on. without
further procedures, then why
should one not as immediately
recognise one’s own experiences?
And why in that case should it
be impossible to describe
them
in accordance with rules of
one’s own?

Intra-language rules can be used by
the inner experiencer
to justify his introspective
claims;
as Aune argues. ’This

is an A’ can be justified by
relating it to B and appealing

to the rule that all Bs are
As.'^^And. Aune continues, the

experiencer cannot ’merely think’ he has rules,
since thinking
one thing rather than another is a
rule-governed activity,
susceptible to inconsistency and error.

The inner experiencer’

164

use Of rules will be shown
by the inferences he
draws concerning the features of his
experiences, if he draws
inferences. he is operating with
rules, whether he explicitly
formulates them or not,^^

Aune sums up the situation as
follows:
If a wholly general doubt
about semant^r

+

^

raised wi^hi^^he frlLSorf
0?"?he
Of
the system to which it aoplies
and an,,
doubt raised within the framework'
of Lmro^he^con
oeptual system is similarly self
-stultifying
that any specification of the
kind of ihing^rwSch
rn question are supposed to
apply must be
justified with reference to what
are oonatLnaa
governing their use
it then
follows that a general doubt about
the consistent
cL^rpossIwy be
tSsii??ad""
doubt must remain absolutely idle
possibility whatever of^gainine
mpirical support.
Since a doubt of this kind is no
less idle when directed to phenomenal
must conclude that an external attack languages w^
cannot succeed. This, however, seems on such languages
to b^the
®
approach
Wittgenstein took in attacking them.fe

—

f

And this is the approach of the refurbished
Bennett-argument.
VI
It has often been urged that solipsism
is self -ref uting.

To determine whether this is so. we
should have a clear idea
of what self-refutation is.

self -refutation,

*

Under the general heading of

philosophers have included ad hominem

.

pragmatic, performative, operational, semantic, and
logical

inconsistency.

The powers of these arguments range from

showing that a man ought to accept a given proposition if
he wishes to hold a consistent set of beliefs, to showing

that what a man asserts is a logical falsehood.

Some of
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these arguments -for exatrmT^
example, +V,
the classic
attempts to gen-

::

“T“' “

..

undiscussed.
.

^
inds.
.

I

As regards the prlm a
facie r-»i
relevant argumentShall argue that none
is adequate to our
anti-

skeptical task.

The predominant kind
of argument from
self-refutation

discoverable in contemporary
philosophical literature
argument from performative
or pragmatic

is

inconsistency.
There
are various ways of
formulating the conditions
for pragmatic
inconsistency.
Passmore proposes that a
sentence is pragmatically self-refuting
(or inconsistent) if,
and only if.
the sentence is to
provide a counterexample
to the
proposUion expressed by that
sentence.'*9Ayer defines a
-selfdefeating- or -self-stultifyingproposition as one such that,
if it is asserted, then
it is false. 50fiut it
is some feature
Of the event of assertion
that falsifies the
proposition,
the claim is not that
the falsity of the
proposition is established by deductive argument.
Hintikka and Nakhnikian
develop Ayer-s account
a sentence is self-defeating
if,
and only if, if jt is
professed, either to oneself or
to someone else, then it is false.

—

Performative or pragmatic inconsistency
is a relation
between what a sentence is used
to express
the proposition
intended by the statement using
the sentence
and some
feature of the event of the
statement- s actual assertion.

-

-
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inconsistency is not
independent of whether
or not
It IS asserted,
,*«
Pra^a
+
ragmatio inconsistencies
might be true if
they were not verbally
exnressert
xpressed, i,
but* are inevitably
(in a
sense to be clarified)
false if th.
^^'bally expressed.
This sort of self
-refutation -Ls
is
•

called -n
’pragmatic,*
not as meaning
.practical., but in
contradistinction to
syntactic and semantic
inconsistency.
Pragmatic inconsisency is a relation
not between
propositions, nor between
propositions and the
(non-linguistic ) world,
but between
speech acts and
propositions (the thoughts
the sentences
used in speech acts
are intended to convey),
it differs
from syntactic (formal,
logical) inconsistency
in that formal contradiction oer«5i<?+e
u
P rsists through
every uniform substitution
Of the sentence.s
subject term, but a change
in subject term
can turn a pragmatic
inconsistency into a normal
sentence.
The sentence. ’l am
not saying anythin^,
anyxning* is pragmatically
inconsistent, if i aay I am
not saying anything,
then it is
false that I am not saying
anything.
But by replacing the
subject term .J. with one
of several others,
such as .he.,
the performatively self
-refuting sentence is converted
into
a perfectly straightforward
report.
Hence, pragmatic inconsistency does not depend
exclusively on the form of words
uttered, but also on the
speaker of the statement, and
how
aker
p
refers to himself. And unlike
some cases of semantic

16 ?

self-reference, there are no
referential problems in
cases
Of pragmatic self -ref
erence. 52statements.
concrete events,
may refer to themselves
as physical events,
instances of
grammar, uses of language
that makes a claim,
and so on.

The pragmatic inconsistency
between a proposition and
its utterance is like the
discrepancy between a statement
and a state of affairs
which falsifies it. 53
ordinarily , the
only way to verify a
syntactically well-formed,
semantically

meaningful descriptive statement
is to look at the world,
such statements are contingent
upon the state of the world.
The important peculiarity of
pragmatic inconsistencies is
that although they cannot be
rejected on logical grounds
alone, and so in the standard
sense are also contingent upon
the state of the world,
the facts which falsify them
are
inescapable aspects of their utterance.
The utterance of a
sentence accompanies the sentence
in its concrete uses in
discourse.
The facts that falsify a
pragmatic inconsistency
are given along with it as it
is uttered.
Further, the

philosophically interesting characteristics
of utterance
are those which are pervasive and
uneliminable

by paraphrase

or translation.

So whereas •! cannot properly construct
an

English sentence,' though pragmatically
inconsistent,
when stated in German, *1 cannot speak*
cannot

is

not

bo restated

to avoid the inconsistency.

There is no concrete context

from which the falsifying factor is absent.
So pragmatic inconsistencies are logically
contingent,

.
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they demand to be
tested by the facts
Bnt
-vitably
and immediately fan
the test
inevitably give
U 3 all the
-I
evxdence
we need to falsify
them.
Thus the reectxons of pragmatic
inconsistencies are
outstanding cani^ates for philosophical
certainties. They are
inevitably
true, yet still refer
to facts.
•

,

"

Following Mackie. we
may formally
^ generalize
^ ^eralize our
e
account
Of pragmatic
self -ref utation.
wnere
5\here d is ao propositioniormxng operator on
propositions, p is a
propositional variable, and E is the
existential quantifier,
it is a logical
law that, for any d,
d(„ot-(Ep)dp)-, not-(not-(Ep)dp)
Whenever an item occurs
which can be symbolised
by d(:ot-(Ep)dp)
xs eelf-refuting in
the sense that what
d operates on.
What the noun-clause
not-(Ep)dp represents,
must be false.
It is not the
proposition symbolised by
d(not-(Ep)dp) that
13 self -refuting, but
the operation it
describes, its occurrence refutes its content
(its noun-clause ).« There
is nothing to prevent the
actual occurrence of this
operation,
1 can type that I am
not typing, so that the
proposition
d(not-(Ep)dp) will be true.
And what is asserted in the
noun-clause could itself be true,
at another time. But as
I perform the operation
in question. I give ample
evidence
that instances of the operation
occur, and that one instance
is occurring now.
embrace the suggestion that
the negations of pragmatic
inconsistencies are certainties.
But it seems obvious that
I

1.69

«...

..

^

not subjective in
the sense that
their warrant is
only a kind of feelinen..
av
®
experience, but in the
sense that
y ruths about a subject,
his activities,
capabilities.
experiences, and so on,
can be established
by this method
ruths concerning the
kinds of entities
which constitute
the oboective realm
cannot be demonstrated
by showing that
the act Of asserting
their denials immediately
falsifies
their denials, and so
verifies their truth,
particular,
we cannot prove that
objective particulars
exist by asserting that no objective
particular*^ py^o+
pcirTiicuiars
exist and^ carefully
attending to that event of
verbal expression. Such
attention is
not sufficient and
immediate proof of the
proposition in
question) the falsifying
ec the
^ * feature of
skeptical assertion
(in this case, the
dogmatic skeptic, but the
same applies
to our problematic
idealist) is not some fact
inevitably
and immediately given
with the utterance.

m

But

must even qualify my welcome
by noting again
that the occurrence of the
operation refutes its content,
the content (proposition)
itself is not irremediably
refuted.
For pragmatic inconsistencies,
the most that is shown
is
that a certain way of
presenting a certain view is
unsatisfactory. The view itself
is not thereby refuted,
and may
well be presented and supported
in other ways.
Even the
claim that I cannot speak,
whose falsification persisted
through translation, can
readily be presented in writing.
I
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n response to the
oh.eotion that argument
tro„ prag-

-tao inoonsistenc. cannot
estahXt.h

the truth ot oh,
active
Ou g^ents. the proponent
of argument fro.
self-refutation

-y

note that for so.e
operators.
i,
^
enow that.. .1 neme.her
that- and -it can
be proved thatare examples of such
truth-entailing operators.
For such
a. It IS a logical
law that: not-d(not-(Ep)dp)
56jn these
oases, each proposition
of the form d(not-(Ep)dp)
is selfrefuting.
Given that d is
truth-entailing
I'^oixxing, Its
its form
fn
guarantees its falsehood.
Here may
mnv be
bo a
o way
to get from the subjective to the objective.
.

But this form of
self-refutation applies to
the skeptic
only When he becomes a
radical dogmatist.
•! know that
I
Know nothing, and .It
can be proved that
nothing can be
proved, are both self
-refuting in the newlyintroduced sense
But .nothing can be knownand -nothing can
be proved- are

coherent insofar as the
proposed test is concerned.
And
•I know that I know that
objective particulars do not
existis also non-deviant.
To be self -refuting

in the more strin-

gent sense presented, the
skeptical position must be both
radical and dogmatic.
Epistemological solipsism is neither.
Therefore, the epistemological
solipsist remains unscathed.
In response to the objection
that argument from pragmatic inconsistency can never
preclude evasion by re-presentation, advocates of the method
of self -refutation may try
to defend a more powerful
principle which

issues in inescapable
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results.

Passmore argues that
what he calls -absolutely
self-refuting, propositions
are thus inescapable,
where to
assert such a proposition
is equivalent
4 -i.vaj.ent to »=
asserting both
that proposition and
its negation simultaneously.
57since
to assert a proposition
and its negation at
the same time
IS to assert a
contradiction, 1 take it
that one asserts
an absolutely self.
refuting proposition if.
and only if
one asserts a
contradiction. Hence, to
assert an absolutely
self-refuting proposition
is to assert a logical
falsehood.
Paradigmatic examples of
absolutely self -ref uting
propositions are -No sentence
conveys anything- and
-There
are no true propositions.
58The line of reasoning
is familiar
If a man asserts that
there are no true
propositions, since
What he asserts is itself
a proposition, it follows
that he
also asserts that what he
asserts is not true, and hence
he
asserts that some propositions
are true.
Therefore, in
asserting that there are no
true propositions, he asserts
both that there are no true
propositions and that there are
some true propositions.
-

This line of reasoning is invalid.

Even supposing

that the man-s assertion is
included within the scope of
the assertion about all
assertions (supposing we cannot appeal to a metalanguage, type
or category distinctions, or
any suitable logic), it only follows
that what is asserted
IS not true, and so that some
propositions are true.
It
does not follow that the man
asserts that some propositions

1?2

are true,

m

asserting something

^

all propositions,
one
oes not assert all
(each) propositions.
Consequently, the
thoroughgoing sheptic in
question is not guilty
of absolute
self-refutation, since although
he asserts so™e
proposition,
he does not also assert
its denial,

Naturally, the problematic
idealist is in no danger
of
absolute self -refutation
anyhow.
But although Passmore
defines •absolute self-refutationas indicated. I think
his
discussion and examples show
that his formulation is
defective
What really aeems to be
going on in arguments from
absolute
self -refutation is the
attempt to show that the
position in
question violates a formal
requirement of all discourse,
a
characteristic of discourse which
persists through all paraphrase and analysis.eowhat
Passmore-s insight comes down
to
is that there are some
principles which are assumed by
all
«ho engage in discourse, and
that to deny any of those
principles. or any other proposition
which is entailed by those
principles, must be a mistake, since
such propositions are
assumed to be true. Whether such
assumptions are matters
of convention, natural
propensity, necessity, etc.,
is,

far as

I

can see, left an open question.

so

In reality, then,

absolute inconsistency turns out to
be, not a matter of
logical incoherence, but rather more
like a species of
performative or pragmatic inconsistency.
But arguing from
that sort of inconsistency was shown
to be no threat to
the skeptical thesis.

The only way to pin such a charge of
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inconsistency on the
problematic idealist
laeaiist is to
t
assume that
V
the subject
term used to express
his +i,
thesis explicitly
•

•

...Mi..

».

' refers

... ..

...... ..... ..

can never know for
certain

+Via+

Objective particulars
exist.this. Of course, is
a question-begging
assumption.
It seems to me that
other methods with
intimations of
novelty
whether self-professed
or not
also reduce to
from pragmatic self-ref
utation. and so are
inadequate
..r ........

-

-

3.v.ral beliefs .. .
......... ......... ..
.....
.
language, a collection
of sentences used for
certain communicative purposes.6lThe
fact that skepticism can
be stated in
language implies the truth
of some of the beliefs
attacked
by the Skeptic.
The conditions for the
use of any sentence
he calls -contextually
implied- beliefs, and the
denials of
such conditions he calls
-conceptual absurdities.if. and

only if. the assumptions
contradicted by the use of a
sentence
are necessary for the use
of any sentence,
conceptual absurdity results.
The absurdity derives from
the fact that
a person uses a sentence
to deny that a condition
necessary
for the use of any sentence
obtains, and the act of using
the sentence naturally
demonstrates immediately the contrary
Of what is being denied.
So if there is to be a language
shared by the skeptic and his
opponent, contextually implied
statements must be true. And so
in stating his position the

1?4

skeptic demonstrates
the truth of some
contextually
implied beliefs which he
chanenxroc.
allengesi consequently,
his position IS conceptually
absurd.
.

.

Kekes. argument is just
an instance of a
strong form
Of argument from
pragmatic self -refutation,
and accordingly
can prove even less than
its weaker cohorts.
Suppose his
argument persuades us that
the skeptic provides
the justification he demands by using
language. What justification
are we talking about?
At best the argument
shows that some
beliefs are justified, thereby
refuting the radical
skeptic
who holds that rational
justification for any belief
is impossible. a skeptic with whom
we are not concerned.
And
just which beliefs may be
included among language’s
contextual implications? The only
example of conceptual absurdity
we are offered is the use
of the sentence *No language
exists.
So. that there is a language
is a contextual implication.
So. at least one belief
is justified.
But we are hard pressed
to discover many more contextual
implications, and certainly
the anti-skeptical thesis
is not among them.

Other speech act theories are
variations on the same
theme.
The transcendental phenomenologist*
s method of es-

tablishing a proposition by arguing
that doubting or denying
the proposition relies on rules
incompatible with those
needed in formulating the proposition
is akin to the species
of self -refutation criticized
at length in section IV of
this chapter. ^^And even most
'presupposition arguments' are
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really equivalent to
arguments fro™ performative
inconsistency.
For example. Fitch
points out that
-presupposition.
Often means some hypothesis
that cannot be
systematically
denied without in some
sense being already
assumed.
-The
very denial itself, or
some important aspect
of it. or some
assumption or method involved
in presenting or
defending it.
constitutes an exception to
the denial.
In sum. although versions
of argument from self
-refu-

tation may help provide us
with subjective certainties
from
Which we may try to argue,
and may successfully impugn
forms
of radical, dogmatic
skepticism, none is sufficient
to pre-

vail over problematic idealism.

And as we saw previously,

no version of parasitism,
verif icationism. the appeal
to
paradigm cases or the need for
non-vacuous contrast enjoys
the long-sought triumph either.
Is there a savior in philosophical heaven or earth?

t

*
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IV

KANTIAN TRANSCENDENTAL
ARGUMENTS
In this Chapter I
want to provide a
promising theory

and to place the
proe:re«?c?
progress nf
of +v«r»
the ^dissertation
vividly before
your mind, i qhain pav,„4recapitulate the salient
structure
Of argument of the
first three chapters.
•

In the first chapter
of this dissertation

I

explained

the epistemological
solipsist thesis that we
can never .now

With certainty that
objective particulars exist
by distinguishing It from other
skeptical theses
showing it to be a
theoretical, non-radical,
non-criteriological skepticism
whose refutation entails,
but is not entailed by,
the refutation of other versions of
epistemological skepticism
and
by explicating the central
notions of philosophical
certainty
and objective particularity.
The discussion of certainty
may
be summarized as follows:

-

—

Def initionR

~

possibir?hit^there existfl^V

‘’utfr'’th
^
warranted in withholding
p or beUevLg not!p"at tV*^
(Maximal warrant) p is maximally
warranted for S at^ t itr ft
IS unimaginable that there
exists
a n>
» t.
f a
that p. is more warranted
f^^-oh
^

P

exhaustively warranted for S at

t

exhaustive or complete, and the
current evidence is positive.
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tlll^
S^fknowUdge-''is extendable

-

irrm eree

tret

ft

=°';'Pletely Justified in
believing that'^p^^on^the^baais
Jf
I
lustif ioation is indefeasible iff for any tru^
DroLe?+^
®’ ®
justified ifPbelieving
completely
that r^vee ^ h
^ *®''® completely
justified in believing
thtt g.

(Lehrer's indefeasibilltvl
Te c ibelieving that p on the
J^Plctely justified in
basie^of
^
Justification is indefeasible iff s wnnia
that p on th^bLire?
Relieving
e
he assumed any further
^t-gument)
true propeiuro^

evM

ffiilillelsilf
(A)

(C)

appraisal.^®

(P)

property of propositions,

se^-f1--i?i^-?^ra^?ire;

times.

Certainties need not be necessary
truths.
Necessary truths need not be
certainties,

(D)

(E)

SXElicati^ Of philosophical

ts not an intri^^

position or
(B)

^^

g.

^ standard-setting concept
of epistemic

Certainties need not be inferentially
justifiable.
Knowledge does not imply certainty.

Argued claims
(1)
(2)

(3)

Irrevisability is necessary and
sufficient for certainty.
Maximal warrant entails irrevisability.

Unmistakability does not entail irrevisability.
exhaustive warrant).

entail maximal warrant ^(nor

,
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not entail
unmistakabiiity

does not entail
.axi.al „arran;.
Maximal warrant does
not entail unmistakabiiity.
(8)

Extendability entails
Hilpinen*s indefeasibility
(9)
Extendability entails
Lebrer-s indefeasibility
(10) Hilpinen.s
indefeasibility entails
Lebrer-s indefeasibility.
1
Lebrer.s indefeasibiUty
does not entail
Hilpinen's.
’

i3°nor:n?riL°l'^^:^™f^„^'^oj-^tifl^

entaus. but
proposition makes
p unjustified.

.

•NO j"-tified"?rie“p?oposIu
(14)

Knowledge does not entail
Hilpinen's indefeasibility.
(15) Knowledge does not
entail Lebrer's indefeasibility.
(16) Irrevisability
entails extendability.
Therefore
(1?) Knowledge is not
extendable.

(18) Knowledge with certainty
is extendable.

Tbe upsbot Of tbe
discussion is this.

Tbe extendability

entails tbe indefeasibility
requirement.
But tbe indefeasibility requirement was
shown to be unnecessary for
knowledge (in tbe ordinary
sense).
Since tbe extendability
thesis entails a proposition
whose truth is not a necessary
condition Of knowledge, the
truth of the extendability thesis
is not a necessary condition
of knowledge.
But although ordinary knowledge need not be
extendable, knowledge with certainty
extendable, since certainty implies
irrevisability.
and

irrevisability implies extendability.

Consequently, we have

•
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(|.

sustained the legitimoy
of the ordinary
knowledge-knowledge
with certainty
distinction.
in the section on
objective particulars,
it was argued

Objective particulars
must be reidentif
iable
that is,
identifiable as the same
thing
^ in different+ perceptual
situations at different
times.
Conioined
-unjoinea with oexistential
+
and
attributive independence,
reidentif
laenxii iahi
lability is sufficient
for
objective particulari
tir
t+ was
bxcuiarity.
it
suggested hut
out not conclusively
argued, that reidentif
lability entails existential
and attribuependence, so that all and
only reidentif iable
particulars are objective.
Cautiously, all three
conditions were
retained in the analysis.
,

•

i i

In the final section
of the first chapter

I adopted some
procedural assumptions in
deference to the skeptic.
I accepted
the egocentric predicament,
allowed that the premises of
my
anti-skeptical argument must be
philosophical certainties,
and granted that all
inferences from certainties
must guarantee
preservation of certainty (given
that the inferences are known).
These methodological assumptions
required repudiation of naive
realism, subjective-objective
reductionism (phenomenalism),
ientific realism, and any
pragmatism which rejects foundationalism, or loosens beyond
recognition the strictures

imposed on

the foundation of knowledge.

I

renounced the views that empi-

rical knowledge is a community
phenomenon necessarily based on
data available to all (public),
that certainty must be construed
in terras of currently accepted
norms governing the resolution
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of determinate
doubts

anH

+v,«

a

.

ristotelian view that
properly
funrf
functioning senses under
proper
P
conditio
P r conditions
give reliable jvnowknowT
ledge
of the WOrIH
T
,
I concluded
bv
sxressing the methodolo^ stressiruo.
gioal character of my
assumptions.
'

,

•

a.

II

second chapter

I

examined Strawsonian
transcen-

dental arguments and
their uses.
Pursuing the descriptive
-etaphysrcal method of
exhibiting the invariant
features of
our conception of
experience. Strawsonian
transcendental arguments attempt to elicit
the analytic implications
of any
coherent description of
experience we can form. A
description
If and only if it is
not formulable in a
language
L Which is incoherent,
that is. an L which is
parasitic upon
some class of languases
-j.*
nguages K.
K
t
L is parasitic
upon a class of
languages K if and only
J-y II
if none of the *
terms of L could be
understood unless some
suitable set of terms of
some L- which
is a member of K were
understood.
L is coherent if and only
not parasitic upon
any
anv K each
eanh L'
t
n-p
v,*
u
F
of which
is different
from L,
< c.

*

•

Strawson's thesis is that a
form of experience is possible
only If some language
corresponding to it is coherent.
He
holds that any possible form
of experience is coherently
describable, he does not hold
that every coherently describable
form Of experience is possible.
He proceeds to argue that
all describable experiencers
(language-users) must be able to
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use Objectivity
concepts (make assertions
about objective
particulars).
His point is that no
coberent language can
e purely pbenomenal
or private, not that
no language, that
xs. set Of terms and
formation rules, can be
private.
After Showing that
arguments for the

impossibility of
exclusively adjectival
languages
iftuages are irrelevant
to Strawson's
conclusion, since a ‘lan^uafi’e
language wi-t-virm-f-u
without substantives
designating
re identifiable particular*Q
—
««
j
a sense datum language
oan
also use non-sensory
relational predicates, adverbs,
and
indexical expressions. I
marshalled a series of
criticisms
Of Strawson's objectivity
argument, and his method
in general
First, his argument
illicitly shifts from
'experience requires
that there be a recognitional
component' to the supposition
that experience requires
that we can distinguish a
recognitional
component.
Second, even this stronger
supposition is inadequate
to Strawson's purposes,
since the argument further
equivocates
on 'recognitional component.'
originally meaning 'the ability
to use a descriptive
predicate' or 'general concept.'
then
meaning 'act of awareness' or
'subjective portion of experience.'
There is an unjustifiable move
from 'items can enter
consciousness only if they are somehow
classifiable'
4.

4.

j.

—

to 'items

oan enter consciousness only
if we can be aware that we are
experiencing them (only if they are
classifiable as 'experiences')
So although the proposition that
all forms of experience must
be aware of themselves as
having experience is allegedly a lemma
of the objectivity argument,
we see that the question of its

I
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truth is begged in the
incipient, unsupported
moves from
experience, to judgable or
describable experience, to
selfconscious experience.
And I argued that only
if it must be
possible to distinguish
within experience a part
of experience
due to the subject and
a part due to the
independent object
does it follow that a
purely inner experiencer
is impossible.
Next I noted that even
if Strawson- s argument
were sound,
all it would Show is that
the purely inner experiencer
is unable to describe that his
judgments contain general and
particular components, or that
he only experienced
subjective
states and not objective
particulars
in short, unable to
do the philosophy Of his
own situation.
It would not show
that he could not judge which
experiences he was having at
any one time, which ability
is sufficient for experience.
Strawson’s argument has not given
us a reason to exclude the
possibility Of a language (i) not
employing objectivity concepts. (ii) usable by itself,
but (iii) describable only by
means of a richer language with
objectivity concepts.
It has
not been shown that any subject
of experience we can make

-

intelligible to ourselves must be a
user of objectivity concepts. though it is true that to
make it so intelligible to
ourselves we must use such concepts.
But that is trivial,
since we are drawing the object-subject
distinction in describing the experience. Therefore, the
possibility of experience has not been shown to entail the
ability
to use

objectivity concepts.

188

objectivity argument
were then generalize.To Strawson's entire
method of metaphysical
reasoning.
something is entailed
hy the fact that we
can conceive of a
possible experience hot
not hy the nature of
possible experi-

worlds in Which there
is experience.
Further. i generated
serxous doubts about
Strawson's appeal to
conceivability as
the test Of metaphysical
possibility, since no clear,
suitable
sense of 'conceivability
was discovered in which
conceivability
entailed possibility.
The unsuitability of
Strawson's method as a weapon
against

epistemological solipsism became
more obvious when we
studied
the transcendental
argument of Individuals
As we saw. this
anti-skeptical argument amounted
to asserting that the
skeptic
cannot both agree and
disagree with us. cannot
accept our conceptual scheme which allows
for re identification
.

of objects and
then always doubt or deny
particular-identity claims about objects.
Strawson says that we do have
the idea of a single
spatiotemporal system of material
objects, and that this requires unquestioning acceptance
of particular identity
in at
least some cases of non-oontinuous
observation.

The argument Strawson
provides for establishing this re
quirement is flawed.
It needs the premise that
the salient

topological properties of a framework
have their analogue in
the reidentifiable particulars
housed.
But the locational
relations between particulars, not
the dimensions of the par-
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ticulars, are to be
correlated wi+h
with the number of
dimensions
Of the framework
in which they are
located
But more generally.
Strawson wholly misconstrues
the
skeptic.
The skeptic does not
claim the unusability of
the
ordinary scheme. „e uses
it in debate.
But he uses concepts
which he thinks may be
unnecessary for describable
experience
and Which he thinks are
employed without rational
credentials!
The designata of such
concepts cannot be shown
to be better
than fictions,

distinguished three levels of
argument here. We can
articulate the subjective
conditions of experience,
thought,
or judgment, that is.
show which concepts are
indispensable
for thought or judging to
be possible.
This has some antiskeptical bite, showing that
the referents of the
concepts in
question are not merely useful
fictions.
But. for all such
an argument shows, they may
still be fictions, even
I

if in-

dispensable ones.

Natural beliefs, indispensable
elements
in our mental makeup, need
not be rationally defensible.
Following Kant. I called this
a -metaphysical deductionof
such concepts.
A transcendental deduction
is needed to show
that the concepts everyone
must use in order to make judgments
are justifiably used.
But Strawsonian transcendental
arguments,
parasitism arguments articulating the
conditions of our description of thought, are regressive
or analytical like Kant-s
argument of the Prolegomena.
They assume the general structure
Of our conceptual scheme and beg
questions of justification.

.
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consequently, Strawson's
transcendental method is
.isguided.
Further, the sorts of
results the method
could pos-

conscious experiencer.
or self -describing
language-user,
-St be a user of tbe concept
'.y experience- or
'.y languageIS absolutely trivial.
The conceptual needs
of the selfreflective episte„,ologist
are different frc
those of the
minimally inquisitive
experiencer, yet the latter
is a conscious, judging agent
nonetheless,
still further, it is
doubtful whether conclusions
about the possibility of
experienoP
can be established.
Even if c is parasitic
upon C*. it does

follow that experiencing
Cs presupposes the
ability to
experience Cs. Although
to experience
lence rs
P
os ac.
as p
Cs requires the
grasp of C' (or the ability
to
po use T'*
c
or some other word
synonymous with, or a
translation of, it), Cs may
be experienced
under some coextensional
but not cointensional
description
not requiring the grasp
of

C

Largely for the reasons
summarized in this section, I
saw no redemptive attraction
in following Strawson's
path.
Ill
In the third chapter
Of various,

I

negatively assessed the merits

supplementary anti-skeptical resources,
including
paradigm case arguments, non-vacuous
contrast arguments,
some variations on parasitism
arguments, verif icationist
arguments, and arguments from
self-refutation. As regards

•
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paradigm case argument
Objective particulsT'*

expression
r^v.

^

.^.

Objectivity expressions
must be learned by
referenop
Terence tn
to r,o
oases, whether they
are com,
pre ensible only by
showing or exhibiting
instances of their
application. Pirst 1
argaeP that even if
concept e^piricis.
or simple, sensible
predicates is true, such
a route to objective particulars seems
to work only if
objective particulars
are collocations of
sensible properties.
But then I argued
that paradigm case
arguments could never
demonstrate the
reality of objective
particulars, since for the
learning of
terms, an apparent example
is as good as a real
one.
the
case Of every paradigm
case argument, the
question is whether
the paradigm features
appealed to are supported by
good reasons
for the usage in question
being what it is. This
question of
justification is not answered
by appeal to cases.
.

m

Support for the faltering
paradigm is offered by the
nonvacuous contrast principle
that .y is meaningfully
applicable
to a only If there are
possible oases of as which
are not F.
The principle is impugned.
But even if true, all it
could
establish is that it is possible,
for all we know, that objective particulars exist.
We could not conclude that
objective
particulars do exist, and so not
that we can know with certainty
that they do.
At best it shows that we cannot
know that objective particulars do not exist,
that skepticism cannot be
established.
Like parasitism, paradigm case
and non-vacuous
contrast arguments rest their case
on the need to make various
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empirical distinctions,
but they fail to realize
that the
Skeptic need not be (and
typically is not, blind
to the actual
use Of any of these.
He worries about
justification, not
practice.
As regards verif icationism.
Stroud argued that a tran-

scendental argument without
a verif icationist
premise fails
to refute skepticism,
while a transcendental
argument with a
verif icationist premise
is superfluous, since
verif icationism
alone directly refutes
skepticism.
So whether or not verifioationism is tenable. l must
show that transcendental
arguments
do not require appeal to
it.
For if transcendental
arguments
require a verif icationist
premise and verif icationism
is untenable, then transcendental
arguments are unsound.
And if

transcendental arguments require
a verif icationist premise
and verif icationism is tenable,
then, given that verif icationism
y itself suffices to refute skepticism,
transcendental argumerits are superfluous.
In this chapter

I

shall meet Stoud-s challenge by
showing

that transcendental arguments do
not rest on any version of
verif icationism. But in chapter
III I argued that Stroud's
verif icationist cannot refute the
skeptic.
Stroud's skeptic
claims that (i) a particular class
of propositions makes sense,
and (ii) we can never know whether
any of them are
true.

Stroud's transcendentalist claims that
(1) the truth of (i)
is a necessary condition of the
meaningfulness of the skeptical
position expressed in (ii), and (2) the
falsity of
(ii)

is a
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necessary condition
of the truth of
(i)
propositions of a certain

f

to know

1 f'

+V\«

a

/

f,)

">«^ringful it raust be
pos^
-true

13 a version of
verif icationism.
.

.

This

The precise
. .
statement
of

^iven

as
lo os

or false.

r: r
^

sometimes know certain
conditions to be
U1 11 led. the
fulfillment of which
logically implies
either
Oboects continue to
exist unperceived or
that they do not.
Stroud holds that this
principle provides a
direct and
conclusive answer to the
skeptic Since
since It
it follows
foil
from the
iple that If the
P
skeptic's claim that we
can never know
at objects continue
to exist unperceived
makes sense, it
must be false, since
if the proposition
that objects continued
0 exist unperoeived
could not be known to
be true or known
to be false, it would
make no sense.
But Stroud's inference
IS invalid.
If the proposition
that objects continue
to exist
makes sense, then, according
to the principle,
either it or
Its contradictory can
be conclusively verified.
But nothing
in the verificationist
principle guarantees that
the realist
proposition rather than its
skeptical denial will turn
out
to be the knowable truth.
And so nothing in the
principle
conclusively refutes the skeptic.
If a class of propositions
makes sense oniy if it is
false that we can never
know whether any one of them
is true,

follows at best that complete
suspension of judgment with
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respect to all the
members of that rla
illegitimate.
Rnt
But.
instantiating to
propositions about
particul
Particular
reidentity.
on these grounds,
grounds to deny our
Knowledge of
persistence is as
speotable as affirming
it.
To avoid this
oriti
^il^icism, Stroud's
veri f*!
r»5i +
ficationist must delete
the final disjunct
sjunct of hhis princiolp
and so maintain
that the notion of
obieot,
Particulars makes
sense to us only if w
certain criteria
entailing
th existence
g the
of unperceived
objects are satisfied
'

•

•

.

•

conclusively
and not merely
verifiable or falsifiable.
But the
general principle is
obviously wrong, it
entails that everyng understood is true,
everything meaningfully
talked about
-Sts. If so. the Claim about
objective particulars
cannot
e lustified as
an instance of (this
version of) verif
icationi.m.
otice that several of
the argument-kinds
we have considered are designed to
show that if epistemological
solipsism
-re true, its statement would
be unintelligible,
hence, the

ve^TlT
table,

falsity Of solipsism is
a necessary condition
of its meaningfulness.
Srzednicki>s variation on
Strawson was a putative
instance of this strategy.
Because (A) I am identical
with
the world. I cannot
say (B) all appearances
of the existence
Of other things are
misleading, since I could
not form the
concept -object other than
I- in a solipsistic
universe.

Assuming the equivalence
between having a concept and
being
able to use and understand
words, we conclude

that (B) cannot
be stated or understood
by anyone if (A) is true,
since if (a).
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::

rr*
^

possessed by anybody,
and so nobody
oould"^
jPdgMents.
But it is rightly
agreed
thit (
does express a
proposition about something
other than
^
psist speaker's self,
so the supposition
that (A&B)
completely and correctly
describes the world must
be false.

In criticism,

argued that 'Necessarily,
nothing exists
Wh.ch is not the world
or some part of it'
does not entail (the
falsehood that) we eer>nr>4- -r
*
® concept Of something
not in
the world,
(a) entails (B)).
Rut
nr^
But no inconsistency
has been
established between (A)
and the fact that thp
k.
subject
mentioned
in (A) has an extensive
repertoire of concepts,
including
•Object other than I.'
To succeed, the argument
must wrongly
assume that all objects
of thought must exist.
Further I
argued that 'object other
than I' ia not unframeable
given the
resources of the solipsistic
universe, it is a complex
concept
Which frameable constituents.
Anyhow, I note that epistemological solipsism is not a
metaphysical thesis (and the
metaphysical thesis (A) does all
the work in the above).
And so
it becomes more evident
that things other than I or
my mental
states are thinkable, and
that claims about them are
meaningfully expressible.
It is just, the claim is.
that their existence is not knowable (with
certainty).
I

•

K

Next

considered Bennett's attempted
refutation of epistemological solipsism. Based
on a theory of concept-utility.
I
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ennett argued that
the solipsist can
have no concept of
the
past.
NOW it is impossible
that a man S hnows
that he is soso Xf bexng so-and-so
excludes self -consciousness,
-Being
so-and-so excludes
self-conso iousness for
S- entails -S does
not Know that he is
so-and-so.But s is self-conscious
onl,
f he can use the
concept -my experience
now.,nd the ability
to use the concept
-my experience nowrequires the ability
to use the concept
-my experience then.Therefore, he concludes, self -consciousness
requires knowledge of the
past
Therefore, nobody could
know that anybody,
including himself.
was having a purely
inner experience.
Therefore, it is not
possibl© "thst ^S Knows
know© what his inner
experience is like while
wondering whether there is an
n objective world,
since if s knows
What his inner experience
is like, he must know
something of
its past history, and
so inhabit an objective
world and know
that he does so.
?

The initial stage of
Bennett-

s

argument was seen to rest

on the falsehood that
no one possesses non-uniquely-f
unctional

concepts.

He infers that the inner
experiencer has no concept
Of the past from the
fact that there is

no non-redundant function

such a concept would serve
such an experiencer.
a distinctive use does not
imply lacking a use.

But lacking

still, suppose
the solipsist can make no
judgments about the past.
The move

from -S is self-conscious only
if he has a concept of the
past to 'self -consciousness
requires knowledge of the pastis unwarranted,

it is enough that S believe,

even wrongly, or
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even te able to believe
wrongly, that he has
a past.
Yet if we grant the
early stage of the
argument, allowing
that s can Know he
lacKs a concept of the
past only if he is
self-conscious, that the
solipsist lacKs a concept
of the past,
and that self-consciousness
requires a concept of
the past, we
can validly infer that
the solipsist cannot
know he lacks a
concept Of the past.'
But then he cannot know
he cannot .ake
judginen'ts sbout; his
nis 'Da.c?'h
past, and so cannot
know he cannot make
justified, true judgments
about uxs
his past.
oast
Hence, he cannot
know he has no knowledge
of the past.
But suppose we still
further grant that knowledge
of the objective world
requires
knowledge of the past, so
that the solipsist
-Lj.psist, Since
since he
k
cannot
know he has no knowledge
of the past, cannot
know he has no
knowledge of the objective
world.
This just shows
v,

that the

epistemological solipsist could
not know that epistemological
solipsism was true. As with
Strawson, this just shows
that
a purely inner experiencer
cannot recognize his epistemic
status, not that a purely
inner experiencer is impossible.
And again, not knowing the
truth of skepticism is different
than knowing the truth of
anti-skepticism.
So Bennetfs

variation on Strawson was shown
to be too weak.
Extending my criticism to an
improved version of Bennett's
strategy, I urged that even
if solipsism of the moment is
impossible, it does not follow that
a purely inner experiencer
is impossible.
To show otherwise is to show
that an experience
Of past and present mental
states alone is impossible,
that a
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language with a functional
past and present tense
.ust he
n private.
This lead to a discussion
of the private language argument, the
response to which was
essentially this.
soriptions of my experiences
being intelligible to
others
not a necessary condition
of their being
intelligible to
myself.
The purely inner
experienoer claims to have
appropriate terms for specifying
things, it is not incumbent
on
him to specify those
things in some language
different from
his own to prove the
meaningfulness of his language.

-

One

need not be able to
describe semantic rules to
understand a
language, since the highest
metalanguage must just be
understood on its own if any
sublanguage is to be understood.
Further, it is not necessary
that the question whether
I keep
or break any rules should
be subject to a social
check.
Some
identification or recognition
must be accepted without further
check, so the realist is in
the same boat as the solipsist.
The solipsist's use of rules
will be shown by the inferences
he draws concerning the
features of his experiences, if he
infers, he is operating with
rules, whether he explicitly
formulates them or not.
In the final section of
chapter III various accounts
of performative or pragmatic
inconsistency are stated.

Prag

matic inconsistency is a relation
between what a sentence is
used to express (the proposition
intended by the statement
using the sentence) and some feature
of the event of the

statement's actual assertion

—

a relation between a speech
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their utterance,
aspects which are
ineli^nable by
paraphrase cr translation.
But i ar.uea that
(i) the negations
of such propositions
can at best be certainties
certaintie, only
i
„
about
a
subject, his activities,
les, capabilities,
car>ahiii +
experiences, and so on,
ana not about the
objective world.
particular, we cannot
prove that objective
particulars exist by asserting
otherwise
carefully attending to
that event of verbal
expression.
And (ii) when the
occurrence of the- assertive
operation refutes
content, the content
Itself IS not irremediably
refuted;
just shown that a certain
way of presenting a
certain
vie. is unsatisfactory
the view .ay be presented
and supported
in other ways.
.

^

m

4.

•

-

concluded the chapter by
arguing that various speech
act theories and
presupposition arguments, intended
as interpretations of transcendental
argument, are variations on
the
same theme, and are subject
to the same limitations.
I

IV

In Chapter II

argued at length that parasitism
or conceptdependency arguments to conclusions
about conceptual indispensability were ineffectual
weapons against epistemological
solip^sism.
I also criticized
instances of a different strategy
thafarguing for the priority of one
kind of entity to another
from the priority of one kind
of entity to another, where the
I

—
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priority claimed in the
premises differs from
the priority
Claimed in the conclusion.
an effort to generalise
my
crrticrsm. and rule out
another candidate for
transcendental
argument, in this section
I shall define
eight important
aenses of -priority,,
and then argue that no
interesting
inference from one sense
to another is permissible.
The senses of -priorityI want to define
are ( 1 conceptual. (2) identificational.
{3) reidentif icational.
(4) doxastio, ( 5 ) epistemic,
(6) ontic commitment,
(7) experiential,
and (8) ontological.
The definitions are as
follows
(Dl) X is conceptually
prior to y
iff
could not grasp the concept for a person
Y
(or
^
^
intellifi-p^T+i
tr
luxeingently
use the word 'Y* nve
®yP°Py"> °r translation)
without
ixnout grasping
era^Je the concept X, but not
conversely.
(D2) Xs are identificationally
prior to Ys for a person

m

)

1

=:

^

?e^en^rt“thi°ngs'’*of
(•TO identify; hefe means

cLer?
?VpL;nv"uSer?
scribe sLt^?y!?)''°’

-

to’

iL1 vid^a?eT""at'''ls

particular me;ber of
definite descriptionrare
classify or de-

f

’

are re identificationally prior
to Ys for a person
reidentif ication criteria for
things'^of
ki^Y^+
OP the identities of Xs, but
+>.•

f

the idintitifi‘'of^°"
the

"" identification as

dl!fferent'ul1fr'"'
(D 4

(D 5

)

)

numertfaU;
'

situations at

Xs are doxastically prior to Ys
for S iff if s did
things of kind X existed, he could
things of kind Y existed, but if
things of kind Y existed, he
might still believe that things
of kind X existed.
Xs are epistemically prior to Ys for
S iff if s did
not know that things of kind X existed,
“hi" could not
know that things of kind Y existed, but not
conversely.
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(D6)

to YS for s

existence^oP^Ysf

con^eVse^T*"^'^'^

(D7) Xs are experientially
prior to Ys for ? iff v=
experienceable only
Xs are,
are hn+
j if AS
but not conversely.
(D8) Xs are ontologically
prior to Ys iff y<s r*/->
exist unless Xs did, but
not oonvSely.

^

Many notions of derived
reality, dependence and
independence, parasitism and
self-sustenance or coherence,
indispensability, primitiveness,
simplicity or unanalysability
are
definable in terms of the
resources just
,

given,

a basic kind of entity

-

m

particular,

the kind of entity
metaphysicians

and some epistemologists seek

-

is simply a kind of entity

that is more basic than
(prior to), or at least no less
basic
than (not 'posterior to), any
other kind of entity.
are now in a position to
assess the various forms of
inference from one sense of
-priority to another. First, recall the simplifying fact that
identif icational priority and
priority of ontio commitment, as
commonly construed, are

equivalent.

On the Russell-Quine view,
commitment is carried

by the quantified variables
(function-satisfiers, for Russell)
of the canonical language because
this happens
to be the

referential apparatus of the language.

And so the general

point would be that we need not countenance
the existence of
anything we need not refer to. One can say
what needs saying
by picking out other referents.
But identif icational dependents
are just those things we need not refer
to.
Therefore, to say
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that the variables of
the canonical language
must range over
Xs IS oust to say in
a particular,
theory-laden way, that Xs
are identif icationally
basic.
Even after this reduction,
the remaining seven
senses
Of -priority allow
of forty two pairwise
permutations.
I
shall focus on some key
inference-forms, and after
showing
that they are invalid,
explain why pursuit of the
others is
uninteres t ing,
have already shown that
conceptual priority does not
imply experiential priority.
Even if understanding concept
Y
I

requires understanding concept

X,

it does not follow that
ex-

periencing YS presupposes the
ability to experience Xs. Although to experience Ys as
Ys requires the grasp of
x (or the
’lity to use

x

or some other word synonymous
with,

or a

translation of, it), Ys may be
experienced under some other
ooextensional but not cointensional
description not requiring
the grasp of X.
In our earlier example, even
if experiencing
my subjective states as -statesrequires the ability to use
objectivity concepts, those states
may be experienced under
another description, such as -redlike
and roundlike,- which
does not entail the ability to use
objectivity
concepts.

By similar reasoning, identif
icational priority does
not imply conceptual priority.
Because even if individuatability
does imply classif lability, there
is in general nothing to
prevent the use of coextensional but
not cointensional

classif icatory concepts in individuation.
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Nor does identif
loational priority imply
epistemio

«.

Sin,.
.
^

must refer to may not
exist.

But if
1
the Xs do not* exist,
then
cannot know that they do
exist.
But then it is possible
to
the Ys I am identifying
exist without knowing
that
Xs exist.
Therefore, luenxit
identif icational
i ra +
priority does not
imply epistemio priority.
i

Doxastic priority does not
imply epistemio priority
that belief in the
existenoe of Ys requires
belief in the existence of Xs does not
entail that knowledge that
Ys exist requires knowledge that Xs
exist.
From the doxastic priority
Of Xs all that follows
is that, if s knows
that Ys exist, he
must believe that Xs exist.
The doxastic priority of
Xs does
not give us the materials
for eliciting that S's belief
about
Xs is true or justified.

-

This same line of reasoning
shows that conceptual priority
does not imply epistemio
priority.
The best argument in favor
of the implication fails

Knowledge requires judgment and
judgment requires the use of concepts.
Hence, if you could not
i

use various concepts unless
you could use X-concepts, you
could
not make the various, corresponding
judgments or knowledge-

claims unless you could make
judgments about Xs, and so could
not know that the various things
in question existed unless
you knew that Xs existed. The
final inference is fallacious,
what follows is only that you could
not know that the various

^
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things in question (Ysl

about Xs.
X

t

judgments

.
Knowledge
ig not required.

And again, by parity
of reasoning,
conceptual priority
oes not i„piy doxastic
priority.
Por suppose that
grasping
the concept X is
required for
r grasping
grasoin^ ta
the concept Y.
Then,
supposing that belief rennir.«e,
requires the use of
concepts, believing
Ys exist requires
understanding the concept
Y.
(Even this
IS unwarranted, as
the coextensionality
argument shows.) By
transitivity of implication,
all we can deduce is
that believing
that Ys exist requires
understanding the concept X
belief
that Xs exist is not
required.

-

Since belief is "weaker"
than knowledge, one may
have
anticipated the failure of
doxastic priority to imply
epistemic
priority.
But it may
be
surDrisins- to o>i
j
taurprising
observe that the converse entailment does not
hold either.
Even though knowledge
implies belief, from the
premise that knowing that
Ys exist
requires knowing that Xs exist,
we cannot conclude that
beneving that Ys exist requires
believing that Xs exist. Knowing p entails knowing
q is not equivalent to knowing that
p
entails q.
The latter -- ^vp
Kfo entails
entaiic- n't
q)
conjoinedc with
the assumption that
p is known, entails that
q is known.
And K(p entails q) obviously
entails B(p entails q)
where
B is the belief operator
which if conjoined with Bp, entails
Bq (where we are dealing
with minimally rational belief).
So
if S knows that
p entails q, then p is doxastically
prior to
q.
But epistemic priority asserts
that S’s knowing p entails

—

•

•

-

-
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Knowing

which does not entail
that s Known that
p entaUs q. And there are no other
grounds for getting from
epistemic to doxastic priority.
What about inferences to
ontological priority?
Epistemic
priority does not imply
ontological priority. For
example, a
person could not Know subatomic
particles existed unless he
Knew that macro-objects
existed, but the existence
of subatomic
particles does not depend on the
existence of macro-objects.
Nor does identificational
priority imply ontological
priority.
we can infer from the
fact that the identif iability
Of Ys depends on reference
to Xs. that such identif
iability
depends on the existence of Xs
only if we add the premise
that
we can refer to Xs only
if Xs exist.
But as above, the additional premise is false.
Finally, the thrust of very many
of my arguments in chapters II and III was to show
that conceptual priority does not
imply ontological priority.

I

The above ten entailment-f
ailures are the crucial ones.
have shown that identificational
priority does not imply

conceptual, epistemic. or ontological
priority.

So.

for example.

It IS uninteresting to our
enterprise whether conceptual

priority implies identificational priority,
since nothing of
interest follows from identificational
priority.
And other
inference-forms, even if valid, would be
useless in establishing
the kind of existential conclusions we
are seeking.

For example,

it is clear that neither doxastic.
epistemic. nor experiential
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priority is implied by
ontological priority, but
even if they
were, they would be for
us impotent
forms of reasoning.

In this section I have
argued that a central method
of

metaphysical reasoning,
cross-categorial priority arguments,
i. defective.
If the argument is sound,
then certain versions
Of transcendental
arguments ought to be abandoned.
I stress
•oertain versions' because
I am not disposed to a
conclusion
of despair.

Rather.

await consideration of what
Kant thought
he was up to. because I
think that he was up to none
I

of these

things, but things much better.

V
If a Kantian transcendental
argument is to refute skepticism on its own terms, then,
trivially, it must minimally

use premises whose truth is
acknowledged by the skeptic.
if the skeptic acknowledges
his

So

consciousness of a succession

of diverse perceptions,

but. noting the logical gap between

the character of this accepted
evidence and the character of

external continuants, refuses to acknowledge
knowledge of
objective particulars, a successful
refutation may perhaps
begin with the fact of consciousness.
But if transcendental
principles are deducible from the fact of
consciousness as
well as the fact of empirical knowledge of
objective particulars. then they cannot be definitive or
criteriological
marks of objective particularity.

We are faced with the

following dilemma* If transcendental principles are
deducible

20 ?

from the fact of
Humean experience
o

-Ke

out the Objective

then tt
they cannot be used

particular-subjective state
disif transcendental
principles

t-otion.

are not deducible
fact Of Humean experience,
but only from the
fact

not refuted.

Lotting p be the class
of subjective
propositions, Q
the Class Of
corresponding objective
propositions, and R the
class Of transcendental
propositions, we may extend
this
problem by arguing that
the overall strategy
of transcendental
arguments would seem to have
to be one of the following:
P entails Q, which
in turn entails R,
Which in turn entails
(1)

Q,

tails

P,

entails

(4)
P,

Q entails P,

(3)
KJJ

q entails
entaiic R,
p
y

p entails R,

u
u
which
in turn en•

which in turn entails

which in turn entails

in turn entails P.

(2)

Q,

•

R;

(5)

r

or (6) r entails
Q, which

Now (5) and (6) may be
rejected out of
hand.
Transcendental propositions are
not proved on them at
all.
and ( 4 ) may also be summarily
( 3 )
rejected.
Not only
do they assume something
which the skeptic denies, but
even
the transcendentalist is
not prepared to say which set
of
particular claims concerning
objective particulars is true.
For several reasons,
(1) and (2) are also unacceptable.
On both, P entails Q.
But if we could show that the
truth
of particular objective
knowledge-claims is deducible from
corresponding claims about subjective
consciousness, then we
would have a method which, far
more powerful than transcenden-

i
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tails. presu..s to b,.
could answer another
sKeptieal question
Of how, at any given
ti.e, we know which
perceptions, if any
are veridical, and which
illusory.
Further, since Q dearly
entails R
if „e know particular
claims about objective
particulars to be true, we
know that there are
objective particulars -- a method which
allowed derivations of
Q-propositions from P-propositions
would render a transcendental
method
superfluous. Further. (2) must
be rejected on the
grounds
that, as will be elaborated
later, particular empirical
state-nts are not deducible from
transcendental principles. Finally,
to reintroduce one horn
of the original dilemma,

-

if (1)

is

correct, the subjective
state-objective particular distinction
via transcendental principles
suffers obliteration.
(l)-( 6 ) oversimplified the
alternatives.

Perhaps we can

preserve the test of objectivity
by holding that Q entails
R
but P does not. But if P does
not entail R, given that it
does not entail Q, „* have
failed to answer the skeptic.
To
refute skepticism and preserve
obvious truths (such as the
inferrabillty of 's knows that something
is ?• from 's knows
that the objective particular,
a. is F'), the transcendental
method must countenance the following
logical relations
P entails R, Q entails R, P
does not entail Q, R does not
entail Q, R does not entail P, it
is optional to permit that
Q entails P.
This handles all of the above objections
except
that transcendental principles cannot
provide criteria of

objectivity.

But is this a worrisome objection?
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I

think not.

take it to be a
fundamental tenet of
Kantian philosophy that
both states of objects
and states
Of persons are parts
of the same natural
order, and that
I

transcendental conditions
of knowledge, therefore,
do not
accord privileged status
to either type of
state.
There
could be justified
knowledge-claims about neither
objective
particulars nor mental states
of persons unless
transcendenprinciples were true. So
I suggest that
conformity to
rules Of synthesis,
reproduction of the diverse
contents of
consciousness according to
rules, does not distinguish
knowledge of the external
world from knowledge
of our inner

experiences.
A brief excursion into

his

Kanfs

Th^

Wolffs interpretation

of Kant in

of Mental Act i vit will
help clarify the
y

objection and my response to
it.^ on Wolffs view, all
consciousness has synthetic unity,
all the changing contents of
consciousness are united as my
thoughts.
This unity is acquired
as the result of (and presumably
only in virtue of) a certain
activity or operation called
-synthesis,' which organizes
our perceptions in rule-governed
ways.

There exists an order

of representations qua mental
contents or immediate objects
of consciousness.
This is the subjective time-order
and is
part of the mental history of an

individual.

Synthesizing

these representations, reproducing
them according to rules,
produces an order of representations
qua representations

(signifying something other than themselves),
which is necessary

’
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and so, sine, nscsssity
of oonnoction.
ordsr or organization
ts dofinitiv. Of
.Objectivity., objective.
.Connection in
the Object, therefore
means .connection of the
contents of
consciousness qua
representations..
Therefore, the very
synthetic activity which
produces thuu.. unity
unitv of consciousness
on
<
produces the objective
realm,

NOW Wolff hoias that
conformity to rule-governed
ways
Of organizing
perceptions, which are the
categories (or equivalently for him, the
categorial principles),
provides a way
to distinguish necessary
connection or objectivity
from subjective association or
subjectivity, in terms immanent
to

experience.

Thus he seems to be
supporting the view I am
trying to reject, that
transcendental principles provide
criteria Of Objectivity.
But this is a confusion,
the view
Wolff. 3 interpretation
supports is different from the
view I
want to reject.
The source of difference
lies in the meaning
Of
objectivity.
*

If .empirical knowledge,
means .empirical knowledge of

objective particulars., and
"objectivity, means "physical
objectivity," then to argue that
transcendental principles
provide criteria of objective
knowledge is to argue that all
and only (justified) knowledge-claims
about objective particulars satsify those principles.
But this view is both false
and un-Kantian.
For example, consider the conditional
categorial principle of causality that
every objective happening
follows from some precedent occurrence
in a lawlike manner.

3
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fiv^ry

mental event, as well
as every physical
event, must
satisfy this principle.
On the interpretation
under consideration. this would not
be so.
a
+
^
’

a out a sense

*

judfpnent,

a judgment

impression, unlike an
objective judgment which
makes reference to an
objective particular,
cannot conform to
cat-gories. and so cannot
conform to the catee-orv
category n-r
of succession
mg to a rule. But after all. the
entire thrust of
Kanfs anti-Cartesian program
is to show that the
contents
Of consciousness are
not better known than
the fact that objective particulars exist.
To require satisfaction
of an
additional, special condition
to move from subjective
awareness
to Physical Objectivity
flies in the face of this
enterprise.
Wolffs view, however, does not
suffer from this defect.
Since he holds that the
synthetic unity which confers
objectivity IS the act of judgment
or cognition, at bottom he
holds
that all judgments conform
to categories.
Sven organized subjective experiences have
objectivity. And this is how
it
should be.
Suppose I want to talk about my
mental contents,
which are themselves representations.
To do so I must judge
about them by means of other
representations. But this talk
perfectly objective. All judgments
are representations of
representations.
Whether the subject-representation
represents
something mental or physical is
irrelevant to the question at
hand.
The Kantian view is that all
experience, whether part
of systematic doctrine or not.
whether purported experience of
the outer or the inner, conforms
to the true transcendental

212

principles.

Wolffs interpretation
supports this view.^

Having discovered the
objection that transcendental
prrnctples cannot provide
criteria of objectivity
to be faulty.
reaffirm the need to accept
the following logical
relations. subjective
propositions entail transcendental
propositions, Objective
propositions entail transcendental
propositions, subjective
propositions do not entail
objective propositions, transcendental
propositions do not entail
either
subjective or objective
propositions.
we Should also repeat
that the transcendental
proposition
in question here is the
proposition that

objective particulars
exist, not. in departure
from the prevalent goal of
Kantian
advocates, that we must be
able to use concepts of
objective
particulars.
We wish to argue that
in order to have experience,
objective particulars must
exist, but it is not the case
that
the experiencer must have
or have had knowledge that
any specific objective particulars
exist or have existed. A transcendental argument will attempt
to show that all experience,
inner or outer, must take
place in a world of objective
particulars.
It does not show that each
experiencer must have
the concept 'objective
particular.' which he uses in making
specific, true, justified
knowledge-claims about the external
world.
The strategy is to show that
while the skeptic may
play his game, his activity implies
that there are objective
particulars, and. consequently, implies
that his position is
mistaken.
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VI
we distinguished
the classes of subjective
(claims about

one's particular subjective
states), objective (claims
about
specific Objective
particulars), and transcendental
propositions
in the present case,
the proposition that
objective
particulars exist. Now let
the class of acknowledged
propositions contain exactly
those claims in fact
accepted by
both skeptic and
transcendentalist. Let the
class of 'irrelevant' propositions
contain all those propositions
rejected
by both skeptic and
transcendentalist, and all, if
any, rejected by the transcendentalist
but accepted by the skeptic,
and nothing else.
Let the class of 'contested'
propositions
contain just those claims in
fact rejected by the skeptic
but accepted by the
transcendentalist.
I use 'reject' as
meaning 'deny or withhold.' and
not so that rejecting a proposition entails accepting the
negation of that proposition,
otherwise, rejected propositions
would be contested. And let
claos of privileged' propositions
contain all and only
those claims which must be true
if anyone is to enter into
discourse or debate.

—

•

The class of subjective
propositions is identical with
the class of acknowledged
propositions.
The class of objective propositions is either a
subset of the class of irrele-

vant propositions or a proper subset
of the class of contested
propositions, depending on whether or not
the transcendentalist
happens to reject the view that we can
sometimes know, at a
given time, that our perception is veridical
at that time.
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The anti-skeptical
transcendental proposition
IS a member of
.
^
class Of contested
propositions.
To refute the
skeptic, we cannot
assume what he denies,
enoe, no contested
proposition may <=^ppear
appear as a premise
n
in a
anscendental argument.
But is it enough to
assume only
what the skeptic accen+c!'? t
p
Is an argument
with only acknow,
^
,
edged (and, perversely,
irrelevant)’ propositions
propositi o
as premises
ficient to refute
skepticism. If we show
that something
^ e okeptic
accepts entails something
he denies, we show
he
•

'

•

•

•

.

.

holds inconsistent
beliefss.

But unless we enjoy
the felicitous Situation in which
the very position we
wish to refute
asserts the truth of
what he accepts and the
falsity of what
he contests, our
argument would merely he
ad hominem. and
would not conclusively
refute the skeptical
thesis itself.
The skeptical position
of the Cartesian-Humean
idealist
happens to he of the
felicitous sort.
It states that we know
with certainty the truth
of various subjective
propositions,
but cannot know with
certainty that objective
particulars
exist.
TO deduce the existence
of objective particulars
from
our knowledge of our
inner states therefore
refutes this position.
It does not. howpvQr*
u
nowever, establish
our certain knowledge
Of the external world
unless it is true that our
claims about
our particular subjective
states are certainties.
Consequently,
If we wish to establish
the certainty of the
non-conditional
,

transcendental proposition that
objective particulars exist,
our refutation of Cartesianisra
suffices if, and only if, the
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acknowledged premises used
are certainties as weil.
class of privileged
propositions is a subset of

Now the

the class of

certainties.

Therefore, if the premises
of our argument are
privileged, the argument
establishes the certainty
of the
existential, transcendental
principle.

Notice that
P

I

said that valid inferences
from privileged

ise sets are sufficient
proofs of certainty.

I did not
say they were necessary,
and if there are certainties
which
are not privileged, they
are not necessary.
There are nonprivileged certainties, such
as Descartes’ cogito
The proposition that I am thinking
is irrevisable for me whenever
I
affirm it. At no iater time can
I have reason to doubt
(disbelieve or withhold) the
proposition that I am thinking, for
whenever I consider a reason, I am
doing some considering, and
since considering is a species
of thinking, any such putative
doubt-maker wouid self-destruct. And
as regards thinking that
was thinking at an earlier time,
that is, remembering,
.

the

proposition to be assessed

—

that

I

was thinking then

—

is

different from the original proposition,
and so the dubitability
of the former fails to impugn
the acceptance-value of

the latter.

Therefore, that

I

am thinking is a certainty for me.

is not a privileged proposition.

But it

It is not the case that *I

am thinking’ must be true if anyone is to
enter into discourse
or debate.
It does turn out,

tions are privileged.

however, that transcendental proposiSo we must stipulate that those pri-
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vileged propositions
which are transcendental
cannot appear
arsons the premises
of a transcendental
argument,
otherwise
not only would we heg
the question, hut
if our transcendentll
arguments always included
transcendental premises,
then, if
a transcendental
proposition always requires
a deduction, a
VICIOUS regress is
generated.
the view

shall pursue, transcendental
principles
are principles which
purport to be true of the
actual world
and can be known to be
oe true in =ii
all possible worlds
in which
judgment occurs. And so
it is natural to suppose
that the
transcendental procedure
begins from the fact that
judgment
or thinking occurs and
deduces the truth of the
transcendental
principle.
But this poses a technical
difficulty, given my
definitions.
The proposition that
judgment occurs (that somebody or other is judging)
is not only a privileged
proposition
it must be true if anyone
is to enter into discourse
or debate
but is a transcendental
proposition as well, since it
purports
to be true of the actual
world and can be known
I

to be true in

all possible worlds in which
judgment occurs.
In response, we may simply
decide to say that it is the
anti-skeptical transcendental
proposition which is contested
and so cannot be assumed, and
allow that there are other transcendental propositions, such
as that judgment occurs, which
the skeptic accepts, and
so can be used without begging
any
questions.
Or we could simply amend our
definitions to obviate
the difficulty.
But it so happens that there is a
way out

-

5

21 ?

with preservation of

rirpc.pn+

umachinery.

Privileged proposilons have this peculiar
feature that, for
those of existential
orm, their existential
instantiations are not
privileged,
although they may still
be certain.
certain
qn -p
So.
for example, while
the proposition that
somebody
^
y or other
judging
is privileged.
shown, the proposition
that I am judging is
not privileged but IS still
certain, as was shown.
So since all transcendental propositions
are privileged
privileged, the proposition
that
I am judging is
not transcendental.
Yet that proposition
will
serve as well as its
existential generalization
as premise of
our transcendental
argument.
.

•

Two points Should be
noted concerning my
characterization
Of transcendental
principles.
First. I claim they are
true
in any world in which
an^ kind of judgment occurs,
I do not
restrict my claim by saying
they are true only in
worlds in
which non-analytic judgment
occurs.
All judgment, whether
analytic or synthetic in its
logical form, is nevertheless
3.ynthetio activity.
Further, not all judgments
could be analytic, since not every
judgment could be a rule of
descriptive
meaning.
If there are rules of
descriptive meaning, some
judgments must have descriptive
meaning, and hence be nonanalytic.
Therefore, there is no possible
world in which
there are only analytic
judgments.
Second,

claim that transcendental
propositions are
true in any world in which any
kind of judgment
I

occurs,

not say 'any world in which
judgment is possible.'

I

To say

do
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that someone has a capability
for judging but never
exercises
that capability
unlike someone who has
a capability for
eating fifteen pancakes but
never exercies that
capability
seems nonsensical to me.
it makes sense only in
a situation
Where, for example, a baby
is born unconscious and
remains
comatose for a long while, we
might wish to suggest that
when
his physical affliction is
removed, he will gain
consciousness.
But if this is the sense of
-possibility of judging,- then
it is an insufficient
starting-point for a transcendental
argument.

-

-

so we wish to show that a
certain kind of act requires

the existence of a certain
kind of object.

All consciousness

or judgmental activity takes
place in a world of objective

particulars.

We do not flout the tradition
which says that

nothing will demonstrate necessary
existence, that no existential claims can be necessary, that
all necessities are
ultimately conditional, when -necessitymeans -logical necessity.A transcendental argument cannot
show principles

to be true in all possible worlds
slmpliciter

.

But it can

establish a relative, conditional, synthetic
necessity
that a certain concept is instantiated

—

in all possible worlds

in which judgment occurs.

the concept has reference.
it has reference.

If we dispute about the concept,
If I soliloquize about the concept,

Most important, if

I

talk or think to myself

about anything at all, the concept in question has
reference.
The overall structure of a Kantian refutation
of epistemo-
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logical solipsis. ia,
then, that what the
solipsiat aoKnowledges entaila propositions
sufficient to support the
transcendental propositions he
denies, so that what he
accepts
entails the transcendental
conclusion.
To this extent I
agree with BecK-s reading
of Kant.^ But Bee.
point Of

ta.es the starting-

refutation to be something
merely accepted, but
not certain,
what distinguishes our
argument from ad homlnem
argument is that all the
premises are either analytic
.the

or

philosophically certain synthetic
propositions.
VII

My partial account of
transcendental arguments has rested
on the philosophical
demands of the skeptical case.
this
section I want briefly to trace
some textual confirmation
of
this account.

m

As is well known,

transcendental truths are supposed to

be a priori synthetic
truths.

The peculiarity of synthetic

propositions, knowable a priori.
Is that their truth value
can be determined independently
of experience even though
they tell us something about the
world.
A priori synthetic
truths are truths which can be
established conclusively despite
the fact that formal logic and
semantics are insufficient
and

particular obsorvations are not necessary
to do so.
to particular facts of experience
or observational

Appeal
procedures

IS not n eeded for the verification
of propositions knowable

a priori.

But for necessary propositions, which tell
us how

-
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the woria

b..

ve.incation

appeal to observations
is
Eossi^. £,
understanhing of the
terms, all Knowahle necessities are
.nowable , eiI^. ^ But
it does not follow
rora the fact that
a proposition is
knowahle a priori that
it
IS necessary.
if -necessary means
-logically necessary,
then to deny this last
claim is to affirm the
impossibility
Of logically contingent
a Eriori knowledge,
and so to give' up
"th© Kantian
©nterprig©,
not

seen another way. if
-necessary- means -logically
necessary.- then, on Kanfs
official view at least,
synthetic necessities would be impossible.
i„ all analytic
propositions,
the concept of the
subject contains the concept
of the predicate
or the c^plement of the
predicate,
s contains P if
and only

If

-noti-a

£)•

is a contradiction {if

-3 is P-

is explicitly

analytic) or is reducible to
a contradiction by
intersubstitution Of definitional
equivalents (if -s is P- is
implicitly
).i0
analytic
A proposition is synthetic
if and
only if it is

not analytic.

Hence, a synthetic necessity
would be a logical

truth Whose contradictory
is consistent.
But this is impossible.
Since, as we have introduced
the notions, the synthetic
and
the logically contingent
coincide, the impossibility was
to
be expected.
Also, as we have introduced the
notions, and as Kant rightly
saw, no synthetic proposition
is derivable from exclusively

analytic propositions. ^2

follows: A
tautology is a propositional function
which is true for all
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..

«.l,.lo

„„u„ „

1.

Stitution.

As we said, a
proposition is synthetic
just in
case it is non-analytio.
Now suppose that
p entails q and
that p rs a tautology,
since p is a tautology,
not-p is a

contradiction,
thing follows

if not-p is a
contradiction,
fron. a

posing. not-q entails

not-q entails not-p.

then, since any-

contradiction, not-p entails

q.

Contra-

Contraposing our initial
assumption,
Therefore, not-q entails
p.

p and not-p.
Since Whatever entails a
contradiction is a contradiction,
not-q is contradictory.
But if not-q is contradictory,
q is
a tautology.
Therefore, if p entails
q and p is a tautology,
q is a tautology.
since analytic propositions
are tautologyderivable. but no non-analytio
proposition is tautology-derivable, no synthetic
propositions are derivable from
analytic
propositions alone. But since
the denial of epistemological
solipsism is a synthetic
proposition, one stricture we can
place on its proof is that at
least one of its supportive
premises must be non-analytic
that is, synthetic.
,

raise these terminological
questions in an effort to
align orthodox Kantian doctrine
with my partial account of it
in sections V and VI.
Specifically, I urge that there are
useful and legitimate senses of
-necessary such that necessary propositions in those senses
are deducible without commission of modal fallacy from premise-sets
some of whose members,
though knowable with certainty, are
not necessary in any of
I
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those senses.

A conclusion can only
be as certain as
its
least certain promise.
But the situations are
different for
the alethic and variants
of non-alethic
modalities.
Formally, a necessary
conclusion may follow from
premises
some of which are
non-necessary
for example, if
p, then
necessaruy q, p, therefore,
necessarily q. This argumentform IS valid, and an
instance of it may even be
sound.
But
It appears to be
question-begging, since one
could not know
the first premise without
first knowing the conclusion.
More
radically, since a necessary
truth follows from anything
or
nothing, we may with formal
propriety produce arguments
none
of whose premises are
either necessary or true, or
arguments
Whose premise-sets are null.
But this is not a satisfactory
way to refute an opponent.

—

All this is true for strong
(S5) modal logic (where the
alternativeness relation is an
equivalence relation
transitive, symmetric, and reflexive
and so) where every possible
world must be taken account of.
Synthetic necessity is truth
in all possible worlds in
which synthetic activity

-

-

occurs.

Like epistemic, doxastic and other
non-alethic modal notions,
its domain is a proper subset of
the set of all possible worlds.
Consequently, if we have available the
non-necessary but
certain premise that synthetic activity
is occurring (in our
world), we are in a position to deduce
synthetic necessities.
If so, we will have deduced
necessities from non-necessities,
though certainties from certainties.
In these circumstances,
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«e Will have produced
an argument which
satisfies all of the
procedural assumptions adopted
in chapter I. section
IV.
With this, we have the
form of an answer to
the Humean
attack on a Ejlori propositions
of philosophy, A
proposition
can only he verified by
reflecting on concepts or by
recourse
to observation.
Philosophical principles can
be verified in
neither of these ways.
Therefore, philosophical
principles
are unverif iable
why should we accept the
first premise?
It is analytic only if
.going beyond concepts- is
synonymous
with -having recourse to
observation.- And if it is not
analytic. then, if it is a
priori, it is synthetic a priori
.

and

the skeptic turns dogmatist.

The Kantian answer is that
it

IS not analytically true,
it is false.

We can verify philo-

sophical principles by appeal to
the logically contingent,
but not inductive nor essentially
-introspective fact that

conscious activity is occurring,
In general,

then, transcendental method begins
with the

act of judgmental consciousness
and logically deduces the fact
that certain a pr i ori concepts are
instantiated
In particular,
we are trying to produce such a
deduction for the concept
'objective particular.’
The emphasis on the fact of conscious
a ctivity as premise, and existential
proposition as conclusion,
are both unusual.
Yet consideration of some of Kant's crucial
claims supports my emphasis. As my foremost
concern remains
philosophical, I do not intend my exegesis to
be decisive
.

or exhaustive.
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At the opening of the
-Analytic of Conceptsin the
SEiMaue Of Pure ReMon Kant says two
very important things.
^

analysis, or tL°procedu?e^usLl°in°4“i'’'^’^®J^”^
vestigations, that of disLctina "" P*'"l°®°Phioal inooncepts as may present
themLlves!^ anrsrof°r
them more distinct: hut +ha
rendering
tn’+K
j-therto rarely attempted
dissection of +ho
g,
TT;
n^i.I7?B^l,g^„4^ understanding itself,
a°hcepts
a priori by iSokini ?or
understanding alone,
as their birthplacf and^bv
analysing the pure use of
this facultt
This’iT^o^
philosophy, anything beyond
al
thirtelongf to
treatment of concepts /n
philosoph^ln^^e^ra^! (bIo!?!)

absolute
c%°^o

understInd?ng':?L\'?ran’

L^Lt4d-^g^“f o^e^%-o^cV:r^rr

to assign its^oroupr^
understanding, and by which we can

which we are enabled

T

^Lm^nf^^ an ~
manner their systematic completeness.
(B92)

The first passage states that
transcendental philosophy attempts to elicit the analytic
implications of the use of the
•faculty of the understanding,* that
is, the operation of
judging, and does not proceed by
articulating the constituent
elements of any conceptual content.
That
the understanding

is the use of concepts, and that
'the only use which the

understanding can make of these concepts
is to judge by means
of them*

(B93) is unequivocal throughout Kant.

Further, in

analyzing the pure use of understanding we
consider only what
follows from the occurrence of the act of
thinking or judging
in general, and not what additional
conditions must obtain if

particular acts of representation are to take place (vis
a vis
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their particular
representative function).
The second passage
reaffirms
since

this truth, adding
that

a. the Judger who does
all
fudging, so that there
IS a self -reflexiveness
about my analytical
enterprise I
can expect a systematic
interconnection between, and
a completeness about, the various
implications of the fact
of
judgmental consciousness.
This interpretation also
makes
sense of Kanfs claim
that only one proof can
be given for
each transcendental
principle. (B8I5-8I6) Our
startingpoint is always the same,
and is the only logically
synthetic
I

prGinis©

in thG proof.

Another very important statement
to study is Kanfs assertion that a transcendental
argument must show -how
subjective
conditions of th ought can have
ob.jectlve validity
(B122)
In the very next sentence
('For appearances can certainly
be given in intuition
independently of functions of the
understanding. ) Kant appears to
countenance the
.

•

•

existence of nonjudgmental consciousness which
would be possible even if objective particulars did not
exist.
But this appearance is
illusory.
Inspection will reveal that the
sentence functions

dialectically.

Kant means to say that it is not
obvious that
mere sense consciousness requires
thinking
which has its
own requirements in turn, among
which is the existence of
objective particulars
but it does.
The subsequent argumentat ion boars this out,

—

—

Kant's quGstion is how subjoctivo
conditions of thought
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can have objective validity,
it ie not how subjective
judgments can be verified. Again,
he is not anxious to
provide
criteria for distinguishing
truth from falsity in
everyday
empirical judgments. I'* The
conditions of thought, the
concepts
indispensable to all judging, must
be shown to be objectively
valid, that is, to be instantiated.
It is not the case that
each judgment requires the use
of objectivity concepts
where objectivity is contrasted
with subjectivity, not in the
sense in which all judging is
objective, the

-

sense of 'object-

employed by Wolff, and used in
noteworthy statements such as
that 'the a E r l o ri conditions of a
possible experience in
general are at the same time conditions
of the possibility of
objects of experience.' (B197)^5 What
is meant is
that no

judging could occur at all unless the
concept of an object
were instantiated.
I

confess that

equivocal issue.

I

am taking an unequivocal stand on an

Sometimes Kant identifies the objective

validity of a concept with its having sense
or meaning, as
in BI 95
We saw that those taking the Wittgensteinian
.

variant

of the linguistic turn subscribe to
this interpretation.

For

them, to say that the possibility of experience
is what gives

objective validity to a concept is to say that concepts
are

meaningful only if there are empirical criteria for their
application.
A second textually supported reading identifies 'objective

validity* with 'necessary universality (for everybody),* validity

.

227

which is not restricted
to the state of ,
ksubject
at a parti,
cular time. My judgment
is objectively
-Lvt-j-y valid if
j
If everyone else
also always connects
his perceptions in
the same way under
the
same circumstances.
The 'operational'
definition of 'objective validity employed
by transcendental
phenomenologists
such as Muck is similar
to this universality
.

one.l?

But can this be a def
inition of 'objective
validity',
specifically, can universal
interpretation of perceptions
be
a necessary condition
of objective validity?

Objectively
valid judgments can withstand
no breach of consensus?
This
view is too strong, as is
Mahaffy's view that 'objectively
valid' means 'necessary
for all cognition of
objects,' in
consequence of which, no
empirical concepts can have
objective validity, which is
flagrantly unKantian.^®
Further, universal interpretation
is insufficient for
j ctive validity as well,
if we had accepted the
doctrine
of transcendental idealism,
our indispensable beliefs
would
be regarded as true.
But we rejected that doctrine
in chapter
I.
In fact, in chapter II we
even rejected the inference
from indispensability to
justifiability
The remaining textually
supported view is that objective

validity is truth (of a principle)
or reference (of a concept).
Kant affirms this equivalence
at B8l6, where he is explicitly
focussing attention on the nature of
transcendental
proof.

He aloO seems to employ this
sense in the discussion immediately

subsequent to his characterization of
transcendental arguments

.

.
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as establishing (and/or
explaining) the objective
validity
Of subjective conditions
of thought. (BI22-123,
And in the
SEitiaue-s -General Note on the
Syste. of the Principles.Kant says that objective
validity can be established
only by
appeal to out^ intuitions.
(B291)
Also, in a note to Bxxvi
he contends that the
objective validity of a
concept is its
real, and not merely its
logical, possibility.
But if real

possibility is coextensive
with existence, as argued
in -Postulates of Empirical Thought,then objective validity
is
reference
The evidence for the favored
interpretation is vitiated
If -truth- means something
like -coherence- for Kant,
as many
hold.
Yet at B82 he says. -... truth.
.. is the agreement of
knowledge with its object- ,2° at
B197, -...truth, that is.

agreement with the object-

j

and at B670,

-...to truth, that

IS,

to conformity of our concepts
with the object... -21 These
statements of a correspondence theory
of truth are not decisive,

however, since if a Wolffian view
on which an object is analysed
as a -that which- is correct,
conformity of concept to object
is conformity between concepts.

For well-rehearsed reasons, a coherence
view, as expressed
clearly by people such as Neurath, is
unacceptable
only does coherence fail to differentiate
between entrenched
myth and scientific system, but the
choice between any individually coherent but jointly incompatible
systems is always

arbitrary.

If maximal consistency is truth, then why
should
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.n. the conceptual
f.a.eworh endorsed in
.ndrspensahle,23 ^ut the
best reason to accept

Critl^

the correspondence interpretation
is that the sKeptical
position is
t plausible on itj
hence, a refutation
of skepticism emPloying the correspondence
interpretation is strongest.
More
bluntly, the final
authorization of my interpretation
is its
consistency with the demands
of an adequate
anti-skeptical
theory.
None of the alternative
interpretations suggested
fulfill this minimal
requirement.

VIII
In the next four sections
1 want to survey some
accounts

of transcendental method,
most of which differ in
important

ways from those already
criticized.

I

hope to reinforce and

further develop my positive
account of transcendental
argument
by criticism of these defective
alternatives.
The first account to be
described has already been rejected
as useless to the anti-skeptical
task.
Despite its obvious

uselessness, it is widely favored.

In fact, the identification

of transcendental method with
analytic epistemology is the

preponderant Anglo-American view.

For example, according to

Milmed, transcendental principles
are deducible from the nature
of empirical knowledge
They are true of all our empirical
knowledge because they are true of all
possible empirical
knowledge, by definition of 'empirical
knowledge.'
It is a
.

supplementary

,

synthetic premise of a transcendental argument
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that our definition of
.eMpirioal knowledge, is
not vacuous,
but has application.
The categories cannot
be applicable to
all contents of consciousness,
it is violation of
categorial
principles which characterizes
Illusion. dreaMng.

and so on.
In his book on Kant,
Korner opts for a similar
view.^?
Judgment is unification of
diverse

representations.

Objective, empirical judgment
and subjective, empirical
judgment
differ in that the objective
refers to an object and not
merely to a subjective impression,
and the objective, if true,
is true for everybody,
regardless of his particular
state.
Korner rightly notes that neither
the content of. nor the

temporal relations among, the
percipient- judger' s perceptions
can be the basis of objective
reference and general validity,
since these features are shared by
subjective and objective
judgment alike.
The resolution is that objectivity
is contributed by the objective judgment
itself, by the way in which
It further unifies representations
already unified
in the

empirical concepts of the subjective
judgment.
concepts are rules governing the connection

These further

of the particular

concepts of the subjective judgment, and
hence concern the
logical form of judgment.
These rules or ways of conferring
objectivity are the categories, and the
propositions which
stats their necessity for making empirical
knowledge-claims

about objects are categorial principles.
It does not follow from the above that any
of the objec-

tive judgments we make are true, that any
pure concepts apply
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to anything.

Korner's Kant secures
objective reference by
appeal to the Copernican
revolutionary interpretation
of transoenbental iiealis.
objects are „ade to
conform to concepts
and not conversely.
HintiKka insists on this
interpretation
Of Kant in which
-genuine knowledge is maker's
knowledge.- and
•reason has insight only
into that which it produces
after a
plan Of its own.-26.Bossart
and others sanction
this view also.27
On this view, transcendental
idealism entails the collapse
Of the mental
content-independent reality gap. and
so the

-

belief-actuality gap.

if transcendental idealism
is true,

then subjective conditions
of thought, concepts
indispensable
to thinking, are objectively
valid.
No transcendental argument
would be needed. But such
idealism seems acutely inadequate
to cope with the problem of
the role of the given in
knowledge.
If my categories of thought
literally determine what I observe,
then what I observe provides
no independent control over my
thought. 28 Further, it provides
a redef inition-cum-resolution
of the skeptical problem
rather than a direct solution on the
skeptic -s own terms; and we agreed
to seek a method which attempts to refute skepticism rather
than condemn it as misguided.
In addition to Milmed and Korner.
Allison. .Kalin. Meerbote. Machina. Crawford. Dryer.
Bartley. Sellars and many
others have argued that Kant-s trancendental
principles are
analytic implications of the concept of
empirical knowledge,
and are not deducible from Humean
consciousness. ^9 Allison
argUGs "that "th© principlGs ar© "thG necessary
conditions for
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experiencing a public,
spatiotemporal world
distinguishable

f-.

the self and its ideas,
we can define
.objectivity, only
in terms of them.
Also subscribing to their
source in the
human subject, he explains
empirical

reality by transcendental

Ideality.

Crawford characterises the
principles as rules for
systematising experience deduced
from the nature of scientific
thought.
Sellars insists that Kant is
not seeking to prove
there is empirical knowledge,
but only to articulate
the concept of empirical knowledge.
Bartley sees Kant.s problem
as
providing a tenable theory of
learning, granted that knowledge
exists.
Meerbote says that Kant intends
to explain certain
features of the concept of knowledge
rather than

prove we have
knowledge, he is asking how knowledge
is possible, not whether
we have it.
And so on.

have no doubt that these
interpretations are exegetically sound if based on limited
portions of the Kantian texts.
In the P rolegomena Kant is
explicit that only objectively
valid consciousness or judgment may
be called .experience,,
that the mere comparison and connection
of perceptions in
I

judgments is insufficient for experience. 3°
in the Critinue
Judgment Kant describes transcendental
principles as stating
universal conditions under which things
can become objects
of our knowledge. 31 And frequently
in the Critique
Pure

M

^

Reason, where Kant regularly says that
transcendental proposi-

tions are necessary conditions of the possibility
of experience
(or a possible experience in general), he
identifies experience
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with empirical knowledge.
so undoubtedly

KanVs an,u.ent 30.eti.es

runs:

it there

particulars about which
we have knowledge,
they
all have qualities of
so.e intensity, they
are extended

U

ratable in space, the event

and

of the changing
of their quali-

ties or states presupposes
some preceding event
upon which it
follows in a lawlike
manner, they persist
through changes,
they are all part of
one spatiotemporal
system and so are interrelatable. and however
remotely, they interact
with one

articulating the structure
of knowledge of
objects and is not
addressing himself to the
epistemological solipsist's
challenge.
If he adds to the
anteoent. 'and there are
objective particulars
about Which he have
knowledge.'
he has begged the
skeptical

f

If

experience* means something
like

•experiential knowledge of
relatively permanent, law-governed
Objects.' or 'discursive
knowledge of spatiotemporally-ooordinated objects.' Kant fails
to answer the skeptic,
since I
believe that in the first
Critique Kant is sometimes
concerned
to refute the skeptical
thesis, concerned with the
actuality
of transcendental knowledge
and not its mere possibility,
this
strain of thought is of no use
to me.
And it is only a strain
Of thought, not to be
confused with a more far-reaching

method.

IX

A cluster of wrongheaded
theoretical requirements is exhibited
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in the following
remarks by Walshs
If a transcendental
proof is to
conclusion, it is not only
''®cessary
requlrirtha^ ? should
from an unshakeable
start
facts we miic;+
^e able to
specify the sing le condition
make the fact possible!
We must^®in°nth°"'^“^°'’®
a position to say
words, be in
that onlv if =’
true can we have the
fa?t^s-^e havrti"
quires two other things
T?i>^a+
we should from the
start be in possession or
•

T

-p

sibilitierto bfconsidered

pol''?ha^i®-®
tive set of hypotheses
exhausSecond
to rule out all oflhlie
t'® able
hvcn^^I
except one definitively
out of court, and to
^
show that
^
remaining one is
self-consistent?32

Walsh goes on to characterise
his "unshakeable.' premise
as one
for which the supporting
evidence is 'so abundant
that there
is no Era ctical likelih^
of our being wrongabout it. 33 it
is not a philosophical
certainty,
fact, the transcendental
conclusion itself enjoys the
suggested epistemic

m

status as

evidently as any other candidate
proposition, so that argument
to such a conclusion would
be
otiose.

But let us shelve this

concern and turn to a more
important one.
To show that a certain proposition
is true only if another
IS true, all we must do is
deduce the latter from the former.

Walsh's talk of uniqueness is
entirely misleading. He has
confused the hypothetico-deductive
method with deduction.
We
are not (and need not be) beginning
with some phenomena and
standing conditions and trying to pick
the best or only adequate hypothesis from a finite set of
alternatives.
We could

never have such a complete set since
there are an indefinite
number of sufficient conditions for any
fact.

All that can

be required, and all that a
transcendental proof intends to

.

.
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1

.

-rom another, certainly
true proposition.

Korner. Kekes. and
Ledger Wood are
guilty of similar
confusion.
Korner sets up his
attach on the possihility
of
ranscendental deduction as
follows: Statements
about a region
Of experience
presuppose we have the
means of differentiating
in that experience
between objects and
their properties
and relations
having a method of
differentiation.
Such a
-thod belongs to a categorial
scheme if and only if
among the
concepts exhibited by the
scheme are some which
are constitutive Of. that is tell
us what is to count
as. an object of
experience, and some which
are individuating for
those objects,
that IS tells us the
criteria by which in general
one object
is to be distinguished
from another. A scheme
is established
(or has application) when
it is shown that a method
of prior
differentiation belongs to it.
when (i) there is a non-empty
attribute P such that -x is
an object of (a region of)
experience- entails and is entailed
by -x is P- (condition of
comprehensive applicability), and
(ii) there is a non-empty
attribute Q which IS applicable
to every object of the region,
and
•x is an Object of the
region and x is a Q- entails and
is
entailed by -x is a distinct
object of the region.' A tran-

-

scendental deduction elicits the
conceptual scheme presupposed
by our statements about
experience
If one could validly argue
that a certain categorial

scheme is necessary in that no
thought or discourse which does
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not fit into this scheme
is possiblp
possible, then one could
conclude
that the necessary
conditions for the
applicability of this
scheme are necessary
conditions for all thought.
Korner disthis strategy.
Sometimes he discounts
it on the grounds
that an unattainable
enumeration of all possible
schemes is
required.. But this rests
on the confusion of
hypotheticodeductive and transcendental
methods.
At other times he discounts it on the grounds
that a multiplicity of
consistent
schemes adequate for the
empirical differentiation of
reality
are possible, even actually
available. He argues
that the

q

ness of the favored scheme
cannot be established through
comparison with undifferentiated
experience, nor through comparison with alternative
competitors to see they are lacking.
The first suggestion is
incoherent; the description of
the
second suggestion shows that
uniqueness fails to hold. He
-oncludes that the only legitimate
claim involved in the uniqueness claim is that alternatives
to the scheme we are actually
employing are not statable once we
have adopted the
scheme.

So it seems that we can attach
no meaning to the question
whether we have to be in the scheme
in the first place, which
IS the question a uniqueness
argument would have to answer,
according to Korner. 35
The second horn of Korner*

s

dilemma, that exposure of

defective alternatives precludes uniqueness
of the preferred
alternative, can be escaped.
Its intended force is reminiscent
of Rorty s complaint that imaginable
schemes cannot be shown
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to be impossible.

But reductive strate.^e
Strategies are not
wedded to
the +V.thing reduced.
And argument
rgument bv
by pT
elimination does not
endorse the things
eliminated.
•

Further. Korner-s
positive claim that
alternatives to
e scheme in use
are unstatable, if
the scheme in use
is
uniquely adequate, is
too strong.
Even Strawson, who
held
that every possible
form of experience
is coherently
describable
recognized that not every
coherently describable
form of ex
perience is possible.
Analogously, even if every
scheme adequate for empirical
differentiation is statable,
not every
statable scheme is adequate
for empirical
differentiation
Hence, it is gratuitous
to preclude specifications
of inadequate
schemes. And this glance
back to Strawson reminds
us of another
possibility for which Korner's
argument fails to account.
namely that the actual use
of other schemes
requires the prior
acquisition of the favored
scheme.
Finally, on Korner's view,
the individuals which
are the
ontic commitments of formal
theories are ideal rather
than
empirical individuals.
Consequently, even if adoption
of the
favored scheme is required
by every formal theory,
no existential. anti-skeptical
conclusions are forthcoming.
Korner's
type Of transcendental
argument will not even explain,
let
n- establish, the relation
between thought and reality. 3^
in several articles, Kekes
repeats Korner's mistakes.

meeting the skeptical challenge
is to'how the anti-skeptical
propositions derive from a par-
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tioular conceptual system,
and then show that the
system is
the only possible one.
But. according to Kehes,
this Kantian
proof of uniqueness and
necessity rests on the
mistaken belief
that Aristotelian logic.
Euclidean geometry, and
Newtonian
mechanics are necessarily true.
The discovery of
propositional
logic, spherical geometry,
and quantum mechanics refutes

Kanfs

argument.

Perhaps Kant misidentif ied the
necessary components,
hut there are some.
No, it is impossible to
show that any
component of any conceptual system
is necessary.
It can be
Shown that some components are
necessary vis-a-vis a particular
system, but not vis-a-vis any
system, since this would require
having the unattainable knowledge
of all possible
systems. 37

The postulational method of
science -- postulating inter-

vening variables to explain the
character of the output, given
the input -- is the regressive
method in Kant.

The logical

structurey of the progressive,
transcendental method and this
hypothetical method are inverted.
Transcendental propositions
are neither empirical hypotheses nor
postulational explanations.
So again, the inability to complete an
infinite series is

irrelevant.
Kekes* specific criticism of Kant's
"uniqueness” proof
is also incorrect.

Recall that our transcendental conclusion

has the general force that there is a predicative
function,

specified by the analysis of objective particularity,
which
is satisfied,

that a certain, abstractly specified, type of

entity must exist (if we are conscious).

What values in the
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domain satisfy the function
IS left „r,H»
is
-e .
undecided;
what in experience satisfies the
conclusion
IS
is left
ev, open
iGit an
question.

The

argument is intended to
encroach minimally on
scientific theory
and discovery.
No substantive
propositions of physics follow
from the conclusion.
Generally, transcendental
propositions
are not axiomatic, and need
have no. non-trivial
deductive
consequences, imply' no empirical
claims. 38
And so the basic error in
the postulationist
criticism of
Kant is perhaps best exemplified
in yet another proponent.
Swing, Who in his book on
transcendental logic, says that
the

indispensability of principles cannot
be established, since
it is logically impossible
to prove the uniqueness of
any
postulate. 39 The simple answer
to this is that postulational
uniqueness is not indispensability
of principle.
Indispensable
principles cannot be unique and need
not be postulates.
They

cannot unique because logically
necessary conditions cannot
be unique.
They need not be postulates because
necessary
conditions of some proposition need not
be sufficient conditions for that proposition.
Once again, all that we seek is
the logical derivation of one
proposition from another, certainly true proposition.

That other derivations of other

propositions can be constructed in no way
diminishes our
accomplishment.
And notice, to return to the final clause
of Walsh’s account, that if the premise
is self-consistent,
and the argument is valid, then the conclusion
is self-consistent.

Finally, in addition to other versions of the postula-
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t.onal account

-

instance Led.en Wooa-s
conception of the
transcendental method as
proceeding fro. abstractive
analysis
Of
experience (insofar as
it is structural)
to a
regress to its presuppositions,
which he identifies
with the
hypothetical method of science
there is a.
a Straws on—
pos"tulationist hybrid offered by
wij.K..rson.
y Wilk-rson
Using the notion of
material sufficiennv
Iiiciency
resources sufficient for
a task
Wilkerson shifts the burden
of proof to the
skeptic.
If the
truth Of a transcendental
principle does provide an
explanation
Of our linguistic
practices, then anyone
rejecting that explanation must provide an
alternative.
The expectation, of
course, is satisfaction
at the skeptic's failure.
After concealing our
disappointment in learning that
the paradigm linguistic
practice needing explanation
is our

^

—

-

-

distinguishing between the subjective
and the objective. 'I „e
may justifiably complain
that, as with the anti-skeptics
of
chapter III. WilKerson fails
to realize that

the skeptic need
not attempt to replace some
of the features of empirical
discourse by others regulatively
preferable.
The essential skep
tical charge is that the system
in use lacks rational justification.
The skeptic does not dispute the
coherence of the
system, but the possibility of
demonstrating that it corresponds with reality. And so even if
the skeptic cannot offer
a viable alternative, it does not
follow that the system he

is criticizing is rationally
supported.

can provide an adequate alternative.

But the skeptic

If the world being as

we think it is is
materially
y sufficient
iiicient tn
to account for
our
system
use, then the mere
thought that
e world is as we
think is materially
sufficient as well
And even if such thought
were also
-Lso 'materi^n
materially necessary,
since I showed that
conceptual
F d-L prioritv
priority hno
4
has no interesting
oross-oategorial implications,
the conceptual
priority of
objective particulars would
be insufficient to
show that they
are not subjective or
mind-dependent after all.
or that we
cannot know otherwise
aa+vid
-rwise, as
the epistemological
solipsist suggests.

m

'

•

‘

.

j.

In a series of recent
articles Gram provides the
following
account of transcendental
arguments.'^2 Let 0 be an
unspecified
epistemic operator, and let
S be a person.
Then an epistemic
premise is a premise of the
form S0(Ex)(Px)' which
states
that S is in a certain
epistemic relation de dicto
to a thing
under a certain description. '+3
Transcendental arguments are

indirect proofs whose only
assumption is an epistemic
premise
with subjective predicate
as descriptive predicate F.
where
subjective predicates are such
that the skeptic affirms that
they, but not their negations,
are knowably applicable.
Ascriptions of negations of subjective
predicates, objective
epistemic propositions, are
transcendental propositions.
schematically, we argue transcendentally
when we argue as
follows. (1) 30(EX)(PX) ... (n)
,

q

...

(n,m) -q

./(n.m.l) SC(Ex)(-P.

Gram argues that no successful
argument of this form is

-concept

-io

o. t.e episte.tc
relation contained
in t.e epis-

precise .a. no indepenCent
support, its inclusion
in
e pre.ise-set
of a transcenaentai
argument wouia aestroy
-s (essentiaiiy) reauctive
strategy (aince suoH
a precise
dubious as the epistemic
premise itself).
(b) if
a partially analytic
precise haa inaepenaent
support, since
it would state xi^oessary
necessaT*v r>nyiHi
4-'
conditions of beine
uuing in the epistemic
the argument would
become superfluous.
And (c) if
such an inaepenaently
supportea precise is true.
„e coula infer its necessary
conditions solely fro. the
description of
the thing to which
s is episte.ically
related (so that the
epistemic premise is
superfluous).^^
.

In effect.

tells us that if the
description of so.e
phenomenon does not imply
the existence of some
other phenomenon. then the perception
or awareness of (or
whatever epistemic relation in which we
stand to) the first cannot
require
the existence of the
second.
But (C) is false.
Hintikka
correctly argues that the
description of sensuous color
phenomena does not imply the
existence of visual sense organs,
but
the perception or awareness
of sensuous color does
require the
existence of visual sense organs. '*5
Nor. similarly, is it true
that if the concept of perception
implies something, then the
(C)

description of what we perceive implies
that thing too.
The
concept of perception implies the
concept of consciousness
(using the elliptical idiom of
concept-implication), the

'

2^3

description of things
perceived does not.

o„.
argues that Hintikka-type
conditionals, partially
analytic
premises of the form
'SO(Ex)M(Px)-^
7 v Wn
X j—» (^^x)
(Gx)\i where
'(Sx)(Gx)'
does not follow from
’(ExlfPv'i*
(Ex)(Fx)
alone, cannot be
established
transcendentally.'*6
f

i

rul_ out transcendental
argumanti Hintikka’s
counterexample fails to comply
with either (A) or
(B), so
rfintikka.s conditional
does not threaten
Oram-s overall assessment Of transcendental
argument.
But while (a) is a
truth
about indirect proof,
we have been given
no reason to believe
that transcendental
arguments must be indirect,
fact, if
we pause to reflect
on our anti-skeptical
project, we see that
proceeding indirectly from
a single assumption
lacks all advantage.
Epistemological solipsism is
neither obviously absurd
nor logically, highly
complex, so that a reductio
of it alone
lacks promise.
Supplementary, independently
supported premises
needed.
But this is just what is
needed for direct argu-

m

mentation against epistemological
solipsism,
ful refutation of our skeptic
need

since a success-

not be indirect, (A) is an

irrelevant criticism.

Condition (B), which Hintikka’s
conditional allegedly
violates, is false.
If it is possible that some
of the claims
accepted by the skeptic, other
than the epistemic premise, are
partial analyses of some epistemic
concept relevant to the
epistemic premise, then it is false
that supplementation of
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the transcendental
argument by such an
analytic precise would

...... .h..

„

'SO,,.,,..,

»y ... ...p...,
or «...

.....
.... , pp„i..,

..

^

tely aware that' -(B)
is false.
faiao n^v.
its; IS
Therefore, transcendental
arguments can have both an
episte»ic precise and an
independently, but not transcendentally,
supported premise. The
point
IS this, addition Of an
independently supported,
partially
analytic premise does not
render transcendental
argumentation
superfluous, since although the
consequent of such a premise
states a necessary condition
of the epistemic premise,
it does
not give us the necessary
condition we seek.

Transcendental arguments are not
ruled out by conditions
(A). (B), or (C).
But Gram's version of transcendental
arguments can be ruled out.
The argument-schema exhibiting
Gram's
account is not indirect or reductive.
If the objects satisfying premise (1) and conclusion
(n+m+1)
are distinct, the

two propositions are simultaneously
satisfiable, and hence
consistent. And relocating the
negation sign in (n+m+1) from

within the propositional function to
the front of the formula
giving the negation large scope
while producing a proposition
contradictory to (1), makes the argument
intolerably strong,
concluding that the skeptic cannot truly
affirm the application
of even the subjective predicate
to anything.
So long

—

—

as 'O'

represents an epistemic relation the
skeptic acknowledges he
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has to something de
dicto
icto, thio
this consequence
follows.
And if
we construe 'O' differentitr
ifferently, +k
the skeptic will
not embrace the
epistemic premise.
Therefore
inerefore. (’ro™t
Gram's transcendental
argument
IS either too strong
to he credible or
too weak to refute
epistemological solipsism.

can extend this last
obiection to show that
transcendental arguments cannot
be indirect, if that
means reductive
Of a single premise.
The single premise is
either epistemic
or not.
If it is not, then it
is either a proposition
with
no epistemic operator at
all or a de
epistemic proposition.
In either case, the
proposition is existential. Now
if the
existential proposition is
accepted, then the argument's
conclusion will be unacceptably
strong.
And if the existential
proposition is contested, then the
argument is question-begging.
Given the result of the previous
paragraph, we can conclude
that, whether based on an
epistemic premise or not, transcendental arguments are not reductive.

^

There is a weaker sense of
'indirect proof in which
supplementary premises are permissible,
this weaker sense,
Ruf. Howell, and others have
insisted that transcendental proof
must proceed indirectly.
Against this one might adduce Kant's
own remarks on the illegitimacy
of reductive method in proving
synthetic principles outside of mathematics. '8
But these remarks have been entirely misunderstood,
and on Kant's (and my
own) view, the issue of reductivsness
is a red herring.

m

.

Kant tells us that direct proof is
desirable because.
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unlike reduotio. we see
from what our conclusion
follows.
He
then says that the
impossibility of the joint
truth of not-p
and some subjective conditions
under which alone anything
can
be conceived by our reason
does not entail p.49 But
'subjective
conditions- here concerns the
Ideas and dialectical
illusion,
such conditions may -be false.confusing the subjective with
the objective.
In essence, Kant-s
"restriction" of apagogic
method to mathematics amounts
to nothing more than the
admonition not to use reduotio when
the assumptions of the proof
are not certain.
So instead of deducing
q from p we can assume
not-q, deduce not-p. and conclude
that, since we know for certain that p, not-not-q. that is,
The denial of a transcenq.
dental principle can be shown to be
false, though not selfcontradictory, by showing that it has a
certainly known falsehood as a consequence.
But we need not proceed indirectly.
But if. as we acknowledge, our
transcendental conclusion
IS existential, Howell has a general
argument in support of
his view. 50 He says that existential
conclusions can be validly
inferred only by existential generalization
or indirect argument.
Admittedly, in our own case, existential
generalization
is unavailable -- wo cannot commence
debate by confidently

pointing to an objective particular.
be

So our argument must

indirect.
The major premise of his argument is false.

With the

help of necessary truths, existential conclusions
can be inferred directly from other existential propositions.

And if

24 ?
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exxstent.al premise,
cor.iolned with necessary
truths only
entails the conclusion,
then the premise hy
itseli entails thl
conclusion.
And this accurately
depicts our

own strate*,y.
By
the use Of necessary
truths, we deduce the
conclusion that ohlootive particulars exist
from the privileged,
and hence certain, existential
proposition that judgment
is occurring (which
IS Itself derived by
existential generalization
from the cartainty that I am judging).

XI

Rufs theory

of transcendental argument
contains several
avoidable blunders.
He argues that transcendental

arguments

are not deductive, but
presupposltional

,

on the grounds that

their conclusions must be
synthetic a priori
but if their
premises were solely analytic,
their conclusions would not
.

be synthetic, and if their
premises were solely empirical,

their conclusions would not be
a priori 51 This overlooks
the
possibility of a mixed premise-set,
which turns out to be characteristic of Rufian transcendental
arguments.
It also overlooks the possibility of explicating
presupposition
.

in terms

of deductive consequence, which
also turns out to be charac-

teristic of his theory.

Carelessness in distinguishing in

practice between def initlonally distinguished
propositions and
statements also engenders needless
difficulties.
Suitably
refined, however, Rufs theory is
interesting.

Statements are datable acts with spatiotemporal
identity

248

conditions. 52 a statement
'exists' if a^"<3e wly
if it has a
... value.
^
A statement
p 'pnesupposes' a
statement p if
and only if the truth
of p i. a necessary
condition of the
exzstence of p.
a 'transcendental
presupposition' is a statement Whose own existence
entails a fact which
secures the
truth value of the
statement itself. 53
Transcendental presuppositions are svnthp+io
o
synthetic a
transcendental statements.
,,
P IS such that its existence
entails its truth, then
p
as a synthetic a
Erlori truth,
.

if p ip 3 ,,, ,,,,

entails its falsehood,
then p
xtp a
d svnthetir
F is
synxnetic a prion falsenood.
Transcendental proofs of
synthetic a priOEi falsehoods
are indirect, The
joint assumption
•

•

that p is true and that
p
IS stated or supposed
entails a contradiction.
Transcendental

proofs of synthetic a
Eriori truths are indirect.
The joint
assumption that p is false
and that p is stated or
supposed
entails a contradic tion.

Rufian transcendental arsuTn-^^ntc!
ai^um..nts, +horh
then, can schematically
be represented as follows;
(1) S asserts or supposes
that p.
(2

)

(Supposition)

-p

,

(Supposition)

(3)

If p exists,

(4)

If p has a truth value,

(5) If p exists,

(n) q
(m-^n)

-q

then p has a truth value.
then

S

asserts or supposes

then S asserts or supposes

p.

p.

s
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(rntn+l)

-(S asserts or supposes

p, and -p).
(m+n.2) If s asserts
or supposes
p. then -(-p).
im+n^3) If p exists,
then -(-p).

(m+n+4) If p exists,
then

p.

(m-.n^5)

Necessarily, if p exists,
then p.
(1) and (2) are
suppositions for indirect
proof.
(3) fonowa
from the definition of
statement-existence.
(4) follows from
the definition of
statement-existence and the
nature of state^ants.
(5) follows from (3) and
(4) by transitivity of
implication.
(m.n.l) follows by indirect
proof, and entails, via
material implication and De
Morsan's theorem, (m+n+2).
By
transitivity of implication.
(mrnt3) follows from
(5) and
(m.n.2), and (m.n.4)
follows by intervening use of
double
negation,
since to suppose that (min+4)
is false leads to
contradiction, given only
definitional and logically true
lemmas, (mtn+4) is necessarily
true, that is, (m+n*5).
Ruf compares his transcendental
arguments with arguments
from self-refutation, and notes
the strength advantage
of the

r er.

Transcendental arguments begin with
mere supposal
on the part of a nyone whereas
arguments from self-refutation
require actual assertions by a
particular
.

person.^'* Now as

Ruf sees the advantage, there
is effectively no advantage at
all.
After all, we are dealing with datable,
occurrent speech
acts -- not abstract propositions
which may or may not be

actually affirmed by someone

-

and we are dealing with an

epistemological solipsist who procedurally
assumes the egocentric
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prsdicamont, for whom the
someone performing
urming the speech act
IS always himself.
Henc« ac,
wi +v, mv Verc;inn
as With
^
'-rsion, any successful
-stance of Hufs transcendental
argumentation must begin
with
act of judgment.
However, behind

Rufs comparative evaluation
may

be the

unexpressed insight that,
whereas arguments from
self -refutation establish the falsity
of a proposition
expressed by a
sentence-token used in a
speech act b^ appeal to
the event
epesch act, transcendental
arguments establish such
falsity (and consequently
truth of the negation)
appeal to
SHa
refluirements for the occur rence
of an^ speech
But if this is true, as
I think it is, then
transcendental
arguments need not begin with
the assertion or supposition
of
epistemological solipsism, the
denial of epistemological
solipsism, or any other proposition
in particular.
The mere fact
that something or other is
being asserted or supposed

^

anal^

suffices.
And this IS obviously an
awesome advantage in power over
alternative anti-skeptical methods.

Notice that transcendentally
established claims are synthetic a priori on Rufs account.
Since the asserted or
supposed p is logically contingent,
it is synthetic.
But
since (m+n^^5) expresses a necessary
truth, p is knowable a
priori.
If the fact that a statement has
a truth value
entails that that value is true, then,
if the fact that it
has a truth value can be ascertained
without recourse to
,

particular observations, its truth is knowable
a priori

.

That
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a statement has truth
value can be d.scertained
ascertained without
.k
recourse
to particular
observations. Therefore,
the^ Truth
truth of transcent
dental statements is
knowable a priori
•

.

%

more powerful account
of transcendental
arguments
retains this virtue.
The fact that I am
judging is logically
contingent, as is the
existence of objective
particulars.
But
the speech act premise,
since self-aff irming
or self -verifying
13 knowable a
,,,
cally necessary, and so
knowable a Eriori.
since the transcendental conclusion that
objective particulars
exist is a
deductive consequence
cf?premise-set. each of whose
members
IS knowable a Eriori.
it is knowable a Eriori
But it is also
synthetic.
Therefore, it is synthetic
a priori
Finally, recall that the
reductive strategy employed
in
Rufian transcendental arguments
is inessential,
since premises
supplementary to the assumption
for reductio are used, we
may
optionally, with’ equal propriety,
proceed directly.
.

.

And in

case of my version of
transcendental argument, it is only
natural to proceed directly.
It would be a pointless
complication to assume that objective
particulars do not exist.
XII

The strategy of a Kantian
transcendental refutation of

epistemological solipsism is to show

t.hat

the existence of

Objective particulars is a necessary
condition for the occur
rence of judgment.
Since I judge, judgment occurs, and so

Objective particulars
exist.

Since

a. certain that I
Ju.ge
can (hy following the
proof) .now with
certainty that objective particulars exist.
This IS
is +h=
ithe anti-skeptical
thesis.
I claim that if
one shows the existence
of
1

I

,

'

objective

particulars to be a necessary
condition of the occurrence
of
judgment, then one can know
with certainty
that objective

particulars exist.

But in chapters II and

in anti-skeptics
such as paradigm case,
non-vacuous contrast, and
parasitism
theorists were defeatpii
ereated htr
by the following
skeptical rejoinder:
•For the acquisition of
concepts, for learning the
meaning of
»ords. etc., belief is as
good as knowledge, and so
reference
or actuality is not guaranteed.
Therefore, no kind of argument
can establish that a kind
of objective entity exists.
In principle. at best one can establish
that particular beliefs must
be held.
But to this result I am
indifferent.'
This skeptical counterargument
is not possible for transcendental arguments. A valid
transcendental argument pre-

cludes further question as to
whether we can really know its
conclusion.
If the argument is valid,
so that the fact of

judgment-making

—

is true, false,

justified or gratuitous

whether the judgment qua representation

—

implies the truth

of the

judgment that objective particulars
exist, then what
sense can we make of the judgment
that there
is a

belief-

knowledge gap between which a resourceful
skeptic may sneak?
If a transcendental argument is
valid,

it is sound.

The very

act of going through the argument is itself
a judgmental act.
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P

position

truth is necessary
for all judgment,
then
that proposition cannot
correctly be judged false
by anyone,
and Its negation cannot
correctly be judged true
by anyone.
More precisely, if a
transcendental argument
is valid.
If Its conclusion were
not true, no judgment
could falsify it.
But if no judgment could
falsify it. it could not
Pe falsely believed,
since it is not possible
that there be
a judgment when it is
not true.
Hence, the conclusion
of a
valid transcendental argument
is unmistakable.
But this does
not entail that a transcendental
conclusion is a certainty,
since, as we saw in chapter
I. irrevisability
is necessary’and
sufficient for certainty, but
unmistakability is neither necessary nor sufficient for
irrevisability.
yet transcendental
conclusions are irrevisable, they
could not be revised so as
to be unwarranted in the
light of subsequent reasons,
since
to adduce further considerations
requires judgment, and judgment entails them.
In fact, transcendental
conclusions are
maximally warranted, so long as their
proofs are fully grasped,
since no state of affairs which we
could describe would render
any other proposition more warranted
than them, since whichever
state of affairs we would describe,
we would be judging, and
judging, the occurrence of which we
know with certainty, entails them.
Therefore, valid transcendental arguments
issue in
s

philosophical certainties.
Notice that no vorif icationist principle
is used in any
of this.

Therefore, the view that any transcendental argument

.

.
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requires supplementation
by a verif ioationi -t
premise in order
to succeed is fal^P
false.
And notice that the
skeptic cannot escape hy saddling himself
with the in any case
uncciontahle
e i=f that
Objective judgments are
meaningless, since all
luagments. and not jnst
some proper subset
of judgments,
entail the anti-skeptical
conclusion.
How could we show that
the fact that
judgment occurs
implies that objective
particulars exist?
chapter I section III. I ,et forth
three individually
necessary and jointly
sufficient conditions for
objective particularity
reidentif lability, existential
independence, and attributive
independence
leaving it an open question
whether reidentifiability implies the other
two.
Now it is natural to
distinguish
the temporal dimension
of objective particulars,
that persistence
and continuity embodied
in the notion of reidentif
lability
from the non-temporal
features of existential and
attributive
independence.
This distinction elicits two
overall proofstrategies.
We either establish the
necessity of there being
some kind of reidentif iable
entity for judgment to

m

-

—

occur, and

then argue that only something
which is neither a self nor a
state of a self could be
reidentif iable or we show that
judgment requires the existence of
something external to our minds,
,

something identifiable and independent,
and then go on to argue
that such a thing must be reidentif
iable

This dissertation has provided ample
evidence that other

methods -- methods which begin from the content of judgment

—
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Which try to give a
Cartesian answer XO
to a Carte
Cartesian question,
cannot succeed.
One cannot get from
inner content to outer
content, from conceptual
content to what must
exist.
Ontological arguments for
descriptive expressions
or concepts are
Lpossihle. Having a sense
does not imply Having
a reference;
understanding does not imply
knowledge.

But the existence of one
sort of thing can imply
the existence Of another sort of
thing.
And when the existence
of the
first is a philosophical
certainty, we have an
unanswerable
proof of the existence of
the second.
But this dissertation
has also exposed the
pitfalls of straining to leap
directly
from the existence of
conscious activity to the
existence of
some non-self.'’^
A Kantian transcendental
argument innovatively pursues

the remaining alternative
by showing that judgment,
which is
an act. guarantees the
possibility of our awareness of
something Which can be identified
as the numerically same thing
in different perceptual
situations at different times (some-

thing reidentifiable). which
implies the existence of something reidentifiable. which in
turn implies the existence of

something different from the self
and any of its states, that
IS. something outer.
Consciousness is
intentional, but it is

an intentional act.

By focussing on the activity of judgment

rather than its representative function.
Kantian arguments
offer new promise of showing that any
world in which consciousness is present is a world in which objective
particulars exist.
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Kantian transcendental
arguments offer genuine
promise
Of refuting epistemological
solipsism in that, of all
the
available alternatives, only
they (i) comply „ith
all of the
skeptic's procedural assumptions,
(ii) satisfy all of
the
formal requirements induced
by the nature of the
anti-skeptical
conclusion, (iii) avoid
imposition of any gratuitous
restrictions. (iv) do not overstep
their bounds in purporting
to

decide substantive scientific
questions, (v) foreclose all
avenues of escape, and (vi) do
not include conditions
which
preclude the possibility of
their sound instantiation.
The
difficult question of whether a
sound instance of a transcendental argument can actually be
produced depends for its answer
on the acceptability of its
analytic premises, that
is.

the

alleged analytic requirements
for the occurrence of any judg-’
mental act. But this rests on
the very large question of the
nature of judgment.
It is not my purpose here to
provide a
theory of judgment.
But it remains an entirely open
question
whether a Kantian theory, sufficient
to support the needed
analytic premises, might not after
all be tenable. ^7
To this

extent, Kantian transcendental
arguments are very much viable
candidates for the long sought conclusive
refutation of epistfimological solipsism.
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NOTSS

CHAPTER IV
1.

This so-called principle
of epistemio
+•
has been disputed, but
^®<^^ctive
closure
if the^Vnnwi ^
temic logic behav;s ^he
operator in episLi^e a^tho^ ’^^^ossity
in alethic modal logic
operator
then
its analogue
true, since
(N(p entails a)
In any event, the t?uth
po-iti ve^^i
quired for my criticism* of^this
it onl
exhibit another,
perhaps acceptable inference-form
confused with the
form I am criticizing.
.

—

’

2

.

EEiori synthesis.

~

See AlOl-102. B154 kni
Bl6o!

4.

o“Kanf-s'^?hought'o^'’thC^
we must reject the theory
depicted'

^

analysis,

outside ourraindr-'^bur^ather'^-a® existing independently
sary and universlily t^ur* Lt

54%ri'i3^

i:

Tz^S

fw

T/il

perc'e^rionn

L

K^^t
a -that Which', the object ft

^arffongancorrect.-

fu?

thf^onnepwinn^ninc't

j“<3g^chts.

’

This transcendentil
the conceptual and the real.
At the
verv leL?
IS not a suitable way of ^^luiing
refuting
the
xne
skeptic on his own territory
And there are other problems 'with
the notion of universality.
Does it mean 'universal applicability'?
Then if
objective particulars exist' i^an
objectLe
jSent
and so characterized by universality,
is
an
of question Ly motivate
u^?n
various species of a priori synthetic
truths, as Kant seems to do, as
follows: fi) Taking the
‘categories' seriously, we distingulSh'^'f
metaphysical, categorial principles which
fr*P
everything in the universe, taken distributive
ThP-r^
I
sub-species of categorial principle: (a) Dy- ly.
namical transcendental principles are
synthetic a prio ri'^
propositions which are discursively certain (provable
via
concepts) and conditionally necessary in relation
to empirical thinking; (b) Mathematical transcendental
principles

ideSisn c^flaKn
?

everyS
,

,
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which are intuitively
certaL^?pJovabllTf^ons°?Sot^
ditionally necessary in
unconrelation
(ii) There, are non^atLorS?
experience,
?r.n
conditionally nece;sarr?n"rela?fSr?:;:‘’!’^^-^.P’'°P“'’
it ions
in general but not
thinking
about evern^ne
^ exists.
^
There are geometric and
iii)
synthetic a priori
propositions, for which
account.
There are dynamical but^not
(iv)
a priori truths^liih
®y"thetic
as Newtont=®i
and action-reaction, for
conservation
which princTni
^2^}Pies (la)
And
•

account,
(v) there are sub iecti vpI tr ?
®ftain, synthetic a priori
propositions fsurh no 0 ^ 1 f
are not necessarror un?vf
^

the proposition that

^ay that

tranLendentarbS no? cateaorief^""i!i^y"

cu?^S?r?a:fr??rr?S?rb??

Sirs;

s

^
'

??

»

-s

il;
universal applicability, see w'k
wLsh

™st

li-

have

i

S?j;.sSS!S;
IHrfsLlHrjIrE:^
ourselves
difficilt-^’"'^
be tolerated.’
5

.

in^linguisUras^welf as practicaf^’
that some disorder and cLos can

instantiation of our transcendental conclusion
on
is neither privileged norcertain?’

the other hand,
6
7

.

.

See Danto, Analytical Philosophy
of Knowledge

.
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p.

Lewis White Beck, ’Once More Unto the
-Answer to Hume, Again,' Ratio (June, Breach - Kant's
196?
The
33 37
premise Beck uses is a proposition about
how constant
conjunction of empirical events leads us to
judge
a causai
^
causal
J
connection between them.
)

8

,

j

.

To be careful, we may say that the truth
of necessary
propositions cannot be ascertained by recourse to
firsthand observation, since it might be argued
that we can
learn necessities by the testimony of
authorities.
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9

.

Kripke argues that there
are know^hio necessities
are not knowable a
which
priori
ments containing onlTl^pe rename
stateIf true, but some such
identities\rr-"''’’'?®^''“^
only knowable a
SSster^ The following
il l correct proof
in modal logics

thrvarfables,''wrcL"serhoridenUUe^

tK

trutrormL^STOh^idcnUtierw''”''®^^’ '^'iP^®"argues,

pirical discovery (and hr^^.t^v,
cm’».v
have been establLheS
"ot
otherwise)
cation from knowable necessitv to qo ?he Kantian impliknowable is faulty,
Kripke's argument rests on
his view
Pi'ePer names.
holds that proper names do no?
He
lit
like definite descriptionr
de dicto amMSi?rin mSdal
re’^i'^,'3®acriptions
obvrSTfily canf This leads^h?m
PPege-R«ssell
disguised description the?r? of
View that
namefa^^O^^l^^^r-^i^LTOOPnaTorr
designators which denote th- same thin^
^
f’
world in which they denote
anythinr^? all
^
is argument
IS that names are always
rigid desisnator
generally are not rigid desfvnatOOO ?
for example, 'the prime number
between 3 and 7?
!

^?

actuals.
For example, if names are not rigid
designators
then you cannot say truly that the
teacher of Alexander
might not have been a teacher
you cannot Lvtha?
Aristotle might not have been a teacher.
For
necessary that the teacher of Alexander LnsiLr
is a
On Its
dicto reading, it is true, but on its de teacher
rr
the modal operator is within the
scope
of
thP^dpfAr^T^+^^
the description, it is false.
Now replace 'the teacher' of
Alexander' with 'Aristotle.' According ?o
Kripke. on
the Frege-Rupell view, the resulting
sentence expresses
a necessary truth.
But the proposition expressed is not
necessarily true.
Therefore, we must reject the description theory and hold that names are rigid
designators.
Vanderbilt University, Leonard Linsky noted
?
Zu
that there is^for Kripke an unjustified
connection between
meaning" theories and
dicto readings such that
the descriptions which do the fixing of meaning
force the

-

^

^

’

26o

them.
But Kripke always
containing
containing names de re^-- int-rpr^t modal propositions
again, names cannot
induce the de re-3de“dioto
these interpretations by
argued,
allow modal propositions Kripk«^ar<='^rratl^^t
If
we
hav?np- descriptions

re interpretation^
to have de
them (as well as names
)"todescrihP^^’
counterf actual situations.
In particular
+ho +vi
designators is logically
namss cannot induce the equivalent^to*th»"'?h
d--V--drd ^+„^*^ambiguity in
modal contexts, given KrT^k^o
modal logic, so that the lattor»
quantified
consideration is not an
argument fo;*
forme!?!
Linsky asks us to consider*
('a)^qanta^p?
Claus
does
not live at the North Pole
?
(hi It
T? IS
role.
(d)
not the case that
m
Now ordinarily, there are no
North Pole.
of negation with simple
about individuals.
But this is due to tha predicatLns™ah^^+^^®a
logic
constLt:
semantics.
with vacuous names such as •qanl»®rir
But
operators
are functional.
Witness
tion obtains with respect'to
moLl Ligui?i!^°®°Por"'^“^’
•

^

5

.

•

-

The^^?Uad or

F^i

^o::r"e°xisttdf -rtr^
could not have but beeA an autLj
So'Lmef caHaducr'’^"
scope ambiguities in modal
contexts.
The crux of the issue is whether
we give the desienator
interpretation as in a lorfaf system,
in SripkrseLn??cf
assign an extension to each predicate.^ and t h^n
i
+
well-formed formula at each
posSbie world.
PoSiDie
world
De die to necessity claims reauire
evalnaion of descriptions at each
possible world (since the same
individuals in%l??erert
worias;.
woridsf^uno^Se
But for
claims, we keep the value of the
description fixed and see if it falls Snder
the extLsiL
of the predicate in all the other
worlds.
There is n^
reevaluation of the description. With rigid
designators
procedures will always give thf^same
^e^int° -- the ambiguity collapses.
result
So modal propositions with constants
get the same value
de dj^jU or
re.
The relevant question is whether
ordinary proper names should function as
constants in
the formal system.
To assume so is merely to assume
the non-descriptive rigidity of names.
If you know that
a name should be so treated, then not only
are identities
'

^^ f
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containing the name necessarilv
knowable a priori as well'
true, they are
And
be this: Nal^s have
Position
should
senses
tions of names as constant' +11 f
the sense funcidentities containing
them are necessarily
true if
If we do not treat
knowable a prifri
they can pick out LrsLsI
constant, if
different indi?Hrt^'^n
worlds, then identitiercS^ta?ntni
different
^
be knowable a posteriori
will only
y.l+
Therefore, KanVi^fK^’
necessary,
^^^sis, as
a^Knnt^
Kant understood it,
unscathed.
*

4^

^

.

remains

10.

This account of containment
applies
>
PPH^s tn
to non-subjectpredicate judgments too.
•

11

.

analytic/ 5e ^eefnol
IS uncontroveraially both
contingcnt'^anJ
12
13

.

See,

for example. Critique of Pure
Reason

aSt"
.

B764.

.

trace Kanfs journey to the
Of -experience interpretation ne/h^'LS/^ir-^^^orsiMUt^
of aprioritv
t +
'

negative and two positive^criterIa~ fo?^a priori judgments;
independence from
universality and necessity.
If expSriencr
can never give necessity and
universality, the negative
„
/
experience,
.

verse?/"

^he positive/

equivalent, reflecting Kanfs belief
that everv a nri ori
judgment takes the form of a universallv
auantifTAd*~
propositional function that can//be
fLImed
But
this view IS no good for Kant.
That space is iAfinite
hence not universal, thlt/ome
/t!rif/Sb/^
^ut particular, hence
®
not universal.
?niv?r/n
a?? the genuine
All
principles of the Analvtic
however are universal in form. But
sLce necessitrcan
judgment regardless of its form,
it IS the^test that survives.
If necessity is taken as the sole
defining property of
EEi2Ei. he comes a purely logical notion.
Kant“af?/?^f’+
Kant
also suggests a genetic account: ’a prio ri
iudgment'
means '.ludgment which has arisen completelFlI^ri/i?'
that is, all the constituents of the
judgment^hon-empirical
or pure.
The constituents are pure intuitions and pure
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pure intuitions, as badly
we should junk it.
And in the
adinissioni of pure and
iirmurp n
lead to the atendonment
of
suggests that a judgme^tls thTs

onthe existence

^ee

of

Aesthetic,
edition Kant’s
- j“‘^Sments does

^;r^or^ifat"?

the
demonstrating
orrprF^ri'iud^e'nr^'"^
are necessary f or“th?§6^sib?fTtr^^^:>^^ showing that they
experience.
see Chapter I t>f Sw^ng?s
book!'""^
14.

15.

16

Note 3 Of -Refutation
of
see B138. and then B234-235.
where Kant disambiguates
-object..

.

We must reject the view

msifrlfff^AcrKaS^^^

valid consciousness or
judgment’^ma74^^a?i
we might just balk at Kant-s
too
17

°d^‘T

etrLg°usf ^r"rp:kenL

Muck offers a version of speech
act th^oi-v
or,
4
IS unacceptable in that it
assumes that all intentional
rational, thus begging the question
See his
TJie gganscendental Method (New
York: Herder & Herder i oAft
^
Transcendental Method^

.

.

^91^342-38 27^
18.
19.

3

'

John Mahaffy, j^nt

'

s

Critical Philosophy

Meerbote, in

his
SkeSfm"°a''d-^
^^^sertation written
Kant

^

(September.

.

Kant-s Transcendental

at Harvard"
holds that objective validity for humans in 19? 0,
gives
“does
not
entfu
objectfv4'"44?f^?°"
'^hat IS, truth.
I do not see much
tevtiioi
interpretation, but it is interchapter I that maximal warrant
y®
!'“yf -ffy?"
condition
for
certainty.
This leads to
i®’??
Frankfurt's,
on which all that
Ko+i
^
both

Descartes^and Kant were seeking were reliable
foundations for science.
Of course, if this is the correct
interpretation of 'objective validity,' then my
version
arguments all the more easily establishes
objective validity.
20

.

Kemp Smith should have translated iirkenntnis as 'knowledgeclaim,' not 'knowledge.'
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21

.

See B236 also, and B848-8-^Q
expressing his
views on knowledge, belief
’and
Kant says that
inter-sub jectivQ agreement ^
n ^^nseguen^
“
of correspondence with the objeo?!
•

^
c.

22

|^

(New York: The Free Pr^ss,
1959
9 |rf5
The question of whether
facts art^ 1110 + +
species of
judging (as Sellars puts it)
for
difficulties that cannot be
fLpd^in^tMa'^d^
^dis dissertation.
Consider the following- -ornhiom
e
(B19'») that tL veri?yinr?Wrd
?hiS
empirical propositions if TocTss
°[
Ll’l
which is achieved by observftifn to
o'^servation
must differ from
,,
view.
But if observation doef «ffe?
f rfm^fdf
judging,
?nr"Tt
what
becomes of the tenet that
I. observation af fnconffifus
O^df^ental?
ac??''?hir?s
At
the other extreme at^
J claims
that observation
io
that IS,
tha-t
intuition or immediate
individual thing, is a species reor-sentatinn nt
tha? not
would require judgment.
If'^we discover
inconsistencies in a theory, we should
choose the prop oition which makes -the theory more
plausible.
Within
the context of an anti-skeptical
theory, I cnoose
choose
the
interpretation I have offered.

)rf^

23

-

L

iuLw

’

orknoSr L

24.

^ Current Philosoph ical ”Issues
New York University Press I 961

(New York;
1

,

25.

26

.

)

.

otephan Korner, Kart (Baltimore: Penguin
Books, 1955).
Jaakko Hintikka, Transcendental Arguments:
Genuine and
Spurious,' Nous. VI, 3 (September,
1972);
274-281.

27.

William H. Bossart, 'Is Philosophy Transcendental?'
The
Monist 55 2 (April, 1971); 293 - 311
,

,

.

28.

This is one horn of the dilemma Scheffler, in
Science
^P.jcc tivi tv pp. 13“14, dubs the 'paradox of
categorization.' The other horn, that if my categories
ao not determine what I observe, then what
I observe
IS formless, nondescript, or ineffable, raises
other
problems.
.

29

.

Henry E. Allison, 'Kant's Transcendental Humanism,' The
Monist 55; 2 (April, 1971): 182-207.
Martin Kalin, Kant s Theory of Transcendental Propositions
dissertation written at Northwestern University, 1970.
,

'

.
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v LXIV,
26, 196?), 533-557:
.
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.

31

.

,

20 (October

Kant, Prolegomena, paragraphs
20-22 (pp. 47-52).
io The Philosooh'r

ed^^CaTw^^ifl
W^lntriduction; sectio^T(^

S.^Kant!'

bxguity Of 'obaeof makes even
32

Skepticism,'

'

paLag^in JeL?"'

.

Kant's Critique,'

Kant4tid^,^He^^^
33

.

Il>id.

.

p.

196.

3^.

ErameworL

1970)^°anrhf

gophy (October I3, 1966). ^^1-^66

nnSiTSibSi,^^)35

.

—

(

^ordf LacLell!^

at

of science

(New YoTkT

paragraph summarizes the account
of Korner's argument given by
Sva Schaper in 'A?guinr
Transcendentally
Kant-Studien 63 (I972); IOI-II6.
,

’

36

.

Korner

.

view about formal theories is oresented
in Exl'^ 2-178,
as cited in Edward
MacKinnon^"^
Problems in the Philosophy
of
^^?enci - I,
I
ocience
The Review of Metanhvsi
rs
yyiT li
aaii,
L<^P ysics
s

(September,

—

1968)TTl3lT3^

,

,8.

Kekes,

'Skepticism, Rationalism, and Language,’
J^ly* 1971
'Transcendental Arguments
Challenge,' The Philosophical Forum
3^^22-431^^^
'

IV^
38

.

J

.

Crawford gets this right.
Gram, in Kant Ont ology and
Ihe A Priori pp. I8I-I83, gets this wrong.
,

,

•

.
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Swing,
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p.

40.

Rnssell &

Fl*

g^hioa l au arterl^
41.

RusLn!

l962),^pp

20 (July,

.

in The Heritage

^

197ofr200-k2r^

Wilkerson does "try to argue that
thio a>i'iTi+ 4
guish the subjective and the
objeJuve
f^noL
am conscious of a series of
?
representa
nio
n I
time.'
^n
But in chapter II I arguerthat
^ that this
+h?’ entailment
does not hold.'
.

4

42.

Arguments,' Nous. V,
15-26j and 'Must TranscendTTTtai
te Spurious?' Kant-S tudien

1
llFebruarv°’'?
vieoruary, 1971):
9 k>'^’'?t®Sr‘*'^"^^

(1974h
about transcendental arguments
in^his
book ind
'f''^n=’®®ndental Arguments,'
ten an^World
wor^ b,
6
3 (September, 1973 ); 252-269
Rnt
It IS extremely difficult to
sort out the relahonfbe
claims and arguments, and so for
exnositto
xpositional ease I have pursued his
most recent and
systematic account.
This section on Gram benefits
Structure of TranLendental
Arguments
Arguments,
an unpublished paper by Scott Shuger.
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Gram, Nous

44.

I^id.
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Hintikka,

.

46.
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Gram,

22.

23 - 26

pp.

.

p.
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’
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'Transcendental Arguments: Genuine and Spurious.

Kant-Studien

pp.

.

307-308.

Henry Ruf
Transcendental Logic; An Essay on Critical
Metaphysics,’ Man and World (I 969 ); 38-64'.
Robert C. Howell, Transcendental Arguments
dissertation
written at University of Michigan"^^ 1967
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48.

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason

49.

Ibid.

50

.

Howell, pp. 112 - 113
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48.
pp.

40-41

.

.

B817-822.

266

P« ^9
Rsfsrsnof*
F>a«-»4dispense with them in what f
defines statement-axistenorin
*

«

•

I

^^at Raf

statement has a trath value,
5 ^K

Ibid.

.

p.

51.

tmpijiaSofLusT'ulrobvfius''"^
sition that objective
particulars exiR xRRyRheRc!’°'
56.

57

For example, Bennett in Kant's
Analvtie

.

.

tn

?L'Seta?l1:R"R|R%Re" foiR’'-"

extrapolation from
the A-edition Transcendpn+ai n
Deduction' and the 'Refutation of ideSismT
'

(

1)
2)
3)

(

4

(

(

I am judging.
Some act of judging is occurring.
consciousness or

RLRRR

)

(hRe°a llnTenir"^^

awareness are representative

Awareness of the instantaneous is
impossible.
is non-instantaneous.
( 7
AR^non^^nRa^t"*"
content is a successive con*„L
+h=^ ^13 a series of
tent, that
items occurring in an
order, and not all at a single
instant
( 8
awareness is of a succession of items.
Awar^f^r^?^
A
areness of succession implies awareness
( 9
of a
of items as a plurality
awareness
of a diversity or manifold.
(10) Awareness of a plurality of items
as a plurality
requires that the plurality be apprehended
numerically identical collection over the as a'
time
which the awareness is occurring.
This identity of the manifold over time
( 11
requires
that the act of awareness of this identical
maniI old connect up or relate
the various elements
which comprise it, that is, be aware of all the
elements together.
12
Such a connective awareness requires that' earlier
(
items in the series be re-cognized together with
the later items, and that all the items be recognized
as belonging to this unity over time.
(13) Only a persisting, identical subject of awareness
can be connective? a series or collection of diverse
subjects of c onsc iousness is incapable of such
connective activity.
(

5

)

(

6

)

)

,

)
)

—

)

)

26 ?

(
(

14
15 ) An
)

(

16 )

(

17

(

18 )

(

19

)

(

20

)

(

21 )

(

22

)

(

23

)

(

24

(

25

)

idLtioal

0«dger.

^
^
unity of consciousness.
But awareness of an obUr' + ioc,^
itself is
impossible.
i can be
by being aware of the awa^e n?
only
obient
consciousness,
So awareness of a T3PT'c.io+-^ ^
awareness of a per^'istinp-^nS
requires
°°"sciousness.
so awareness of^succesi?™ nf ''•
"
>^®'iui>'es awareness of
something persisting.
cannot be an item in the
series°"'or*^of^th'*’^^^®^^"®
awa

coistUu;:!

something is not part of my
mental Ufl!'"'"®
But^if something is not part of
my mental lifp
It is^ existentially and
attributively independent

tSLli?rand whicTpers?ftf
waica persists,
.

)

-prese;tation)

L^ntll'llfr^^

^

P'^'-'^-P^ually

it is reidenti f abi
i

o

something required for awareness
of succession, which
in turn is reou
„
^ 5 r»d fe^ -l^^ging,
is an objective particular.
So I am aware of an objective
particular.
^

)

activity of judging I deduce that
1 am aware
TaJU
IwL^ora
of a succession.
s
e^
The status of the items in
series (subjective or objective)
is left an onen
question.
Also, what I judge is wholly
irrelevant
So
I need not judge that
I am confronted with a
temporal
sequence in order to generate the
argument.
Eve^if I
judge that certain features are
simultaneously
occurring
the same consequences ensue.
Awareness of suL^ssion is’
shown to require awareness of
something persisting
it

4

h's??ng'h°if
®^^ce such a concept

ofhomettinl'pe”

is a concept, and like all
"the items of the series which

constitute my mental life.
The proof shows that I could
not be aware of any of these items
unless there was
awareness of a persistent, so that the
persistent cannot
be identical with any of those items.
The argument as presented has weaknesses -(7) involves
contraries, not contradictories (although this
is not
the remaining alternative is an uninterrupted, abiding thing, which just brings us
closer to
our conclusion that much faster), and more
seriously,
U) seems to imply that the object of judgment is always
objectual, never propositional.
Whether this is so, if
so, whether it is a difficulty, and if a
difficulty, whethei
It can be remedied, are questions beyond the scope
of the
present inquiry.
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